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Abstract 
This project examines the extent to which the Eurovision Song Contest can effectively 
perpetuate discourses of national identity and belonging for diasporic communities. This is done 
through a detailed performance analysis of former Yugoslav countries’ participations in the 
contest, along with in-depth interviews with diasporic people from the former Yugoslavia in 
Malmö, Sweden. The analysis of national symbolism in the performances shows how national 
representations can be useful for the promotion of the state in a reputational sense, while 
engaging a short-term sense of national pride and nationalism for the audiences. More 
importantly, the interviews with the former Yugoslav diaspora affirm Eurovision’s capacity for 
the long-term promotion of the ‘idea of Europe’ and European diversities as an asset, in spite of 
the history of conflict within the Yugoslav communities. This makes the contest especially 
relevant in a time of rising right-wing ideologies based on nationalism, xenophobia and racism. 
 
Key words: diaspora, former Yugoslavia, Eurovision Song Contest, music, nationalism, Sweden, 
transnationalism 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
Research Rationale and Objectives 
Every year, over 100 million people across Europe watch the biggest non-sporting 
televised event in the world, the Eurovision Song Contest (O’Connor 2007). The contest 
(commonly referred to as Eurovision or the ESC), organised by the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU) since 1956, is often not taken seriously by its impressively large audience due to a 
perceived lack of music quality and over the top visual performances (Baker 2008a). However, 
what it seems to manage rather frequently is stir up national pride across Europe as well as point 
out political, historical and cultural ties (and breaks) within Europe. For example, countries such 
as Azerbaijan and Armenia are notorious for their antagonistic stance towards each other since 
their conflicts in the 1990s, which has extended to their Eurovision participations.
1
 They have 
not exchanged a single point amongst themselves given the way that Eurovision voting is 
arranged. Each country’s juries and audiences vote for their favourite ten songs, and then reward 
them with points (12 points for the best song, 10 for the second best, 8 for third, 7 fourth, down 
to the tenth-best song getting 1 point), making the country whose song gets the most points the 
winner of the contest. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Greece have an near-
impeccable track-record of exchanging the highest ‘12 points’ between the two states due to their 
cultural, historical and political ties.  
                                                 
1
 The Azeri police questioned 43 people in 2009, after they had voted for the Armenian representatives at 
Eurovision. They were accused of being unpatriotic and a potential security threat for the state of Azerbaijan (BBC 
2009). Subsequently, when Azerbaijan hosted the 2012 Contest, Armenia withdrew from the contest due to safety 
concerns for their representatives and their fans (BBC 2012a). 
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However, a curious scenario has recently ensued in the contest: from year to year certain 
countries receive high points from countries they do not share any relevant historical or cultural 
ties with. This is evident especially with Turkey and the countries of the former Yugoslavia 
receiving high points from Scandinavian and German-speaking countries from year to year. 
What is the explanation for these seemingly anomalous occurrences? Do they tell us more about 
nationalism and diasporic transnational connections than one would assume from an event such 
as a song contest? 
Fundamentally, this is a question of the ways in which transnational and national 
identities are performed through the medium of international media events. The Eurovision Song 
Contest, in turn, represents one of the best possible case studies, considering its scope and 
popularity across Europe. The explosion in diasporic and transnational studies in the 1990s has 
produced an impressive amount of academic literature, but much of the work focuses on the 
effects of globalisation on the nation-state, as well as its effects on diasporic communities around 
the world (Young, Zuelow and Sturm 2007). The role of cultural media, and especially 
technology, in transnationalism and diaspora studies has been noted and researched by scholars 
(Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010). However, surprisingly little attention has been given to such a 
large-scale cultural event as Eurovision.  
In geography, there has been no research or publications on the contest despite the 
intrinsically geographical nature of the event. Other competitive international events, such as the 
FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games, have had a much more prominent role in academic 
research. This is potentially due to their global reach and popularity of sports, while the ESC is 
culturally specific to Europe and a non-sporting event. Nonetheless, both Eurovision and other 
international competitive events can be placed in the same larger public arena of nation-based 
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competitive events that, for a time, focus the attention of significant numbers of people. 
Unsurprisingly, the limited research done on Eurovision has focused largely on the nation-states 
themselves, rarely considering the diasporic communities as subjects of study. Research has 
looked at both spectrums of the continuum – from how countries perform their national identity 
via ESC performances (Baker 2008a and 2008b) to the potential of the contest to act as a pan-
European cultural event (Fricker and Gluhovic 2013a). Predominantly, Eurovision research has 
taken the geographies of the nation-state as their frame of reference and has rarely deviated from 
it, in effect excluding diasporic communities from the studies of the contest and larger studies of 
international media events. By looking at the way that diasporas experience, perform, and 
respond to nationalism and national identity depictions via Eurovision, I will help bridge this 
evident gap in scholarship, and bring Eurovision within the scope of cultural and political 
geography for the first time. 
Research Statement and Context 
Through a critical look at the Eurovision Song Contest, this project examines the ways in 
which Eurovision influences diasporic identities through both complicating and simplifying 
conceptualisations of national identity. By using Martin Sökefeld’s approach to diasporic social 
mobilisation, I examine to what extent the contest can effectively perpetuate discourses of 
national identity and belonging for diasporic communities and migrants through its range of 
representational practices. Essentially, Sökefeld (2006) argues that diasporic communities, or put 
simply, ethnic communities of people living away from home, do not exist by proxy but that 
those communities need to be mobilised into existence. Just because there are people from one 
country living abroad does not mean that they automatically constitute a community and have a 
sense of identity related to their displacement from home.  
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In order to study the ways in which the ESC can facilitate a sense of national identity and 
belonging for diasporic communities in lieu of supporting the processes of diasporic social 
mobilisation, I have decided to study one of the largest European diasporic communities. My 
research focus is on the diasporic peoples from the Serbo-Croatian speaking areas of the former 
Yugoslavia: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. It is crucial to 
immediately address the complexity and diversity of this large group of people, especially in 
terms of ethnicity and religion. I have opted to focus on a linguistic-cultural conceptualisation of 
what the communities I work with are. While we have four major ethnic groups: Bosniaks, 
Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs, there are three major religious groups: Muslims (mainly 
Bosniaks), Catholic Christians (mainly Croats) and Orthodox Christians (mainly Serbs and 
Montenegrins). Instead of making these dividing factors of ethnicity and religion my focal points 
in research framing, I have decided to focus on the unifying aspect of a shared linguistic and 
cultural sphere
2
, especially in light of over 70 years of the existence of the former Yugoslavia, 
which brought these peoples together under the same state. In that regard, I refer to them as the 
Serbo-Croatian speakers, or for simplicity’s sake, more often as ‘former Yugoslavs’ or ‘former 
Yugoslav people’.  
                                                 
2
 Arguably, there are differences between the ethnic groups that are evident in the dialectics of language. For 
example, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian are all official languages of their respective countries, not 
Serbo-Croatian. However, Serbo-Croatian was the official name of the language identified during the existence of 
socialist Yugoslavia, and it facilitated the creation and perpetuation of a linguistically-based common culture in the 
former state. The origins of the unified language came from the 1850 Vienna Literary Agreement between Croatian, 
Serbian and Slovene writers trying to create a unified literary language for the south Slavic peoples. The political rift 
in the former Yugoslavia and its successor states has led to the distancing (at least in the academic sense) of the 
languages, whilst the general public often uses the term naš (‘ours’) to describe all four languages, and to emphasise 
the linguistic similarities. This is especially the case in multi-ethnic areas, or in instances of inter-ethnic 
communication. The four languages are almost completely mutually intelligible, creating a unified cultural linguistic 
geography in the former Yugoslavia, encompassing Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. In the 
other two former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia and Slovenia, the populations speak Macedonian and Slovene, 
respectively, which despite being relatively similar to Serbo-Croatian are not as easily understandable and are to a 
large extent outside of the Serbo-Croatian cultural sphere.  
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As the result of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, over a million people 
fled the area and moved as far as Canada and Australia, but also closer to home, to places such as 
Austria and Sweden. I have strategically chosen to study the diasporic communities of former 
Yugoslavs in southern Sweden, specifically in the Malmö metropolitan area. 
The first reason for the choice of the Malmö metropolitan area or MMA (Stor-Malmö, in 
Swedish) was the sizeable presence of former Yugoslav people not only in the area, but also 
Sweden at large. While the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1990s dramatically increased the numbers 
of Yugoslav people in Sweden, the first sizeable communities originated from agreements made 
in the 1970s between Yugoslavia and Sweden on the temporary migration of (un)skilled labour 
from Yugoslavia (Dingu-Kyrklund 2007, 1). By 2013, the MMA had over 140,000 foreign-born 
residents, representing 21.9% of the population, on top of another 100,000 second generation 
people (14.9%) (Statistics Sweden 2014). Malmö itself has over 15,000 residents from the 
former Yugoslavia alone, which is approximately 15% of the foreign-born population in the city 
(Malmö stad 2011).  
The second reason for the choice of the MMA and Sweden is the popularity of 
Eurovision in Sweden and the cultural clout the contest carries. Eurovision is unprecedentedly 
popular in Sweden both as an entertainment and cultural phenomenon, commanding 84% of the 
viewing market in 2012 (ESC Daily 2012). The contest has been hugely popular ever since the 
first Swedish victory in 1974. The winners of the contest, a relatively new band called ABBA, 
were propelled to international stardom and chart dominance thanks to their participation. 
Eurovision songs even make a strong impact on the Swedish iTunes charts, with 22 songs from 
the 2012 contest charting (EuroVisionary 2012). Additionally, because they won the 2012 
contest, Sweden hosted the 2013 edition in Malmö, which provided a perfect context for my 
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research. I assumed that local participation and interest in Eurovision would be heightened, 
furthering my chances of getting informants, as well as having the opportunity of experiencing 
the contest myself and getting a more embodied experience of the contest itself.  
Methodological Framing and Positionality 
I have utilised a number of research methods in order to fulfil my research aims and 
understand the connections between diasporic communities and (trans)national identities via 
cultural events. Aside from the extensive review of literature on diasporic and transnational 
communities, nationalism, and Eurovision, the centrepiece of my research is a series of one-on-
one semi-structured interviews with individuals from the former Yugoslav republics living in the 
MMA. I have conducted twelve interviews with a varied group of people, ranging from people 
living there for less than five years to second generation people who have never lived in the 
former Yugoslav republics themselves. The interviews focused on three large topics, loosely tied 
together in order to allow informants to alter the course of the interview if they wished to. The 
three topics were their migratory experiences and histories, the experiences of being and living 
as part of the diasporic communities, and lastly, their experiences with and opinions of the ESC. 
I have also conducted an interview with the Head of Press of the Montenegrin Eurovision 
delegation at the 2013 contest, Mr. Sabrija Vulić. The thinking behind conducting the interview 
was to see how the national broadcasters organising the contest and preparing their nations' 
performances see their participation: the thinking behind the performances themselves, but also 
the role and impact of the diaspora in the contest. 
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The project also includes an analysis of the performances of select former Yugoslav 
countries since 1989.
3
 The performance analysis was based on analysing not only the discursive 
elements of the performances such as lyrical content, but also compositional/musical content and 
the visual performances themselves. I aimed to highlight national symbolism in the way the 
songs representing those countries sounded and what the performances looked like, and whether 
they perpetuate national belonging and nationalism via their representational powers.   
It is important to discuss my own positionality early on, especially with regard to 
conducting primary qualitative research. The realisation of one’s subjective position in the 
creation of new knowledge is critical for a properly reflexive project, especially one that aims to 
distance itself from empiricist thinking. Through their research methods, analyses and 
interpretations, scholars create and shape the knowledge that we disseminate, and we need to 
recognise that power and influence. In that regard, I need to realise that my own subjectivity can 
be a constraining as well as a beneficial factor for my research.  
As a passionate Eurovision fan of over ten years, I am well acquainted with the contest 
itself, which brings both opportunities and challenges to my project. On the positive side, I am 
well-connected within both the scholarly Eurovision community and the fan community. This 
allows me to sympathise with my informants and understand them a bit better than someone who 
has limited exposure to the ways in which fans experience and feel for the contest. Surely, this 
emotional link is also a limitation of my research where I could end up putting a positive spin on 
things due to my own fandom. This was checked through multiple discussions and editing 
processes in collaboration with my academic supervisor, which enabled me to position 
Eurovision in the right context.  
                                                 
3
 The countries are: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Serbia & Montenegro (2004-5) and the 
former Yugoslavia itself (1989-92). 
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As a member of a global former Yugoslav diaspora, this project enables me to understand 
the daily diasporic and transnational conditions of my informants. My own immersion in the 
diasporic community allows insights a non-diasporic person might not have. Language is also an 
important aspect of the research and my choice of communities to work with. As a native Serbo-
Croatian speaker, I was able to easily communicate with my informants in their native language, 
which facilitated strong and constructive rapport between my informants and myself. 
Interestingly, there were two instances where parts of the interviews were conducted in English 
due to the inability of informants to discuss highly conceptual ideas of identity in Serbo-
Croatian. In both instances, the informants were highly educated within a Swedish educational 
system, but did not possess the necessary vocabulary in Serbo-Croatian for these concepts. 
Facing my positionality in research and writing processes, from initial project conceptualisation 
to final write-up, provides for a more rounded and critical understanding of the diasporic 
condition as it is complicated by the Eurovision Song Contest.  
Relevance of the Project 
This research project illuminates the place of diasporic communities in the strengthening 
or weakening of ethnic nationalisms, as facilitated through a major transnational cultural event. It 
also demonstrates how diasporic communities respond to visual, musical and lyrical portrayals of 
the homeland and whether those portrayals facilitate diasporic engagement and a stronger sense 
of belonging to the diasporic community. These insights are particularly vital in the context of a 
rising tide of nationalism within the European Union. Right-wing politics and policies, 
supplemented by a rhetoric of xenophobia, racism and nationalism, provide the perfect stage for 
inquiries into the ways that ethno-national minorities and migrants react to, contest, or adapt to 
this rhetoric and policies. 
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 In current scholarship, the focus of diasporic studies has largely been on transnational 
connectivities via economic factors, such as remittances, travel, or property ownership. 
Conversely, diasporic communities have been largely marginalised in discussions of national 
identities in relation to their contentious transnational position. My research examines how 
diasporas react to and work with nationalism from the homeland – especially one that has been 
severely affected by the social normalising of nationalism. This research also adds to an ever-
growing literature challenging the view of diasporas as emotionally separate from their host 
states by recognising the transnational aspects of the connections that these people have with 
both their homelands and states of residency. The results of this research contribute not only to 
cultural, political and population geography, but also transnational studies, ethnic studies and 
studies of nationalism in history, geography and sociology.  
Structure of the Paper 
The paper is divided into seven chapters. The present and first chapter has introduced the 
research issues and contextualised both the Eurovision Song Contest and the former Yugoslav 
diasporic communities in the MMA. It has briefly touched upon the methods used for the 
research project, as well as the positionality of the researcher in the larger process of research 
and write-up. It highlighted the relevance of the research in both the larger sphere of academic 
knowledge and the everyday experiences of transnational identities.  
The second chapter provides an overview of the migratory history of former Yugoslavs to 
Sweden, as well as a general overview of the changes in Swedish immigration attitudes and 
policies since the Second World War. It also provides a discussion of the academic literature on 
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diasporic and transnational migrations and identities, and introduces the former Yugoslav 
communities in the Malmö region. 
The third chapter briefly discusses the idea of the nation and the phenomenon of 
nationalism, providing for a theoretical framing for the discussion of music and nationalism. 
This, in turn, introduces the Eurovision Song Contest and offers a detailed review of the 
scholarly literature published on the contest thus far. It concludes with a discussion that brings 
the various theories together, presenting the theoretical framing for the analysis in the following 
chapters. 
The fourth chapter discusses in detail the methods used for the research project. It 
explains the sampling method, introduces the twelve informants, and provides a detailed 
breakdown of the way the performance analysis has been conceptualised and conducted. 
Having elaborated upon the methodological aspects of the project in the previous chapter, 
the fifth chapter is the first analytical chapter. It analyses the space for the mobilisation of the 
former Yugoslav diasporas via external and internal factors. Discursive master frames facilitating 
national diasporic identities are discussed and nationalism in the diasporic communities is 
analysed via the interviews with my informants. 
Linking to the scholarly literature on the contest, the sixth and final chapter begins with 
the analysis of Eurovision performances, providing a context for the following discussion. The 
rest of the chapter focuses on the ways informants understand the ESC not only in terms of its 
successes and failures, but also the ways it influences their identities and the ways it may be a 
relevant or irrelevant cultural event.
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Chapter Two: 
The Theory and Practice of Transnationalism and Diaspora 
1. Sweden – from Multiculturalism to Integration 
All human experiences are set in specific historical moments without which they cannot 
divorce themselves and cannot be properly understood. Geography as a discipline is intimately 
connected with history and the need for historical inquiry to enlighten geographical research has 
long been recognised by geographers. In this chapter I will therefore introduce the history of 
Swedish immigration since World War II and the experiences of the communities that I am 
studying since they started coming to Sweden. I will explore and map the ways in which people 
from the former Yugoslavia developed multiple experiences and communities in southern 
Sweden, in the process creating an ‘anatomy’ of these communities. This will be preceded by a 
discussion of academic debates on the understanding of diasporic and transnational communities, 
and how the former Yugoslav communities in Skåne fit or do not fit these concepts, providing a 
theoretical backbone to my project. 
While some scholars have recognised Western and Northern Europe to have had two 
major migration waves since World War II, they tend to be too broad to be of practical use. The 
first wave identified is the one of labour migrants from 1945 to 1973, and the second is the 
permanent settlement/secondary immigration wave from 1973 onward (Messina 2007). Along 
with the issues with the broadness of categorisation, there is a need to redefine these categories 
specifically for the context of former Yugoslav communities for the purposes of my project. 
Following the differentiations noted by Slavnić (2011) and Povrzanović Frykman (2001a) in 
their studies of Bosnian and Croatian communities in Sweden, slightly different historical 
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categories are more relevant. The collapse of the socialist systems across Eastern Europe in 1989 
and the subsequent opening up of borders represents a completely different stage to the 
migratory processes in Europe in comparison to the Cold War era. On top of that, the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s have also altered the ways we have to approach the resulting 
former Yugoslav immigrant communities across Europe.  
Therefore, I identify three migratory waves of former Yugoslav peoples in Europe: a) 
post-war refugee (World War II) and labour migrations (1945-1973); b) Family reunification and 
permanent settlement (1973-1989); and finally c) refugee migrations and European integration 
(1989-present). This historical framing is relevant not only to former Yugoslav migrants, but can 
also be applied to other immigrant communities coming to Sweden in the 1990s, as will be 
shown below.  
World War II and Labour Migrations 
 Until World War II and its aftermath, Sweden was considered a country of emigration, 
especially in the 19
th
 century. Swedish immigration policies in the early 20
th
 century were rather 
restrictive, and only loosened up in 1941 to admit refugees from occupied Denmark and Norway. 
In only four years, Sweden admitted over 150,000 refugees from its neighbouring states, 
characteristic of the large-scale migratory movements across Europe throughout the war period 
(Borevi 2012, 33). Having remained nominally neutral within the conflict in Europe, the Swedish 
economy remained untouched and was to be mobilised for the reconstruction of the continent 
post-war. The need for Swedish products across Europe also meant a need for an increase in 
labour to fuel Swedish economic growth and production. Since many of the vital jobs to these 
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efforts were undesirable to Swedes, migrant workers were seen as a willing and cheap 
alternative.  
Unemployed migrants from southern Europe could escape “structural unemployment or 
underemployment” and at the same time get a “chance to earn a lot in a short period of time, thus 
improving their economic subsistence base at home” (Bade 2003, 228-9). By 1947, the Swedish 
government had signed worker exchange treaties with Austria, Hungary and Italy, and by 1967 
with Yugoslavia (Bade 2003, 228; Goeke 2011, 745). This, however, was not solely a Swedish 
phenomenon. It was especially prevalent in West Germany, Austria and Switzerland (see Table 1 
on page 14), which took in immigrant labour from not only Yugoslavia but also Turkey and 
other southern European countries. It is not surprising, then, that the word for these ‘guest 
migrants’ or ‘guest labourers’ was actually coined in German – Gastarbeiter. 
 As the gastarbeiter numbers increased in Sweden, its Social Democratic government 
sought a way to control the influx. Originally, a work permit would have automatically meant a 
permanent residency permit, and these could be very easily obtained. As a matter of fact, it was 
so easy that throughout the 1950s tourists could get a work permit if they happened to stumble 
across a good employment opportunity while on vacation in Sweden (Borevi 2012, 35-6). With 
an increase in permanent residents, however, not all of them had achieved the necessary standard 
of living that the average Swede was seen as entitled to in those prosperous times
4
. In order to 
equalise the standard of living, the government passed an Immigration Bill in 1968 which 
afforded equal rights and welfare for both immigrants and native Swedes. From regulating only 
                                                 
4
 According to Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics Sweden, the unemployment rate in Sweden has 
been consistently under 5% until 1992.  In 1992, it reached 5.2%.  In 1993, however,  the methodology of the 
Survey was changed, and the unemployment rate has been in the range of 4 to 8% in the period 1993-2008. (Data 
found in Table 3A: Unemployment, general level, of the International Labour Organisation’s LABORSTA database 
for Sweden (International Labour Organisation 2014)).  
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work-related aspects of immigrants’ lives, the state realised the need to also assist the 
gastarbeiter in lieu of housing, education and social care provisions (Borevi 2012, 38). It is no 
surprise then that by 1973 there were just over 40,000 Yugoslav citizens residing in Sweden, 
according to the Swedish census (Statistics Sweden 2014; Sundhaussen 2011, 174. See Table 1). 
Table 1: Yugoslav labour migrants in major European destination countries circa 1971-73
5
.  
Destination 
Country 
Yugoslav Census 
1971 
Estimate A)  
1973 
Estimate B)  
1973 
West Germany 411,503 68.9% 700,000 65.1% 469,000 58.4% 
Austria 82,957 13.9% 197,000 18.3% 197,000 24.5% 
France 36,982 6.2% 75,000 7.0% 54,000 6.7% 
Switzerland 21,201 3.6% 28,000 2.6% 28,000 3.5% 
Sweden  16,359 2.7% 40,000 3.7% 25,000 3.1% 
Other European 
countries  
27,867 4.7% 35,000 3.3% 30,000 3.8% 
Total in Europe 596,869 100% 1,075,000 100% 803,000 100% 
Sources: Goeke 2011; Statistics Sweden 2014; Sundhaussen 2011. 
Transitioning Towards Family Reunification 
Throughout this period, the vast majority of immigrants to Sweden were labourers, 
mainly channelled to Sweden thanks to labour exchange treaties with south European countries. 
However, with the 1973 Oil Price Shock shaking up West European economies, the generous 
arrangements between industrialised and industrialising European states ended quite abruptly 
(Bade 2003, 228). Even before the Oil Price Shock, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and 
the National Labour Market Board were becoming increasingly conservative throughout the late 
1960s and early 1970s, which helped further the anti-labour immigration stance. In 1972, the two 
                                                 
5
 Estimates for 1973 were both by Yugoslav scholar Ivo Baučić, but were a compliation of different Yugoslav and 
foreign sources. They show the extreme differences  in data that was available in the 1970s, and the wide gap 
between the official Yugoslav numbers and the actual (estimated) numbers of people abroad. The numbers for 
Sweden in Estimate A are actually from the Swedish census, available from Statistics Sweden (2014) and 
correspond to Yugoslav citizens within Sweden. The number kept steady until 1979 when it dropped to just under 
40,000, and stayed the same until the outbreak of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
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bodies successfully lobbied the Swedish government to re-focus its interest on economically 
underused segments of the Swedish ethnic population, instead of just taking in more 
gastarbeiter. Those were the youth, women and disabled people, who were still not fully 
integrated into the Swedish economy but now got preferential treatment over labour migrants 
(Borevi 2012, 38-9). 
With the abrupt end of intensive labour immigration the Swedish government recognised 
that large numbers of gastarbeiter would remain in Sweden, due to the immediate acquisition of 
permanent residency via work permits. In 1975 a new law was passed, with its main premise 
being a multicultural Sweden. The law featured the idea of a partnership between immigrants 
and minority groups, and the majority host population (Borevi 2012, 41). Not only were the 
immigrants entitled to equal treatment in every aspect of life through the state’s provision of 
equal access to Swedish culture and services, but they were also encouraged to maintain ties to 
their homeland and develop their own cultural activities within Sweden (Borevi 2012, 40-1). 
Scholars have noted that despite this positive attitude toward immigrants in Sweden, the 
government did not foresee the continued growth of immigrant communities in Sweden much 
beyond existing guest workers. However, as a signatory of the European Social Charter Sweden 
obligated itself (by Article 19, Section 6)
6
 to “facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the 
family of a foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the territory” (Council of Europe 
2013). What this meant was that the families of all the gastarbeiter who came to Sweden were 
now entitled to resettle in Sweden as well. In that regard, there was a clear shift from labour 
immigration to permanent settlement immigration via family reunification, which represented the 
                                                 
6
 All 47 Member States of the Council of Europe have, at one point or another, become signatories of the European 
Social Charter. The majority have adopted the updated 1996 version of the Charter, while Switzerland and 
Lichtenstein have refused to do so, keeping the 1961 original. Sweden was one of the original signatories in 1961, 
and has signed the revised Charter in 1996, which was ratified by the government in 1998. (Council of Europe 2013) 
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majority of immigration throughout Europe even after the accession of the new EU members 
from Eastern Europe
7
 (Bade 2003, 231-2; Pascouau 2013, 11). 
Post-1989 Migrations and Hardened Attitudes 
 The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of socialist authoritarian 
regimes across Eastern Europe not only affected politics but also population movement across 
the continent. The idea of a borderless Europe, especially during the period building up to the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992
8
, was quickly replaced with a reinforced need to better monitor and 
restrict borders. This was especially the case in Sweden, which suddenly had a surge of refugees 
seeking asylum, mainly due to the country’s exceptional international reputation on refugee 
acceptance and humanitarian foreign policy. As a result of its reputation, by the fall of 1989, as 
many as 6,000 asylum seekers entered Sweden each month – the annual quota for its neighbours 
Norway and Denmark (Nordin 2005, 43).  
Sweden’s liberal reputation was first established at the end of World War II, when it 
granted residency to all death camp survivors across Europe (Nordin 2005, 23). The reputation 
was further advanced in 1956 with the acceptance of over 15,000 Hungarian asylum seekers after 
the uprising against the Soviet Union. Sweden continued to accept tens of thousands of asylum 
seekers over the decades – 25,000 Chileans, 11,000 Eritreans, 30,000 Kurds and Assyrians, 
35,000 Persians, 12,000 Poles, amongst others (Nordin 2005, 26). It is no surprise, then, that 
                                                 
7
 According to the European Policy Centre’s paper on Intra-EU mobility (Pascouau 2013), the exercise of the 
freedom of movement within the EU has not been fully utilised by nationals from member states within the EU. As 
Pascouau notes (ibid., 11), “it has been described as a “weak” phenomenon. According to the European 
Commission, ‘around 3.4% of EU-born workers work in a member state other than that of their birth. In comparison, 
the proportion of non-EU workers in the EU-27 workforce in 2008 was twice as high (over 6.6%) as that of foreign 
EU nationals’.”  
 
8
 Signed in 1992, but entered into force in 1993. 
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Sweden became a major destination for Eastern European asylum seekers after the opening up of 
European borders. 
 The Swedish government did toughen up its generous refugee policy for a brief two years 
(1989-91) to curb the large amounts of refugees entering the country, but with the lack of 
international attention to Swedish internal issues, this went largely unnoticed by both 
international media and potential asylum seekers/refugees (Nordin 2005, 43, 58). Large numbers 
of refugees kept on coming to Sweden, peaking in 1992-93 as the war continued to rage in the 
former Yugoslavia. By June 1992, as many as 2,500 people from the former Yugoslavia arrived 
to Sweden weekly (Nordin 2005, 58). The government curbed this in 1993 by installing 
obligatory visa acquisition for refugees while they were still abroad (instead of allowing them to 
come to Sweden without pre-approval and apply for asylum and refugee status, as was the case 
up until then with citizens of Yugoslavia). At the same time as they imposed restrictions, in a 
sweeping move in June 1993, the government granted permanent residency to around 42,000 
Bosnian refugees who had already found refuge in Sweden (Povrzanović Frykman 2012, 54-5). 
By the end of the conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina in late 1995, there were some 58,700 
Bosnian citizens who were granted residency in Sweden, 95% of which remained in Sweden 
(Valenta and Ramet 2011, 4). 
 At the same time as the influx of tens of thousands of refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia and other crises epicentres, such as Iran and Iraq, the newly created European Union 
was courting Sweden and its population to join the political union through the heavy promotion 
of a sense of European identity and a shared history and culture among all European peoples 
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(“sharing from ‘Plato to NATO’” was a common tagline9) (Pred 2000, 39). It was an identity 
struggle for many Swedes – how to reconcile a sense of Swedishness with a sense of 
Europeanness, while accepting tens of thousands of foreigners from all over the world into their 
country. On top of that, this coincided with the first severe economic crisis in Sweden in twenty 
years as it restructured from an industrial to a post-industrial society. 
All these events contributed to the sudden rise in xenophobia and racism across Sweden, 
leading two-thirds of Swedes to believe that the number of accepted refugees should be limited 
(Eastmond 2011, 278). These changes were especially exacerbated in Malmö, since the city 
received one of the heaviest inflows of migrants as well as being severely hit by economic 
restructuring. Where Malmö was a large industrial port centre up until the 1980s, the city lost its 
strong economic footing in Sweden due to the restructuring to a service-based industry, and 
experienced socio-economic difficulties and ethnic tensions for the first time in a long period 
(Slavnić 2011, 265-6). Similar processes across the country led to a shift from the usual left-wing 
liberal political climate to a more right-wing conservative one, within a few years.  
The Political Shift to the Right  
  As Swedish scholar Mette Andersson (2010, 4) has noted, the study of racism as a topic 
for research and political debate in has been rather marginal in Europe, with a few exceptions. 
One of those notable exceptions is geographer Allan Pred’s work Even in Sweden: Racisms, 
Racialized Spaces, and the Popular Geographical Imagination (2000). The fascinating (and 
fascinatingly poetically written) book works on debunking the disconnect between the realities of 
                                                 
9
 The Government stated its aim to join the European Community (as it was being formed into the European Union) 
in 1990, and the official negotiations started in 1993. A referendum to join the Union was held in November 1994, 
and with the support of 52.3% of the electorate, Sweden was to join the Union. The Swedish Parliament, the 
Riksdag, ratified the decision in December, and on January 1, 1995 Sweden joined the European Union 
(Government Offices of Sweden 2014).  
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Swedish immigrants’ experiences and what the world perceives Sweden to be like – an 
immigrant utopia of sorts. Others have done work on studies of these disconnects in other places, 
with a special focus on the rise of xenophobia and racisms across Western Europe. Nordin 
(2005) and Pred (2000) both remind us that these events are not Sweden-specific, with Pred 
providing a set of examples for his claims: French immigrants facing political and everyday 
resistance against their opposition to become more Francophone; police racism failing to provide 
safety for people of colour in the UK; the rise of neo-Nazism in Germany since reunification; 
and the experiences of the Roma across Europe (Pred 2000, 5-8). And while Swedish racism has 
longer roots than most (even Swedes) know about
10
, Sweden has been touted as the hotbed of 
multiculturalism, as was engrained in the 1975 Immigration Law. Along with Canada and the 
Netherlands, Sweden represented a multicultural triad (if not its apex), where anyone and 
everyone could find a home and a good life, based on a generous welfare state.  
 The 1990s turned out to dispel this refugee-accepting welfare-utopia image of Sweden, at 
least when it came to how the government dealt with the issues of immigration. The rise of right-
wing political parties to prominence in Sweden, such as Ny Demokrati (New Democracy), 
indicated an increasing conservativism within the Swedish population. Precisely because of the 
shifting political mood, the elected Social Democratic government unsurprisingly took a more 
conservative approach than they had in the 1970s when they initiated the multiculturalism policy. 
In 1996, a new policy on immigration was installed, which focused on refugee repatriation and 
assistance to immigrants who wanted to return to their countries of origin, as soon as it was safe 
for them to go back. Family reunification rights were also re-defined as being solely amongst the 
nuclear family, curbing large-family movements to Sweden (Borevi 2012, 63). In cooperation 
                                                 
10
 In 1931, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) passed a ban on people of colour visiting and settling in Sweden 
(Nordin 2005, 17). Anti-Semitism was also prevalent, as demonstrated by the rejection of the vast majority of 
Jewish asylum applicants from Germany in November 1938, after the Kristallnacht events in Munich (ibid., 17). 
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with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA, formed in 1995), 
refugees would get funding assistance to rebuild their homes or start businesses in their countries 
of origin. However, this was not quite as successful, at least with the Bosnians: around 95% 
decided to stay in Sweden (Valenta and Ramet 2011, 4) with over 85% naturalising and 
becoming Swedish citizens (Bevelander and Pendakur 2009, 13). SIDA’s focus and the majority 
of funding shifted to reducing poverty across the globe instead of assisting the government in its 
policy (SIDA 2013). 
 A clear official shift from a multiculturalist to an integrationist approach happened in 
1997, with the new Integration Policy of the Swedish government. A discursive shift from 
immigrant rights to immigrant obligations was enshrined in this new policy, where more 
responsibility was put on the individual immigrant instead of a perceived immigrant community. 
The new policy was cloaked under the guise of trying not to create all immigrants as a special 
interest group, since they had a large variety of experiences and backgrounds. In a way, it was 
seen as ending the essentialising of refugees, asylum seekers, economic immigrants, and other 
kinds of immigrants within a singular grouping by focusing on the individual immigrant instead 
(Likić-Brborić and Bennich-Björkman 2013, 47). However, practically it was an integrationist 
approach trying to make immigrants conform to Swedish cultural norms, in stark contrast to the 
1975 Immigration Policy.  
The multicultural Sweden of the 1975 Social Democrats was deemed passé, and cultural 
integration was the word of the day. In the decade following the policy, it has been strengthened 
by the 2010 Introduction Policy, which provided for introductory programmes of immigrants and 
refugees (Borevi 2012, 85). Individuals were made personally responsible for participating in the 
programme’s activities, such as language courses and employment training, and the ones that did 
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not participate were deemed ineligible for various benefits that came with participation. This 
way, the government directly dictated the level of involvement of new migrants with Swedish 
cultural norms and the state itself, unlike before, where immigrants had the freedom to choose 
their own pace at which they would interact and integrate, if at all. 
Disconnects of Swedish Reputation and Realities 
 The international reputation of Sweden as an immigrant haven has been maintained quite 
successfully, despite the developments in the last two decades. However, academics have started 
debunking the ‘Swedish myth of exceptionalism,’ noting Swedish inconsistencies when it comes 
to “what Sweden was projecting about herself to the world and what the nation was practicing at 
home” (Nordin 2005, x). These inconsistencies are glaringly varied both geographically and 
racially, and were furthered by larger “neoliberal disciplinary strategies, neoconservative moral 
reaffirmation and the erosion of a comprehensive citizenship pact” between Swedes and 
immigrants (Schierup and Ålund 2011, 56). Allan Pred (2000, 186-223) ingeniously shows the 
way that Swedes have embraced this exceptionalism myth themselves and have selectively 
chosen what to remember and what to forget, in process creating popular geographical 
imaginations within Sweden. In other words, Swedes have internalised their liberal humanitarian 
reputation to such an extent that when faced with the realities of racism and xenophobia within 
Sweden, they selectively vilify places where racist events take places, labelling those places and 
people as ‘racist’. Ultimately, this creates a scapegoating effect against other places (towns, 
cities, regions) in order to let themselves off the hook “when it came to racism and anti-
immigrant sentiments, and the ‘non-racist’ places they lived in” (Pred 2000, 215). It is in a sense 
an internal othering that provides for other geographies as the problematic ones, but our own 
geographies as humanitarian, refugee-friendly, international, and accepting. 
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The realities, as Pred (2000), Nordin (2005) and Schierup and Ålund (2011) note, are 
inconsistent with Swedish perceptions of themselves and their country. It is not only the 
structural issues such as “the extended processes of urban segregation, social exclusion and 
labour market discrimination” (Schierup and Ålund 2011, 47) that are problematic. In his 
dramatically titled chapter, “Brute Facts: Nightmares in the Banal Daylights of the Everyday,” 
Pred (2000, 224-51) delves into the daily experiences of immigrants of colour presenting a face 
of Sweden that many have never heard of. From strange looks on the all-blonde buses to outright 
racist slurs on the streets and more severe verbal confrontations, the everyday for immigrants 
does not correspond to the mythologised immigrant-friendly Sweden. Certainly, these are 
individual experiences and are not necessarily representative of the overall experiences of 
immigrants, but that does not distract from Pred’s poignant message: the myth of Swedish 
exceptionalism IS a myth.  
Other scholars have noted a cultural hierarchy within Sweden that also dictates the social 
and economic experiences of immigrants. The concept of culture has increasingly become 
elusive in Sweden, since the ethnically Swedish population is seen as normal or normative, and 
as such, their culture is invisible for it is all-encompassing. Borevi (2012, 27) claims that this has 
roots in the 1930s when Swedes had embraced this ‘culturally-liberated’ idea of themselves 
where they prided themselves “not [by] culture but [by] development.” Eastmond (1998, 175) 
furthers this idea by noting how culture is increasingly identified with foreignness and 
immigrants, further normalising Swedishness as the status quo, the normal state of being. Hence, 
cultural hierarchisation is based on geographical and cultural proximity to Swedish popular 
imaginations of themselves – anything remote from Europe is further down the hierarchy. That 
way, Bosnians are hierarchically in a better position than Palestinians, Iranians or Nigerians in 
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Sweden. Culture, in this case, is also racialised – the lighter the skin, the better off you are. 
While Bosnians may be high on the hierarchy, they are still below Finns, Danes and other Nordic 
peoples who are on the top of the cultural hierarchy.  
The process of othering transcends identity issues and social conduct, and affects socio-
economic issues and mobility for migrants as well. In her research of Bosnian Muslim refugees 
in Sweden, Eastmond (1998) notes the difficulties of some of her informants to break into the 
Swedish labour market. She notes that entering the labour market “increasingly depends on being 
Swedish, not only in the cultural but also in the ethnic sense” (ibid., 174). This connects with the 
idea of cultural differentiation between Swedes and non-Swedes, and how cultural 
distinctiveness can be a “disadvantage in an increasingly restrictive host society and [can] feed 
into discourses of difference and discriminatory practices” (ibid.). Even when trying to 
circumvent the difficulties of entering the labour market by creating one’s own business and 
being self-employed, research has found that there is still a large native-to-immigrant income gap 
in Sweden (Andersson Joona 2011, 136), indicating that these problematic structures penetrate 
the everyday lives of immigrants even when they try to circumvent them.  
Housing segregation has also become an issue and has been studied especially in the 
infamous Rinkeby (in Stockholm) and Rosengård (in Malmö) neighbourhoods. Some of my 
informants noted this segregation when discussing Malmö, specifically pointing out Rosengård. 
Therefore, as Pred argues, immigrants’ lives are impacted by everyday structural and individual 
othering and discrimination, both socially and economically. Sweden, after all, is no longer the 
state that promotes a partnership between its ever-growing immigrant population and native 
Swedes, but rather one that tries to conform the immigrants to Swedish cultural norms via 
integration. 
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2. The Anatomy of former Yugoslav Communities in Malmö:  
Transnationalism, Diasporas and the Everyday 
Having discussed the socio-historical context of Sweden, I will now present an ‘anatomy’ 
or a social map of the former Yugoslav communities at my research site. The discussion in this 
part of the chapter is predominantly derived from existing academic literature and some of my 
observations during field work in the Malmö metropolitan area, as well as informed by the 
previously presented socio-historical context within Sweden. However, in order to theoretically 
ground my observations and create a viable direction for my research, I will first present my 
theoretical understandings regarding transnational and diasporic communities, which are directly 
related to the former Yugoslav communities I worked with.  
It is important to do so because transnational and diasporic communities are not the same 
as ‘regular’ communities of people who have been born and lived in the same place forever – as 
rare as these communities may be. As a matter of fact, the very knowledge of the rarity of such 
communities in this day and age is quite telling of the importance of transnationalism and 
diaspora studies. The study of these communities goes to the very core of social and cultural 
geography’s fundamental question – what is society? We cannot maintain the same ideas about 
society when societies may be transnationally conceived and have multiple connections across 
the globe. As Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004, 1003) point out, “the lives of 
increasing numbers of individuals can no longer be understood by looking only at what goes on 
within national boundaries.” They go further in proposing the broadening of the analytical lens 
since “migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields, 
encompassing those who move and those who stay behind” (ibid.).  
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 An extensive body of literature has been dedicated to the conceptual and practical 
differentiation of diasporic and transnational communities, mainly due to many obvious 
similarities between the two. Transnationalism is a relatively new perspective, coming to 
prominence in the early 1990s and gaining much momentum within academia. Unlike the older 
concept of diaspora, which was originally used to denote the ancient Greek and Jewish migrant 
communities, transnationalism created a confusion within both the academic and lay 
understandings of communities that lived far from their original homelands. Arguably, since the 
rise to prominence of transnationalism, there has been an “inflationary use” of the term, in fact 
denoting any and every migrant experience, whether warranted or not (Castles and Miller 2003, 
30). Due to this heightened use of the term, there has been a lot of overlap between the 
understandings of diasporas and transnational migrants/communities, leading to difficulties with 
distinguishing the two concepts in clear terms (Samers 2010, 288). My goal in the following 
sections is to address these debates and present my framework for the understanding of former 
Yugoslavs as both diasporic and transnational communities. 
Transnational Perspectives 
 The newer of the two perspectives on migrant communities warrants close consideration 
first. Exactly because it is the newer one, it has led to reconsiderations of the understanding of 
what diasporas are and whether there truly is a difference between the two conceptualisations 
between diasporas and transnational communities. According to one of the most notable 
figureheads in transnationalism studies, Steven Vertovec (1999), there have been six prominent 
approaches to transnationalism: transnationalism as a social morphology, a type of 
consciousness, a mode of cultural reproduction, an avenue for capital, a site for political 
engagement, and a (re)construction of place or locality. The plethora of varied approaches has 
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not made it easy to come up with a self-sustaining concept, especially in relation to diaspora. 
And even that is a contested view – while some enjoy the flexibilities and varieties of post-
modern theorisations, others call for firmer theoretical categories and limits to the usage of the 
concepts. 
 Many scholars have noted that transnationalism is not a novel phenomenon, but solely a 
novel perspective that scholars have adopted (Portes 2003, 875). Whilst there is more or less 
consensus on that, the issue of the actual extent of transnationalism and membership in 
transnational activities, events, processes and identities, has been a heavily contested field. 
Some, like Portes (2003) and Castles and Miller (2003) argue that not all immigrants are 
automatically transnational. Probably due to their staunch criticism of the inflationary use of 
transnational terminology and perspective toward all migrants, Castles and Miller (2003, 3) 
provide a rather limiting perspective of who can be considered a transnational migrant, or 
transmigrant: 
Temporary labour migrants who sojourn abroad for a few years, 
send back remittances, communicate with their family at home and 
visit them occasionally are not transmigrants. Nor are permanent 
migrants who leave forever, and simply retain loose contact with 
their homeland. The key defining feature is that transnational 
activities are a central part of a person’s life. Where this applies to 
a group of people, one can speak of a transnational community. 
Instead of being inclusionary, their categorisation is exclusion-based. They have taken the two 
most opposite types of migrants and convoluted them into one (outsider) category, without 
providing a credible explanation for doing so. Having transnational activities as a “central part of 
a person’s life” is basically what gastarbaiter are all about. They have intensive ties with their 
homeland via remittances and families living there, but also maintain a strong relationship with 
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their host state through the provision of work and daily engagement with their local 
communities. Permanent migrants can also have the same connections. 
Alejandro Portes (1999), who shares the idea that not all migrants are transnational, 
provides a useful definition of transnational activities. According to him, they are activities “that 
take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant 
commitment of time by participants.” Furthermore, they are not solely limited to economic 
initiatives, “but include political, cultural and religious initiatives as well” (Portes 1999, 464). If 
we look at Castles and Miller’s passage above through Portes’ lens of transnationalism, their 
reasoning suddenly seems unsurprisingly faulty. This comparison allows us to see Castles and 
Miller’s misguided criticism of open-ended conceptualisations of transnationalism, while at the 
same time accepting more limited types without justification, giving rather contradictory 
interpretations as an end-result. 
On the other spectrum are the less bound concepts of transnationalism, such as the 
transnational social fields approach proposed by sociologists Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick 
Schiller (2004). According to them, contemporary reality is interconnected in such complex 
ways that we need to adopt an approach that “distinguishes between the existence of 
transnational social networks and the consciousness of being embedded in them” (ibid., 1006). 
This approach takes into consideration the transnational peoples’ social fields in both host and 
origin countries and differentiates between conscious and unconscious embeddedness in these 
fields. They see social fields as sets of “multiple interlocking networks of social relationships 
through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and 
transformed” (ibid., 1009). Levitt points out in her earlier work (2001, 197) that these networks 
incorporate social and cultural values and expectations, as well as patterns of human interaction 
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that are shaped by these fields. While these social fields can be contiguous with national borders, 
most often they are not. Recognising the transnational nature of these social fields allows us to 
see actors within the fields as themselves transnational, both socially and institutionally via the 
multiplicities of (inter)national laws and institutions they engage with in their everyday lives 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 1010). 
This perspective differentiates between ways of being and ways of belonging within 
social fields. What ways of being refers to are the actual social relations, activities and practices 
in which individuals engage in. However, they are limited to just activities and processes and do 
not reflect onto the identity of people. One can be a part of a social field, embedded in it, but not 
identify with any of the identity politics associated with that social field. For example, one can 
listen to music from the former Yugoslavia or eat ethnic food but reject the identity signifiers 
that come with it. Ways of belonging, on the other hand, have that identity-based component, 
through practices “that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to 
a particular group” (ibid., 1010). Ultimately, ways of belonging “combine action and an 
awareness of identity that action signifies” (ibid., 1010). Pushing their argument further, Levitt 
and Glick Schiller claim that individuals can choose to enter the social field, even if they do not 
have extensive social relations with individuals or groups transnationally. Via “memory, 
nostalgia or imagination,” individuals can effectively self-identify with and assert their 
participation in a transnational way of belonging  within a social field (ibid., 1011). Similarly, 
Maja Povrzanović Frykman (2011, 243) notes that these social fields, or “transnational social 
spaces,” are “established and sustained by sets of practices (i.e. transnationalism) related to 
cultural politics and representation, political attitudes and engagements, economic, social and 
emotional links and exchanges.”  
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The social fields perspective is clearly a less bounded one than the previous theorisations. 
It extends the variety of people who can be understood as experiencing such ways of being and 
belonging within social fields. While we had Castles and Miller (2003) rejecting specific kinds 
of experiences as not transnational, the social fields approach allows us to widen the scope of 
what we can study and embrace a variety of experiences. For example, in her initial writings on 
social fields, Levitt (2001, 198) notes how migration should not even be a prerequisite for 
engagement in transnational activities. In one of her more recent works, she notes that (Levitt 
2009, 1227): 
While the numbers who regularly engage in transnational practices 
may be fairly small, those who engage in occasional informal 
transnational activities – in response to elections, economic 
downturns, life-cycle events, and climatic disasters – are much 
greater. 
By allowing a more fluid and open conceptualisation of transnational identities and membership 
in transnational groups, which recognises and even accepts non-migrants, the social fields 
approach opens up the field to multiple experiences and understandings. Not only does this allow 
us to look at fluctuations in transnational engagement due to elections or cultural events like 
Eurovision, but it also allows for the inclusion of second generation migrants into our 
theorisations and empirical work. Through this perspective, the experiences of second generation 
migrants are included into our fold of understanding of living ‘away from home,’ even though 
those people technically already are ‘at home.’ 
Andersson (2010, 3) has criticised the usual ways in which social science has studied 
second generation migrants because of its heavy reliance on “quantitative studies of integration 
in national labour markets and education systems” and not qualitatively studying their 
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experiences. Precluding Andersson’s criticism, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004, 1017) had 
addressed this when acknowledging the need for rethinking the concept of ‘second generation’: 
Conceptualizing generation as a lineal process, involving clear 
boundaries between one experience and the other, does not 
accurately capture the experience of living in a transnational field 
because it implies a separation in migrants’ and nonmigrants’ 
socialization and social networks that may not exist. 
Clearly, instead of taking an exclusionary approach, these scholars propose a more inclusive and 
experiential approach. An approach that would require taking up a diversity of people and 
experiences that are interconnected, but not the same. The point is not to create a gradation or 
hierarchy of ‘how transnational’ one is, nor clear-cut categorisations and definitions but to study, 
understand and share people’s experiences. 
Another relevant aspect of transnationalism is the individualism connected to it. As per 
Levitt (2001), a person can be a transnational migrant, or a person within a transnational social 
field, without even moving. If one moves alone, for example, one can still experience being in a 
transnational social field – connections back in their homeland, people they interact with daily in 
their host destination, etc. It is clearly an individual experience. A larger “imagined transnational 
community” out there that a person can identify with and feel like a part of (i.e. way of 
belonging) is arguably another thing altogether (Sökefeld 2006, 267). Then, according to some 
scholars, we have a diaspora. 
Diasporic Perspectives 
Similar to transnationalism approaches, diasporas have generally been either understood 
on either bound or unbound terms. Geographer Elizabeth Mavroudi (2007) has written about this 
binarisation of the understanding of diasporas. She discusses the more traditional definitions as 
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depending on “easily classified and defined” criteria, such as the constructions of “place, time, 
identity, community and the nation-state as bounded” (ibid., 470). These bounded approaches 
have been intrinsically tied to a homeland-centred perspective that is heavy on categorisations 
and boundaries/criteria for diasporic memberships (e.g. Cohen 1999; Dwyer 1999). On the 
flipside of bounded perspectives, she notes the unbounded perspectives that are inspired by 
postmodernist thought. They look at how identity “may be a political project that is subversive, 
resistant and elusive” due to the ways boundaries are “disrupted, transgressed, and potentially 
ambivalent” (Mavroudi 2007, 473). They generally revolve around ideas of fluidity and 
nomadism of identities and experiences, and understandings of space as malleable and open-
ended (e.g. Clifford 1997; Gilroy 1993). 
There has been a number of diaspora theorists that have taken up understandings from the 
transnational perspectives and re-evaluated the ways diasporas have been conceptualised. The 
biggest challenge was to think beyond the dichotomies that Mavroudi noted. This is important 
for multiple reasons. In her research on the construction of spatial identity by Turkish minorities 
in Germany, geographer Patricia Ehrkamp (2005) directly addresses this need to go beyond the 
dichotomy. She notes how this binarisation creates “mutually exclusive notions of local and 
translocal ties” and that going beyond it would allow scholars to “recognise immigrants as agents 
who are able to forge their belonging and multiple attachments” on their own (ibid., 348). Levitt 
and Glick Schiller (2004, 1012) also call for the development of “tools to capture migrants’ 
simultaneous engagement in and orientation toward their home and host countries,” giving 
theoretical and methodological footing to Ehrkamp’s stance. 
Whether based on bound or unbound perspectives, studies of diaspora have generally 
taken the fixity and ‘natural’ existence of diasporas for granted. So much so, the whole 
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conceptualisation of identity, community, and the nation-state have become rather “static, 
essentialised and fixed for political, socio-economic and cultural reasons” (Mavroudi 2007, 474). 
Many scholars have criticised this essentialising, and an alternative understanding of diasporas 
has been proposed – diaspora as process, as Mavroudi calls it. Maja Povrzanović Frykman 
(2001b, 20) terms it the diasporic condition, because it “hints at the processes of their 
[migrants’] identity formation and keeps the research interest open towards a wide range of 
experiences of ‘living away from home.’” Rogers Brubaker (2005) emphasises the need to look 
at the existence of diasporas not as natural, but as a process of practice and performance. For 
him, diaspora should be seen “as a category of practice” primarily, and that this practice of one’s 
membership in a diasporic community via identity performance, is what creates and sustains the 
diasporic community itself. 
These process-based understandings of diasporas pit themselves against essentialising 
and recognise diasporas as imagined communities instead of a ‘natural’ result of migration. 
According to German scholar Martin Sökefeld (2006, 280), the “development of diaspora 
identity is not simply a natural and inevitable result of migration but a historical contingency that 
frequently develops out of mobilization in response to specific critical events. Diaspora is thus 
firmly historicized.” In his view, a group of migrants may become a diaspora, only if they 
manage to develop a “new imagination of community” (ibid., 267) – meaning that the existence 
of diasporas is not a given, just as Brubaker argued. In his own research, Sökefeld claims that it 
is the social mobilisation of migrants abroad which creates this newly imagined community, or 
diaspora. He looks at how diasporas are socially mobilised via political opportunities, mobilising 
structures, and practices and framing, using the Alevi diasporic communities in Germany as his 
case study. His conceptualisation aligns nicely with the social fields approach, allowing us to 
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recognise the presence of diasporic transnational social fields that help facilitate these forms of 
social mobilisation, which in turn create a sense of diasporic belonging and identity. Without an 
active, political mobilisation of co-nationals abroad, a diasporic community would not just be. 
There needs to be a reason for their congregation, and such mobilisation provides an opportunity 
for community creation and identity formation. 
Towards A Theoretical Middle-Ground 
Arguably, a theoretical middle-ground can be found in the compilation of a number of 
perspectives. In my understanding of both transnationalism and diasporas, process is a crucial 
concept and a fundamental starting point. As Ehrkamp (2005), Mavroudi (2007), Levitt and 
Glick Schiller (2004), Povrzanović Frykman (2001b), and Sökefeld (2006) have all argued, there 
needs to be an understanding of the development of transnational and diasporic communities, 
and the revisiting, questioning and negotiation of diasporic identities. This is done through 
looking at diasporic and transnational identities as constantly evolving, constantly political and 
constantly spanning multiple complex geographies. Clearly, it represents a shift from a focus on 
definitions and categories, to a more fluid, performance- and process-based understanding of 
diasporic and transnational identities.  
In line with that strand of thinking, I decidedly focus on individuals’ experiences, self-
perceptions and self-identifications, rather than on categorisations. This way, as Levitt and Glick 
Schiller (2004) argue, I can include a variety of experiences, even ones that are not usually 
labelled as ‘migrant’ ones but are transnational in the nature of their experiences. The 
transnational social fields perspective can not only be applied to diasporic and transnational 
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communities and how they are (re)created constantly, but also be used for a re-conceptualisation 
of the Eurovision Song Contest as a transnational social field in itself. 
Through the use of the transnational social fields approach, diasporic communities can be 
understood as constantly renegotiated via sets of social, cultural and economic networks and 
actors, both individual and systematic. Furthermore, diasporic communities are also a discursive 
social field, where hegemonic notions of belonging influence the politics and identities of 
diasporic and transnational peoples. By looking at discourse through a Foucauldian lens, we 
recognise the power that discourse has in shaping identities and larger conceptualisations of the 
world. The very understanding of what constitutes a diasporic community can be seen as a 
product of discourse. As Lees (2004, 102-3) points out, discourses create their own “regimes of 
truth.” Discourse becomes part of the very creation and recreation of identities, and it is 
embedded within identity politics itself, making identities fluid and susceptible to constant 
negotiation. The same can be applied to transnational diasporic communities: whether one is 
simply ‘being’ within the social field, or feels a sense of ‘belonging’ to a diasporic community 
(or communities), the hegemonic power of discourse inevitably pulls them towards one another 
and enforces an overarching, over-simplified concept of diasporic belonging. 
Keeping the hegemonic power of discourse in mind, I tried to be very flexible and 
accepting of different understandings of identity by my informants. Some have thought about 
this discursive power of ‘the diaspora’ and have actively rejected identity-labels connected to 
diasporas. This hegemonic power of diasporas was also noted by Sökefeld (2006, 267-8), when 
he writes that it is the “insistence on imaginations and discourses of shared identity [that] 
distinguishes diaspora communities from other kinds of transnational social formations.” 
However, since my research is not preoccupied by categorisations and differentiations between 
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diasporic and transnational communities, I took a degree of flexibility allowing my research not 
to specifically focus on the questioning of the definitions of diaspora. Instead, I focused on the 
exploration of the experiences associated with the very concepts of transnationalism and 
diaspora.  
For me, what truly matters is the recognition that one can claim membership in the larger 
diasporic community (or transnational social field) if they wanted to. This is facilitated by 
possessing the necessary socio-cultural and historical knowledge just as self-identified members 
of the diaspora do, along with actually ‘being’ in the transnational social field of diaspora(s). 
Sometimes, however, individuals take an issue with the hegemonic framing of identity that the 
diasporic community projects, which has been the case with some of my informants. This can 
lead to their rejection of the identification with the diasporic identity and community at large. 
Such instances facilitate the questioning of our conceptualisations of diasporas and the 
overarching identity politics that such hegemonic identities radiate and perpetuate.  
Addressing the politics of diasporic identity, Sökefeld’s (2006) three-pronged concept of 
social mobilisation via political opportunities, mobilising structures and practices, and framing 
provides numerous insights for diasporic group identity formation. This is especially poignant 
within the context of Sweden, where political opportunities were extremely favourable for the 
creation of diasporic communities thanks to the liberal immigration laws of 1975. These political 
opportunities do not just include institutional/legal/state frameworks and opportunities, but also 
others such as media and means of communication, transportation, and larger issues of 
accessibility for minorities (ibid., 269). The mobilising structures that facilitate the organising of 
diasporic identities (as social movements), are often realised in the form of diasporic 
organisations, which end up being significant actors in these movements/identities. This aspect 
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of social mobilisation, however, does not require ‘official’ organising, and can be as loose as just 
“networks of people that are bound to the same issue” (ibid.). Finally, the framing of the social 
movement is a crucial component for mobilisation, as Sökefeld (ibid., 269-70) argues: 
Frames are specific ideas that fashion a shared understanding for a 
social movement by rendering events and conditions meaningful 
and enable a common framework of interpretation and 
representation. They are ideas that transform certain conditions 
into an issue, that help to define grievances and claims...  
Specifically focusing on the experience of the diasporic condition, he goes further to claim that: 
In the first place, frames include all the ideas from which an 
imagination of community is composed, the ideas that define 
migrants as members of a transnational community or relationships 
as relations of belonging. Thus, by being framed as ‘home’, a 
distant place that a migrant (or his or her parents) has left and 
perhaps visits occasionally, becomes home. (ibid., 270)  
Clearly, framing is a crucial self-identification condition in Sökefeld’s approach, but it does 
require the participatory and contextual aspects of political opportunities and mobilising 
structures/practices to be fully effective in mobilising a sense of diasporic identity. However, we 
have to keep in mind the diversity of experiences, identities and levels of participation in 
diasporic communities. While on paper this may seem a strong basis for the development of a 
community, it will ultimately depend on the individual transnational person’s experience of their 
situation and identity, whether they will ultimately choose to identify with their ‘allotted’ 
diasporic community. 
These political and socio-economic opportunities and circumstances that Sökefeld points 
out have manifested themselves in many migrant communities in Sweden, but have been 
extremely relevant for communities from the former Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav conflicts have 
created a specific context for these communities due to changing political allegiances, identities 
and beliefs. War traumas also provide for a specific context for many of the refugees who have 
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fled or were forcibly expelled from their homes, further complicating the overall situation. Those 
people often need not be reminded of their belonging and ethnic identity via any official or 
unofficial channels, since they live with the oft violent and visceral experiences of expulsion and 
uprooting from their homes. In the final sub-section of this chapter, I look in more detail at the 
conditions that have led to the creation of diasporic identity among former Yugoslav 
communities in Malmö and Sweden at large, and present a brief ‘anatomy’ of these communities. 
Former Yugoslav communities in the Malmö metropolitan area (MMA) 
Map 1: The Malmö Metropolitan Area.   
Municipalities are numbered as follows:   
#1 Malmö, #2 Vellinge, #3 Trelleborg, #4 
Skurup, #5 Svedala, #6 Lund, #7 
Staffanstorp, #8 Burlöv, #9 Lomma, #10 
Kävlinge, #11Eslöv,  #12 Höör.  
(Wikimedia Commons 2014. Metropolitan 
Malmö. Last accessed September 15, 2014. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Me
tropolitan_Malm%C3%B6_ver.1.PNG) 
 
Malmö has had an extensive post-
World War II immigration history, becoming 
one of the three major immigration hubs in 
the country, along with Stockholm and 
Gothenburg. By the mid 1980s, upwards of 80% of all new refugees in Sweden flocked to these 
three urban centres (Andersson and Solid 2003, 73-4). This was in part due to the strong 
industrial basis the city has had because of its strategic importance for Sweden as the country’s 
southernmost large port. Despite the struggle to transform into a service sector-based city in the 
past two decades (Slavnić 2011, 265-6), migration to the city has not slowed. As a matter of fact, 
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the city has increased its proportion of foreign-born population from 24.8% in 2003 to 31.1% in 
2013 (Statistics Sweden 2014). This corresponds to 97,320 people out of a total population of 
just over 312,000. As noted in Chapter One, the MMA itself has around 21.9% of foreign-born 
residents or around 140,000 individuals, which is much lower than the city’s share. 
A significant segment of Malmö’s foreign-born population has come from the former 
Yugoslavia, either during the gastarbeiter period or as refugees during the wars in the 1990s. It 
is estimated that over 15,000 people from the former Yugoslavia live in the city (Malmö stad 
2011), representing over 16% of the total foreign-born population in the city and approximately a 
tenth of all former Yugoslav people in Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2014). Some came as refugees 
during the Bosnian War directly, while a large portion came to the city from other areas of 
Sweden after the Bosnian conflict ended and they could freely move and settle across Sweden. 
The Swedish government had an immigration policy in place from 1985 to 1994, which allocated 
refugees directly to municipalities where they could settle. With the ‘placement policy,’ refugees 
first arrived to refugee camps, and were later placed in one of the 277 participating 
municipalities across the country
11
. During the waiting-for-placement period, refugees had no 
contact with any municipal officials and did not know where they would be sent to live (Edin, 
Frediksson and Ålsun 2004, 136). After a few years, once they had established themselves and 
were not dependent on social welfare, they were able to move wherever in Sweden they wanted, 
and many chose Malmö as their new home. 
The longevity of Yugoslav migrations to Sweden presents yet another difficulty when 
talking about these communities because there is a temporal differentiation in arrival that needs 
to be accounted for. Not only are they ethnically, religiously and geographically heterogeneous, 
                                                 
11
 The number of participating municipalities was 60 at the very beginning in 1985, but quickly went up to 277, out 
of a total of 284 municipalities in Sweden.  
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but they have also come through different immigration waves and represent cultural norms from 
different periods. Both scholars who have studied former Yugoslav communities in Malmö 
(Slavnić 2011 and Frykman Povrzanović 2001a), have acknowledged this internal struggle over 
having such varied groups lumped together on an ethnic basis after the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
However, ethnic as well as state-based associations (i.e. associations with the state of origin) 
have become a dominant (if rare) glue for the diverse communities. What may once have been 
considered a ‘Yugoslav’ diaspora (or at least to a relatively large extent), now represents a 
multiplicity of ethnically-based diasporic communities. Yet, these communities are still 
connected in many ways due to the linguistic, cultural and historical ties between them.  
Aside from their numerical presence, former Yugoslavs have made their presence visible 
physically in Malmö, although not as vocally as some other immigrant groups. Unlike the 
Turkish or many Arabic diasporas for example (Ehrkamp 2005), there are no Yugoslav (or 
ethnically separate Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian) neighbourhoods or communities that 
are physically visible in the landscape anymore. The two Orthodox Christian churches in the city 
(Macedonian and Serbian) are as far as this physical aspect extends. The Bosniak Islamic 
Community Centre in Malmö does not have its own mosque building, and Bosnian Muslims use 
the multi-ethnic Malmö Mosque, uniting Muslims from across the world. An interesting aspect 
that Ehrkamp (2005, 347) noted about the Turkish diaspora in Germany, and which can be seen 
with the former Yugoslav communities in Malmö, is the presence of satellite dishes on buildings 
where immigrants live. Povrzanović Frykman (2011, 252) notes how one of her informants 
“keeps up the habit of living her daily life in the post-Yugoslav media space” by almost 
exclusively watching TV channels from the former Yugoslavia, which she asserts as a common 
occurrence. Appropriately enough, my accommodation during fieldwork in Sweden was with a 
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Bosnian family, which was the only family that had a satellite dish on their balcony in the 
apartment building. They also spent their time exclusively watching programmes from former 
Yugoslav countries, confirming Povrzanović Frykman’s observation about diasporic media 
spaces. 
The recent reconnection and mixing of the media space in the former Yugoslav republics 
has not been limited to television but has actually been much more prominent within the music 
industry (Baker 2006). While the proliferation of cable television in the former republics has 
enabled easier transnational viewing patterns (and for diasporic communities across Europe, in 
lieu of satellite television (Ehrkamp 2005)), the collaboration on the music scene has been 
unprecedented. Famous artists from the former republics, such as Aleksandra Radović (Serbia), 
Hari Mata Hari (Bosnia & Herzegovina), Nina Badrić (Croatia), Sergej Ćetković (Montenegro), 
and Toše Proeski (Macedonia), amongst many others, have signed deals with multiple labels 
from both Croatia and Serbia
12
, opening up those markets for their albums and garnering fans 
across national borders. 
Another important marker of former Yugoslav presence in the everyday landscape of 
Malmö is food. Much more so than the two churches and the diasporic organisations whose 
offices blend in with the rest of the landscape, the inclusion of food from the former Yugoslavia 
has been a marker of visibility and presence of those communities in the city. A traditional 
Balkan dish called ćevapi or ćevapčići is ever-present in many restaurants, fast-food stalls and 
pubs. Places such as ‘Burek House’, ‘Ćevapi No1’ or ‘Bosniska köket’ feature a variety of foods 
from the former Yugoslavia. These places have diversified the geography of foods available not 
                                                 
12
 Some of the biggest record labels, Croatia Records (Croatia), HIT Records (Croatia), and CITY Records (Serbia), 
have deals with numerous artists that are not from their country of origin. For a detailed list of artists, see the links in 
the bibliography: CITY Records (2014), Croatia Records (2014) and HIT Records (2014). 
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only to the diasporas, but also to Swedes. During my fieldwork in Malmö, I often noticed that 
small food stalls (kiosks) featuring Turkish or Arabic kebab or Greek gyro, would almost always 
have ćevapi as well. Large and small ethnically-based grocery stores are present for immigrant 
consumption, but now many Swedish grocery store chains also offer a variety of imported 
products from the former Yugoslav republics, along with other immigrant destinations, for both 
immigrant and ‘domestic’ Swedish consumption. 
Other markers that are not as physically prominent as food can facilitate a strong (if not 
stronger) sense of diasporic mobilising via political opportunities, and mobilising structures and 
frames, as Sökefeld names them. While they are not necessarily physically visible in the 
landscape, they are relevant in a number of ways, primarily when it comes to identity formation 
and the politics of diasporic belonging. As noted at the beginning of the chapters, political 
opportunities for diasporic mobilisation have been plentiful, especially since the liberal laws of 
1975. Even today, there is significant support for diasporic organisations from the Swedish 
government, and political opportunities continue to be relatively favourable (Kostić 2013). 
Despite the deterioration of Sweden’s immigration record in the past two decades, there seems to 
be a well-established tradition of diasporic mobilising structures which maintain a sense of 
diasporic identity in Sweden. 
According to the literature, the major diasporic mobilising structures for former 
Yugoslavs in Malmö, and Sweden at large, have been diasporic organisations and associations. 
As Sökefeld (2006, 269) explains, mobilising structures can be networks of people “bound to the 
same issue” who “establish associations that create and sustain discourses of community.” In that 
regard, diasporic organisations are prime examples of a strong mobilising structure. Looking at 
organisations for former Yugoslavs of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin or Serbian descent in 
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2013, there were 172 registered diasporic organisations in Sweden, out of which 12 are located 
in Malmö – a number surprisingly low considering the number of former Yugoslavs in the city. 
The organisations are part of a larger system of associations, based on ethnic belonging. The 
three associations overseeing the work of the organisations are the Association of Bosnian-
Herzegovinian Organisations in Sweden (Savez bosanskohercegovačkih udruženja u Švedskoj), 
Association of Croatian Organisations in Sweden (Savez hrvatskih društava u Švedskoj), and the 
Association of Serbs in Sweden (Savez Srba u Švedskoj). 
While the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Association is formally open to all citizens of Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, in practice it is almost exclusively frequented by Bosniaks (Eastmond 1998, 
164; Valenta and Ramet 2011, 14). The other two organisations are also strictly frequented by 
Serbs and Croats, respectively, following divisions that were emphasised as a result of the 
Yugoslav conflicts (Kostić 2013, 37). In her research, Povrzanović Frykman (2001a, 181) noted 
the indifference of Croats toward other former Yugoslav diasporic communities in Malmö, 
especially the Serbian communities: “When it comes to Serbian and Croatian diasporas in 
Sweden, a picture could be presented of parallel existence with no formal, and certainly no 
public communication.” This also applied to collaboration with other ethnic diasporic 
organisations, which were categorised as being “out of the question” by Croatian organisations 
(ibid.). It is not surprising then, that the vast majority of diasporic organisations have become 
fiercely mono-ethnic since the early 1990s. 
 Overwhelmingly, the associations’ mission statements revolve around the preservation of 
languages, cultures, traditional values and customs, and the maintenance of a ‘diasporic’ identity 
for new generations. As Kostić (2013, 37) puts it, “the national association has a role of 
preserving homeland identity in a broader Swedish context of a host country.” Together the 
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associations have over 30,000 members across Sweden. However, the level of engagement and 
activity varies greatly, from sporadic to weekly participants. Regardless of the level of 
engagement, the organisations remain an important ‘official’ channel for social mobilisation and 
identification for diaspora members (Kostić 2013, 37; Note 9).  In practical terms, the 
associations have their own newspapers (often political in nature), as well as numerous activities 
for their members: traditional folklore dances and singing, sports gatherings and competitions, 
but also religious events celebrations and language instruction for children. The associations also 
organise cultural awareness weeks, which feature dancing, singing, theatrical performances, but 
also other kinds of promotional events. 
However, these organisations and associations would not be able to function and have the 
impact they have without deep-seeded ‘master frames’. As previously noted, these frames are 
ideas that “fashion a shared understanding for a social movement by rendering events and 
conditions meaningful and enable a common framework of interpretation and representation” 
(Sökefeld 2006, 270). The imagined community that is discursively invoked via these master 
frames is what enables mobilising structures such as diasporic organisations and associations to 
exist in the first place. In order to have a meaningful diasporic organisation, you first have to 
have a formed belief in the existence of the diasporic community. An active imagination of the 
community is necessary. These frames endorse a sense of belonging to a larger diasporic 
community and are the crux of diasporic identity. 
 Master frames for diasporas are created and conditioned by both internal and external 
factors. Internal factors would be a sense of belonging to and identification with this imagined 
community. This is especially prominent with the recent refugee migrants who have fled their 
countries because of the horrors of war, not solely because they were searching for better 
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economic or political conditions. Diasporic organisations emphasise this group identity and 
attempt to create a cohesive sense of what it means to be a member of that diasporic community 
– a practice that also alienates many who see their identities as more fluid and reject the overt 
politicisation of their identity.  
External factors reinforce the internal ones, and are related to both the host country and 
the country of origin. For example, according to Al-Ali’s research (2002), people who have 
stayed in the former Yugoslav countries tend to other their co-nationals living abroad, 
reinforcing a sense of differentiation between the two groups. Othering is also prevalent from the 
Swedish side in a variety of ways, which Pred (2000) has discussed in much detail. One of the 
major ways in which former Yugoslavs have been othered and their sense of differentiation 
strengthened, is through the lack of educational recognition of Yugoslav degrees in Sweden 
(Povrzanović Frykman 2012). Just like with any type of (real or perceived) oppression, people 
group together and help each other, reinforcing a sense of shared experience and, often, identity 
(Povrzanović Frykman 2012; Slavnić 2011). 
We cannot ignore the relevance of the maintenance of a sense of diasporic identity via the 
relationship and orientation toward the perceived homeland. This can be seen as a way of being 
within the social field, as it looks at activities and processes individuals and groups engage in. 
However, they are also a way of belonging, since organisations reproduce a discursively 
hegemonic idea of national and/or diasporic belonging via their goals, foci, and membership. 
More often than not, these organisations are oriented toward the homeland and the maintenance 
of the diaspora-homeland relationship, which is furthered by the othering from the host nation, 
amongst other factors. Aside from diasporic organisations, there are other activities and 
processes that can be seen as ‘diasporic.’  
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The widely researched and analysed remittances are a relevant and interesting indicator 
of homeland orientation also. According to World Bank data (2013), some of the former 
Yugoslav republics tend to have a significant share of remittances represented in their GDP. For 
example, 7.4% of Serbia’s GDP comes from remittances, while 7.9% of Montenegro’s and 
10.8% of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s GDP comes from remittances. The data is partial, since it only 
takes into account ‘official’ transactions in lieu of bank transfers, but it is still indicative of the 
transnational reach and relevance of diasporas both socially and economically. According to 
Kostić’s (2013, 39) quantitative survey-based study of the political, economic, social and cultural 
aspects of Bosnian transnationalism in Sweden, around 78% of respondents sent remittances at 
least once a year. These may not always be financial and can also take the form of gifts during 
visits to the former Yugoslavia (Eastmond 2006, 154). 
A seemingly ‘lighter’ form of diasporic connections with the homeland can also be seen 
through more cultural and social channels such as music, instead of financial ones. Diasporic 
organisations often have folklore dancing and singing troops as their central activities. Aside 
from the organisations, and due to the large numbers of refugees across Europe, music stars from 
the former Yugoslavia have started going on extensive ‘diaspora tours’ across the globe. The 
biggest stars from the region, such as Lepa Brena, Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović, Jelena Karleuša 
and Željko Joksimović, amongst a sea of less famous performers, have visited Malmö in 2012 
and 2013, attracting thousands of fans.  
These cultural aspects of diasporic engagement seem to be largely popular, though some 
scholars have argued that relations with homelands have been deteriorating in spite of them. 
According to survey data from 1985 on Yugoslav migrants in Sweden, around 43% of 
immigrants’ children under 16 years were actually living in Yugoslavia with their relatives, 
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instead of with their parents in Sweden. These ties seem to have been severely cut due to the 
wars, since by 2001 only 3% of the same demographic now lived in the former Yugoslavia
13
 
(Goeke 2011, 746). Also, due to the war and its aftermath, many refugees and gastarbeiter were 
unable to return for an extended period, which would have an impact on younger generations’ 
connections with their homeland and their (un)willingness to go live there. Rebeka Mesarić 
Žabčić (2006) noted this with the Croatian communities in Sweden where younger Croats were 
seen as not active participants in the lives of diasporic communities. 
However, cultural aspects of diasporic engagements such as concerts deserve more 
attention from scholars, since they represent a relevant aspect of people’s everyday experiences. 
Moreover, I believe people may give importance to music from their homeland especially when 
they are not living there, and as banal a thing as music becomes a much more meaningful 
element to one’s life. It transgresses the limitations of ‘just an activity’ (i.e. way of being), and it 
carries a symbolic significance that indicates a sense of belonging within a group of people 
sharing the same musical, and consequently, cultural traditions and identities. In this way, it 
creates a transnational social field where music is one of the cultural identifiers and glues with 
the rest of the community, and a space where music carries more representational clout than 
usual. Keeping that in mind, in the next chapter I introduce the Eurovision Song Contest as a 
prime example of music’s importance to national identities and perceptions across Europe. 
                                                 
13
 However, the levels of Greek and Turkish children of the same demographic have also severely declined in the 
past twenty years, so this may be a larger diasporic trend. The war, however, has certainly contributed to a decline in 
people sending their children to the former Yugoslav republics. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Nation and the Eurovision Song Contest 
1. The Nation and Nationalism in the Everyday 
Before introducing the Eurovision Song Contest as a (pop-)cultural channel for diasporic 
connections and a means of preserving national identities, it is important to address my 
conceptualisation of the nation and nationalism. The field of nationalism studies is a multi-
disciplinary one, with anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and geographers all 
providing diverse ontological and epistemological approaches and interpretations. One of the 
most basic and common ways of understanding and classifying nationalism is through the ‘Kohn 
dichotomy,’ which divides nationalism into two kinds: ethnic or civic (Coakley 2012, 206). 
Ethnic nationalism is connected to allegiances to an ethnic group based on kin, genealogical 
relations and common ancestry, and is perceived as emotional and non-rational. Civic 
nationalism, on the other hand, is connected to allegiances to the state and is seen as rational and 
chosen (Ignatieff 1993). However, this simplistic understanding of nationalism provides limited 
recognition of the diversities of nationalism in the real world. Scholars have criticised this 
dichotomous idea of nationalisms (Coakley 2012; Smith 2010), and have acknowledged the 
range of meanings, understandings and shapes of nationalism. 
Aside the Kohn dichotomy, there are three major paradigms of the nation and 
nationalism: primordialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism. Primordialism is the oldest 
conceptualisation of the nation and it relies on the belief that the nation is something organic, 
innate and ancient. While scholars have distanced themselves from the approach, it is still very 
popular in the public sphere, as Anthony Smith observed while claiming that the majority of 
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people “feel and believe in the primordiality of our ethnies and nations – their naturalness, 
longevity and power” (Smith 2010, 57. Emphasis in original). Modernism came as a response to 
primordialism and represented a fundamental shift in how we understand the nation. Modernism 
sees nationalism as a calculated creation and propagation by ethnic elites, with the aim of 
consolidating power and fulfilling their own goals, which are masked as goals of the nation. It is 
quintessentially a top-down system. The ethno-symbolist approach was created as a middle 
ground between the previous two, taking the strongest aspects of both approaches. 
Fundamentally, while recognising the modern qualities of nationalism and national identity, 
ethno-symbolists also recognise nations’ rootedness in pre-modern times. According to them, 
modern nations did have predecessors in ethnic communities, which form a primordial kind of 
basis for the modern conceptualisation of the nation (Smith 2005). 
Performing the Nation in the Everyday 
While the vast majority of scholarship on nationalism has focused on the collective sense 
of nationhood and belonging, literature on individual-scale everyday nationalisms has gained 
prominence recently. In their insightful theorisations on everyday nationalism, Fox and Miller-
Idriss (2008) look at four major ways in which the nation is produced and reproduced by both 
collective and individual actors, while rejecting modernist top-down approaches. They argue that 
nationhood is reproduced on an individual scale every day through ‘talking the nation’ 
(discourse), ‘choosing the nation’ (national universe as pervasive), ‘consuming the nation’ 
(consumerism), and most importantly, ‘performing the nation’. 
The performative aspect of belonging and representing ones’ participation in a larger 
collectivity has been a prominent aspect of many recent theorisations on nationalism. In the case 
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of Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008, 545), they begin by introducing the performance of ritualised 
“visual and audible realization[s]” of symbols and symbolic attachments, mainly via national 
holiday commemorations. While they are critical of the effects of holidays and national 
commemorations, they acknowledge the places where the true impact often lays – sports events. 
They note the ability of sports manifestations, such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic Games 
and other international competitions, to spark national passions for large swaths of the population 
in many countries. They go as far as claiming that the fans “momentarily become the physical 
embodiment of the nation” (ibid., 547). The simultaneity of the sports-watching, chanting, flag-
waving, and other activities in support of the nation, connects to the drama, suspense and 
unpredictability of the live event. This, they claim, brings fans closer to one another, both 
physically (if they are present at the event) and symbolically through their ritual performance of 
nationhood (ibid., 547-8). 
This basic idea of performativity has been developed and popularised through the work 
of feminist scholar Judith Butler (1999
14
). For Butler, gender is not an essence but it is “a set of 
acts that produce the effect of a coherent substance and conceal gender’s lack of stable 
foundation” (Feldman 2005, 221. Emphasis in original). The ‘set of acts’ is crucial here, since 
she sees gender as representing a “repetition and a ritual which achieves its effect through its 
naturalization in the context of a body” (Butler 1999, xv). Therefore, gender does not possess 
any essence to itself but is ‘created’ through learnt and repeated acts that produce the image of 
something stable, durable, and fundamentally unchanging.
15
  
                                                 
14
 Original published in 1990. The updated and revised 1999 edition was used for this project. 
 
15
 This concept of performativity has been appropriated by geographers from varying foci and for varying aims. In a 
similar vein to Butler, Bell et al. (1994) have used it in geographical studies of sexuality, while Marston (2002) used 
it to study the contestations of diasporic identities through non-normative actors. Some geographers and social 
scientists have applied the theory in investigations of geographical and historical questions beyond gender and 
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If applied to the concept of nation, Butler’s critique of gender goes directly against the 
core of primordialist theorisations, which perceive the nation, just as Butler claims gender is 
perceived, as stable, durable, and unchanging. Butler expands on Robert Stoller’s idea of the 
‘gendered core’, which she claims is (re)produced by constant repetition of the performance of 
gender. Ultimately, this repetition of performance, while effective, only produces a 
“hallucinatory effect of naturalized gestures,” making the existence of a natural, gendered ‘core’ 
seem inevitable (ibid., xv).  
Just as Butler manages to dismantle the idea of the naturalness of gender, we can also 
dismantle the idea of the naturalness of the nation, all while looking at the everydayness of 
nationalism and its performance. The nation is not something intrinsically natural somewhere 
deep inside us, but it is a set of routine, everyday performances of the nation, on both individual 
and larger scales, such as the local/national/global. Michael Billig (1995) questions this taken-
for-grantedness of the nation and the national world order at large and claims that a “whole way 
of thinking about the world is implicated” in nationalism (ibid., 61). Our understanding of the 
world is based on the nation-state system, where our world is ‘naturally’ constituted through a 
collection of separate states. As he notes, it has become a “common sense” of sorts (ibid., 4), 
which is part of the strength of nationalism. It is all around us, and it has successfully managed to 
“make people forget that their world has been historically constructed” (ibid., 34). Practically, 
this fortifies the ‘choosing the nation’ aspect of Fox and Miller-Idriss’ take on the nation.  
Billig (1995, 44) notes another common thread in scholarship, media, and popular 
understandings of nationalism, which portray nationalism as being apparent only in times of 
“social disruption and which are reflected in extreme social movements.” It is also assumed to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
sexuality, such as theorisations on the performativity of space (Gregson and Rose 2000) and questions of state 
sovereignty (Feldman 2005). 
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a ‘foreign’ phenomenon that the developed countries of the West16, with their strong traditions of 
state, do not entertain. ‘Our’ (Western) countries are seen as featuring patriotism, a “healthy 
necessity,” while nationalism, being foreign, is a “dangerous surplus” of emotion and love for 
the nation (ibid., 56). The ordinary life in the normative (again, Western) state is assumed to be 
“unexciting politically and non-nationalist” while nationalism is understood as “extraordinary, 
politically charged and emotionally driven” (ibid., 44). Billig rejects this accepted use of the 
term, and disaggregates nationalism into two major types: hot and banal, allowing for an analysis 
of Western countries’ often disregarded nationalisms. This banal kind of nationalism is reflected 
in daily indications or “flaggings” of the nation in the lives of its citizens. 
The emphasis on routine is in line with performative conceptualisations of the nation, 
which form the basis for my own understanding of nationalism. Just like Billig, I see nationalism 
as permeating all spheres of everyday life in a multiplicity of ways, which is furthered by 
everyday routine performances of the nation. Some choose to call it patriotism, while others call 
it nationalism. Either way, it aligns with Fox and Idriss-Miller’s (2008) four categories of the 
everyday reproduction of the nation – talking, choosing, consuming and performing the nation. 
Before elaborating on the connections between nationalism’s performance and diasporic (and 
transnational) identities, I will briefly discuss the role of music in nationalism and introduce my 
case study: the Eurovision Song Contest. 
2. Geography, Music and the Nation: the Eurovision Song Contest 
The relationship between music and the nation, and by extension music’s relationship 
with nationalism, has been recognised as substantial by many scholars. Scholarship on these 
                                                 
16
 His case studies are the United Kingdom and the United States, and the ‘West’ refers to them, as well as to 
‘western democracies,’ such as the EU, Australia and New Zealand.  
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topics has been extensive, and has been researched through a variety of foci in the past few 
years. Some scholars have focused on nationalism in music, while having different foci and 
research agendas. For example, some have looked at nationalism as exemplified through musical 
education (Herbert and Kertz-Welzel 2012), some have written on specific ‘national(ist)’ 
composers (Curtis 2008), while others have looked at geographically and nationally diverse case 
studies: Russian music (Frolova-Walker 2007), Jewish music across the world (Moricz 2008), 
and Ecuadorian music (Wong 2012), to name just a few.  
Another section of the literature has looked at music and diasporic experiences, with the 
vast majority focusing on the numerous African diasporas across the Caribbean and the 
Americas. Recently, a diversification of the field has happened, with music of the Roma 
(Silverman 2012), Chinese in the U.S. (Zheng 2010) and Irish in North America (Cooper 2009) 
being written about, amongst others. As I have noted in the previous chapter, it seems as if 
national music can play a relevant role in the lives of the diasporic communities – or at least for 
some individuals within those communities. The ability to listen to music from ‘back home’, or 
even see your favourite pop star come to Sweden, normalises the everydayness of the diasporic 
condition. The dislocation becomes less severe. Music, both physically and emotively, allows 
people to transcend geographic boundaries and rekindle connections with different places. 
Therefore, the Eurovision Song Contest as a contest of nations is the perfect stage for 
such emotive and geographical representations and connections to take place. But before 
presenting Eurovision, it is important to address this connection of nationalism and music. The 
work of American ethnomusicologist Philip V. Bohlman (2011) on the development of national 
and nationalist music in Europe provides a good starting point. 
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Choruses, Anthems, and National(ist) Music in Europe  
The development of nationalist music in Europe was at its peak at the same time as the 
rise of nationalist ideologies across the continent in the 19
th
 century. According to Bohlman 
(2011), nationalist music stems from this era but it developed out of ‘national’ music. He 
differentiates between the two kinds, claiming that national music “reflects the image of the 
nation so that those living in the nation recognize themselves in basic but crucial ways” (ibid., 
59; 60-1). National music provides for a collective sense of identity based on a ‘bottom-up’ logic 
– focusing on the people and its land. It is based more on inclusion than exclusion. What 
differentiates nationalist and national music is the very existence of the nation-state world order 
and national competition enshrined in it, which is reflected in nationalist music. 
Nationalist music, by contrast to national music, features a ‘top-down’ approach, centring 
on the (nation-)state as the true epitome of the nation. It enforces cultural boundaries, which have 
political goals and purposes to themselves, usually in the service of the nation-state (ibid., 86-7). 
In the simplest of terms, it is competition that differentiates national and nationalist music. 
National music is self-sustainable without the necessity to compare itself in relation to other 
nations – something that nationalist music features prominently. In his work Bohlman (ibid., 71) 
analyses choral music as a perfect stage for nationalist music, mainly because of its performative 
and staging qualities: 
The chorus connects to the audience, symbolizing for the audience 
its own selfness, as if to put the audience also on the stage. [...] The 
potential to transform the choral performance into a moment of 
high nationalism is very great indeed. It is a moment that 
composers of national opera or the organizers of choral revival 
movements rarely fail to miss.  
Choral music provides an excellent stage for a collective performance of the nation musically. 
The case of the Estonians and their diaspora is interesting to note. They have utilised the ‘mass 
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chorus’ form, which “provided one of the most important symbolic forms of national 
unisonance,” in order to maintain their sense of nationhood throughout most of the 19th and 20th 
century (ibid., 42). Interestingly, this collective musical performance became once again crucial 
in the national independence movements of the three Baltic states in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  
 In the former Yugoslavia, accordingly, different national groups had varied histories and 
expressions of national and nationalist music, but it is late twentieth century music that has 
spurred the most attention in scholarship. This was due to the penetration of nationalism into 
music and the creation of new musical forms, simultaneously with the development of the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. So much so, according to Catherine Baker (2013), that music 
came to be used as a weapon for ethnopolitical conflict and violence. This was achieved in three 
ways: music being an accompaniment to violence in concentration camps or during military 
campaigns; as morale-raising for troops and the wider public; and as a source of conceptual 
(cultural/historical/political/ethnic) separation (ibid., 425). It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
vast majority of scholarship has focused on the studying of the highly popular, newly created 
nationalist musical form in the former Yugoslavia: turbo-folk. 
 Turbo-folk has been defined in a number of ways, none very flattering. Some call it a 
“fusion of western rock, oriental Turkish rhythms and sevdah17, love sickness and yearning, 
unrequited love” (Hudson 2003, 173), while others are less kind to the music form: 
  
                                                 
17
 Sevdah or sevdalinka is a musical form stemming from Bosnia & Herzegovina, which prominently features 
Turkish influences and is in most cases a ballad. It is predominantly associated with Bosnian Muslim music, but is 
widely popular in the Serbo-Croatian speaking countries. 
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This music combined a militaristic Serbian nationalism with a 
kitsch pop aesthetic that is characterized by provocatively dressed 
female performers pumped full of silicon who sing about death, 
love, passion, emotions, blood, and patriotic sacrifice…  
(Volčič and Erjavec 2010, 103) 
The new genre came into being in the 1980s, with the proliferation of the mixing of Western 
electronic pop sounds with Serbian national motives and forms of singing. The ‘vocal ululation’ 
always present in turbo-folk songs comes from Turkish and Middle Eastern traditions, but is 
combined with sounds that are often synthetic or electronic in nature, and reminiscent of Western 
pop music (Baker 2006, 286; Hudson 2003, 166).  
Unlike truly explicit nationalist songs
18
, the association between nationalism and turbo-
folk developed to a large degree due to its performative aspects. Turbo-folk gained notoriety 
because of its lower-class (often rural migrant) audiences, its often vulgar performances and the 
striking stylistic choices of the performers (as noted in the quote by Volčič and Erjavec above) 
(Hudson 2003, 173). Arguably, the Serbian government actively used turbo-folk music for its 
propagandist purposes, further linking it with the nationalist cause in Serbia (ibid.). Some 
performers had openly nationalistic songs they were performing within the genre too, furthering 
this nationalist perception. The genre of music, while proving itself popular and managing to 
morph into a more pop-friendly sound in the aftermath of the conflicts, is still highly divisive and 
does not go unchallenged in the music industry when it comes to popularity. 
 In regards to the collective spirit of national music, ‘unofficial’ national anthems are also 
important to pay attention to. Bohlman (2011, 111) argues that they function in the same way as 
national music does, in contrast to nationalist music: their relevance is derived in a bottom-up 
fashion. Unlike official state anthems, which are installed from the state’s government and are 
                                                 
18
 See Hudson (2003) for an excellent overview and analysis of major Serbian nationalist songs. 
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officially sanctioned (but can often entice emotion within the population nonetheless), these 
unofficial anthems’ status is derived from the people itself. For example, in the U.S. we have 
America, the Beautiful, in Serbia Tamo daleko (Far Away), and in Slovakia we have Hej, Slováci 
(Hey Slovaks). These songs are not official anthems but often contain the same emotional 
strength – and sometimes even a larger one – that can entice feelings of national belonging. 
These songs, along with official anthems and other national songs
19
, allow for an embodied 
experience of nationalism, both on emotional and physical terms. As Hudson (2003, 174-76) 
notes, even songs that have no overt nationalist undertones, depending on the context in which 
they are performed and to what cause, can become nationalistic regardless of the intentions of the 
songwriter or singer. In the same vein, I argue that certain songs performed at the Eurovision 
Song Contest produce similar effects for some groups of people, which has been studied in much 
detail by a small yet dedicated community of scholars. 
Cold War Geopolitics and Eurovision 
The Eurovision Song Contest has been entertaining, frustrating, inspiring, and puzzling 
European audiences for almost six decades. The annual contest is the flagship programme of the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which describes itself as the world’s “foremost alliance of 
public service media” (EBU 2014). The union of national broadcasters was established in 1950, 
with 23 broadcasters at the time, while it now touts an impressive 72 active members in 56 
countries, and over 30 associated members (ibid.).   
                                                 
19
 See Bohlman and Petković-Djordjević (2012), for national epics in the Balkans, or Hudson (2003) as noted above. 
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The idea to have a pan-European song contest came from the Sanremo Music Festival
20
 
in Italy (established in 1951), which aimed at preserving the spirit of Italian music from the 
popularisation of musical genres and styles from the Americas (Fabbri 2013, x). However, unlike 
Sanremo, the intent behind ESC was to create a vehicle to connect European broadcasters via 
technological cooperation and joint TV programming (Fricker and Gluhovic 2013b, 2; Vuletić 
2013).  With time, however, the contest gathered political and cultural clout, becoming 
increasingly relevant for the promotion of both the “European idea” and national causes (Fricker 
and Gluhovic 2013b, 9).  
As the world’s foremost televised non-sporting event, the ESC has become a topic of 
interest for academic inquiry, just like the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup or other large-
scale televised events. While the competition has been around for almost sixty years (first 
competition was held in 1956), the scholarship on it has been relatively recent. Due to often 
being seen as a festival of kitsch, silly tunes, and unknown artists, the contest has been dismissed 
for decades. To this day, it has continuously faced fierce criticism across Europe, while its very 
existence and its over-the-top visual qualities confuse the rest of the world. However, some 
scholars have recognised the political and cultural power that the contest can wield, despite of 
being able to wield it only for a week every year. 
The contest has become increasingly relevant in post-1989 Europe due to the socio-
political changes that have followed from the collapse of the Iron Curtain, and the ‘reunification’ 
of Europe. Musically, it was seen as a competition for the ‘best song’ of Europe back in the 
1950s and 1960s, and it was a very serious affair: audiences dressed in gowns and suits, sitting 
and silently listening to the performances, while the artists were lone singers performing to a live 
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 Official name is Festival della canzone italiana di Sanremo (trans. San Remo Festival of Italian Song).  
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orchestra. Political scandals and intricacies were no stranger to Eurovision, such as the 
accommodation of the Spanish and Portuguese authoritarian states in the contest, as well as the 
connection of the 1974 Portuguese Eurovision entry with the start of the anti-authoritarian 
Carnation Revolution (Pinto Teixeria and Stokes 2013). However, these political intricacies were 
only a minor distraction in the Contest. In the post-1989 geopolitical situation in Europe, 
however, Eurovision has become a political player of sorts, with more political and cultural clout 
than ever before where the politics are not just a distraction anymore. 
The changes in Eurovision post-1989 were both logistical and political. On the logistical 
side, there was a major expansion of Eurovision. The contest expanded drastically after the 
opening up of the Iron Curtain, and the 1993 merger of the EBU and its Cold War equivalent 
from the Eastern Bloc
21
, the International Radio and Television Organisation (OIRT). That year, 
ten new countries were eligible to participate in the contest, but only three passed the preliminary 
round, with the other seven debuting in 1994 (see Appendix A). The logistics also drew politics 
into the fold: in pre-1989 Europe, the geopolitical situation limited Eurovision to being a ‘West-
only’ competition. The EBU-OIRT merger allowed Eastern European countries to join the fold 
of the ‘Eurovision family,’ and their participations have proven most interesting when looked 
from a political lens. It is important, however, to note a glaring exception to the west-only 
participants in the pre-1989 Eurovision: the former Yugoslavia. The socialist country left the 
OIRT in 1950, joined the EBU, and started participating in Eurovision in 1961.  
                                                 
21
 I use the term ‘Eastern Bloc’ as synonymous with the Warsaw Pact and its member states: the USSR, Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. I also include Albania in my understanding of the 
‘Eastern Bloc’, despite them withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact in 1968. However, in terms of my use of ‘West’ 
and ‘East’, I appropriate a more cultural delimitation – in East, I include all the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, 
but also the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Arguably, Greece and Cyprus find themselves on a 
crossroads of sorts between the two, but due to the historical association of West with the Hellenic civilisation, I 
have chosen to put Greece and Cyprus under the categorisation of ‘West.’ My aim here is not to propose any new 
dichotomies or insights into the topic, which is beyond the scope of my research, but to clarify my usage of the 
terms.  
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As Vuletić (2007) observes, the former Yugoslavia was a symbolic lone ‘star’ on the 
Eurovision stage. While the political relevance of its pro-West stance due to its participation was 
hard to miss, Yugoslavia kept on failing to impress European juries and ending up with poor 
results in the ESC. Its fortunes changed with the embracing of a more pop-friendly sound in the 
1980s, especially one musically and thematically tied to the Adriatic Sea and the summer party 
life associated with it. Its best results – fourth places in 1983 and 1987, and victory in 1989 – 
were all emblematic of that modern pop-sound. All these songs came from Croatia, where this 
pop genre was dominant, while in Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina folk and turbo-folk music 
was gaining in popularity.  
When it hosted the 1990 contest in Zagreb (as per EBU rules, the winner of the contest 
has the honour and obligation of hosting the contest next year), Yugoslavia proved itself to be a 
competent organiser of a large-scale international event, after it had done the same with the 1984 
Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo (Vuletić 2007; O’Connor 2010). The symbolism of 
Yugoslavia, a socialist country, hosting the first contest after the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
could not be missed. With hindsight, however, neither could the irony. Just thirteen months after 
the Italian Toto Cutugno won the Eurovision trophy with his song celebrating European unity
22
, 
Yugoslavia’s internal political and economic problems reached a tipping point, starting the first 
international conflict on European soil since World War II (Ramet 2006, chapters 10-14). 
Performance and Identity Politics in Eurovision 
Scholars have argued that the contest, despite having ‘song’ in its title, is not truly about 
music, nor is the music itself the focus of scholarly interest. As noted above, the EBU started the 
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 Insieme: 1992 (Together: 1992) was the title of the song, referring to the then anticipated Maastricht Treaty and 
the creation of the European Union and the collapse of the East-West division of Europe in the Cold War. 
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contest to showcase technological development and to facilitate cooperation amongst TV 
broadcasters in Europe. The quality of the songs and their chart impact have always been only 
secondary. This is reflected in the often-lamented poor song quality, and even poorer chart 
results of most entries, with a few exceptions like the winners from 1974, “Waterloo” and 2012, 
“Euphoria” (Tragaki 2013, 4-7; Wolther 2012, 167; Warner Music Group 2012). Even in the 
rules for the 2013 contest, the ESC is still described as a “state-of-the-art, world-class television 
production and consists chiefly of successive live televised performance of songs by artists...” 
(Eurovision 2014a). When consulting the literature on Eurovision, it is not the music that it 
focuses on nor the aspects of technical cooperation but the multiplicities of cultural and identity 
politics that the contests enables and radiates. 
The politics of Eurovision are all-encompassing to such an extent that it is almost 
impossible to distance the contest from them. In an attempt to classify distinct dimensions (or 
categories, ways of understanding) of Eurovision, Wolther (2012) effectively presents ways of 
looking at Eurovision as a political phenomenon. Even his attempts at somewhat distancing ESC 
from politics exude the inner politics of the contest. For example, he notes that the competitive 
dimension (which is theoretically apolitical) has itself largely contributed to the politicisation of 
the contest, since it diminished the importance of music in favour of the relevance of presenting 
the nation and national culture on an international stage (ibid., 170).  
This also relates to the (again, theoretically apolitical) media and musical-economic 
dimensions. Even if a Eurovision entry fails to achieve high sales, a high placement in the 
contest itself is seen as satisfactory enough. The high placement means that the nation has been 
honoured accordingly, effectively relieving the artist and song of the consequences of 
commercial failure. The nation, therefore, trumps economics and profit. Brian Singleton (2013) 
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notes this most explicitly when discussing the chart failures of the Irish three-time winner, 
Johnny Logan
23. His consistent success at Eurovision (garnering him the nickname ‘Mr. 
Eurovision’) has made his lack of chart success outside of the contest irrelevant due to his 
contribution in promoting Ireland internationally (ibid., 148).  
In the post-1989 context of expansion of both Europe and Eurovision, and the 
geopolitical changes in Europe, it is easy to conclude that Eurovision has mirrored political and 
cultural trends as present in the continent. However, some scholars see the relevance of 
Eurovision as bigger than just a mirror of post-1989 Europe, and certainly more than “just a 
political event”. Fricker and Gluhovic (2013b, 3) understand the contest as “not just a mirror but 
perhaps a driver in changing conceptions and realities of Europe and Europeanness since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.” It is not only politically relevant but also in an embodied sense, providing a 
way to create a “new European awareness offering insights into the diverse simultaneous 
realities that are lived in Europe,” ultimately leading to the shaping of a notion of European 
citizenship (ibid., 10). It is relevant that in their volume on Eurovision (Fricker and Gluhovic 
2013a), affect-based research has taken up a more prominent role, studying the very experiential 
nature of Eurovision (Zarouila 2013; Pajala 2013). However, politics, and especially identity 
politics, have been a crucial aspect of Eurovision – both in mirroring and driving change in 
Europe, especially in the former Eastern Bloc countries. 
The changes and consistencies in European geopolitical relations – both positive and 
negative – have often been mirrored in Eurovision’s voting, but have also been affected directly 
by the voting. Analyses of voting patterns have been one of the earliest academic ventures in 
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 Irishman Johnny Logan is the only Eurovision performer to win the contest more than once. He won in 1980 and 
1987 with songs he wrote and performed, and the 1992 victory came with the song “Why me?” which he penned, 
but was performed by Linda Martin. 
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regards to the contest. Yair’s (1995) pioneering work on the voting from 1975 to 199224, pointed 
at three geopolitical cliques or voting blocs: Western-European, Nordic, and Mediterranean. The 
so-called “buddy,” “neighbour” or “political” voting, has been more a media preoccupation than 
one of scholarship (Kirkegaard 2013; Fenn et al. 2005; Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). While 
some scholars have discussed it in passing, mainly in relation to other topics, it has been the 
prerogative of statistical studies to analyse the voting patterns. The conclusions have been 
somewhat diverse, but they do tend to reject the hypothesis that Eurovision voting is overtly 
political. 
However, there are a number of connections and biases exemplified in the voting, 
according to the scholarship. For example, Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) emphasise that there 
is a minor bias when it comes to religion and ethnicity in the way the public votes, but that bias 
is not shared by professional juries. Aside from those bias factors, their analysis focuses on 
geographical proximity as a major factor for vote exchange. Fenn et al. (2006, 576), on the other 
hand, argue that while there are “unofficial cliques of countries”, their existence cannot be 
explained “solely on the grounds of geographical proximity” but that other facts need to be 
considered. In line with their observations, Ginsburg and Noury (2008, 49) have concluded that 
it is actually “quality” of the songs that is the main determinant in the voting, but that cultural 
and linguistic factors play a strong secondary role, as well. 
Academic research and its results aside, the media space given to the voting results and 
its interpretations has been immense. Whether people believe the academic’s statistics or not 
becomes quite irrelevant. What matters are the voting trends and patterns that the general public 
perceives on the scoreboard year after year, as well as the occasional ‘official’ reaction to the 
                                                 
24
 1975 is the year that the current voting system was put in place and it has not been drastically altered since. 
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results by political figures and governments. Some issues tend to be rather minor, while others 
seem rather disproportionately serious, considering that we are dealing with a song contest. For 
example, after the 2011 contest, a media storm was raised in Bosnia & Herzegovina over Croatia 
placing the Bosnian entry only as its 4
th
 favourite song
25
. The high expectations were based 
mainly on extensive historical, political, and cultural ties between the two countries, as well as 
previous exchanges of high rankings between the two nations
26
 (Balkanmedia 2011). 
Furthermore, we have the more serious geopolitical issues caused by voting, which at 
time have escalated into diplomatic rows between countries. In 2013, Azerbaijan failed to give 
the Russian representative any points, effectively ranking it outside of their top 10, which caused 
the Russian Foreign Minister to request an explanation of the Azeri voting. The Russian 
complaint was addressed directly by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, who ordered an 
inquiry into the Azeri voting in a move towards the ‘normalisation’ of friendly Russo-Azeri 
diplomatic relations (BBC 2013a; Russia Today 2013). 
Aside of the analyses of voting patterns, the connection between identity politics of the 
state and Eastern European countries’ participation in Eurovision has been a popular subject of 
research. Scholars have studied the relevance of Eurovision to identity politics in countries such 
as Lithuania (Ingvoldstadt 2007), Russia (Heller 2007; Meerzon and Priven 2013), Serbia (Baker 
2008a; Mitrović 2010) and Turkey (Gumpert 2007; Solomon 2007). Often, Eurovision is seen as 
a way to rethink the nation and what is truly ‘national’, and how a nation can fit into a larger 
                                                 
25
 Croatia ranked its other neighbour, Slovenia, first, Azerbaijan second, and Serbia third, followed by the Bosnian 
entry. 
 
26
 Croatia has consistently ranked Bosnian songs as either first (4 times) or second (3 times) in the previous decade 
(2002-11), making the 2011 ranking the lowest since the last time Bosnia & Herzegovina was ranked forth by 
Croatia back in 2002. Reciprocally, Bosnia & Herzegovina has ranked Croatia first (3 times) and second (2 times), 
but Croatia has failed to qualify to the final of the competition a number of years, hence could not get awarded any 
points in those years. The Bosnian’s lowest ranking of Croatian songs goes back to 2003, when they ranked the 
Croatian entry fifth (Eurovision 2014b).   
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European community, making the contest much more politically salient than many in Western 
Europe would give it credit for. As Sieg (2013, 220) writes in her study of meanings and norms 
of Europeanness in Eastern Europe via ESC: 
For many post-socialist countries, whose relation to Europeanness 
was ideologically, culturally, or geographically tenuous, the ESC 
became a stage where they could perform their imagined 
relationship to Europe as a ‘return home’ or demonstration of 
friendship. 
This can also relate to not only post-socialist countries, but to countries perceived as European 
outsiders yet ESC participants, such as Israel and Turkey. The cases of Serbia and Turkey, 
however, have been especially fascinating in this regard, as they have both found themselves as 
the European ‘other’ to a significant extent in the eyes of the West: Serbia as the aggressor in the 
wars in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, and Turkey as the perpetual (historical) 
Islamic-Asian ‘other.’  
The attempts at negotiation of national identities with identities of European modernity 
are the focus of Solomon’s (2007; 2013) and Gumpert’s (2007) works on Turkey’s victory in 
2003. They directly address this fluctuating Turkish identity and Turkishness as portrayed on the 
Eurovision stage in 2003. Solomon (2007) notes the “historical moment” that has allowed 
Turkey to actually reach the level of popular support (aside from having a catchy song) 
necessary for victory; most notably the improvements in the Turkish geopolitical image across 
the continent. Gumpert (2007) takes the argument further, through an analysis of the lyrical, 
musical as well as visual aspect of the music video and live performance of the Turkish winner, 
Sertab Erener. He argues that Erener actively ‘self-orientalised’ both herself and Turkey, being 
the representative of the state, in order to satisfy the Western gaze. A gaze which, as expected, 
favourably responded to an exotification of Turkey in line with historical European imaginations: 
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women in harems, belly dancing, and musically ‘ethnic’ sounds, along with possibly deviant 
(lesbian) sexualities, all re-affirming Turkey’s foreignness yet making it desirable at the same 
time (Gumpert 2007; Solomon 2013). Building on Gumpert’s observations, Solomon (2013) 
concludes in his later work that the Turkish broadcaster, in cahoots with Erener, created a well 
calculated and designed marketing ploy, instead of an actual representation of the Turkish state 
on stage. A ploy that seems to have paid off, since Erener went on to win the contest. 
Marijana Mitrović’s work (2010) on (re)constructions of Serbian national identities in 
Eurovision performances 2004-08, provides another glimpse into the workings of the nation via 
the contest. Through an ethnicisation of both sound and visual identity, which are “almost 
entirely recycled from the ‘memories’ of medieval Serbia” (ibid., 173), the Serbian 
representatives in 2004 have managed to reinforce an idyllic idea of Serbian cultural history not 
just for the Western gaze, like Turkey did, but for the Serbian population too. While hosting the 
contest in Belgrade in 2008, the idyllic Serbian culture was yet again represented through 
Serbia’s stage performance. This time, however, it was not a medieval rural culture but an urban 
19
th
 century culture, representing a more ‘Western’, modern, ‘European’ Serbia. The closer 
linking with a European look and values came as part of Serbia’s attempt to appease the EU and 
show itself as a worthy candidate for accession into the Union (ibid.).  
However, the Serbian performance also challenged the perceived all-encompassing 
power of Europe in acts visible and audible to everyone, but only understandable to Serbian 
audiences. The performance featured, both in staging and lyrics, strong symbolic historical 
references to Serbian state and national unity, especially in regards to Kosovo and its unilateral 
declaration of independence earlier in the year. With this act, Serbia set some limits to its 
“demonstration of friendship” towards the EU, as Sieg put it.   
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Starting with their 2004 entry, “Lane moje”27, Serbia seems to have gotten to the 
forefront of a larger “ethnic turn” in Eurovision, as Alf Björnberg (2007) has labelled it. 
Björnberg identifies this ethnicisation as an attempt by some countries at a “creative (re) 
construction of national or ethnic identity in music” (ibid., 21). This being said, other countries 
have featured ethnic motives in their songs in the 1990s, but to little success usually
28
. Many 
Eastern European countries have tried to showcase this more ethnic sound and/or look to their 
representatives and performances, in an attempt at a “somehow more authentic or explicit 
ethnicity than the more modernized and “disethnified” West European societies” (ibid.). Few 
songs have been purely ‘ethnic’ – the majority has been a mixture of ethnic and pop sounds, 
creating a balance between a perceived ethnic flavour and authenticity, and commercial appeal 
for pan-European audiences. 
This approach has allowed some Eastern European countries to achieve quite good 
results, but also some Western European countries too. While there are plenty of ethnically-
sounding songs in the contest, usually the Eastern European ones do better than the Western 
European ones (see Appendix B). This Eastern European dominance when it comes to ethnic 
sounds and visuals can be understood as an affirmation of the perception that the ethnic 
authenticity of Eastern European music is indeed perceived as somehow “more authentic” than 
the one from the West. In both the East and West, however, this ethnicisation seems to have a 
dual function: to reaffirm the nation on the domestic front for popular consumption, but also 
                                                 
27
 Technically, Lane moje was representing Serbia & Montenegro, but the song came from the Serbian broadcaster 
RTS, not the Montenegrin RTCG. The representative of Serbia & Montenegro that year was selected in two rounds. 
In the first round, four songs were selected from Montenegro, and four more from Serbia. In the final round those 
eight songs were accompanied by sixteen songs chosen internally by the joint national broadcaster of Serbia & 
Montenegro, and the winner was chosen through a mixture of televote and jury votes, with Lane moje gathering 
most points from both juries and televoters. 
 
28
 The exceptions are the 1995 and 1996 winners from Norway and Ireland, respectively. Since then, the first 
country to win with an overwhelmingly ‘ethnic’ sounding song was Ukraine in 2004, with a successful blending of 
ethnic folk sounds and pop tunes (Baker 2008a). 
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show a national uniqueness in a larger European rootedness, aimed at an international 
consumption. 
The negotiation of national and European identities has also been examined in a Western 
European context, and they have often shown themselves as impactful even for countries where 
the nation and state seem to be firmly established and secured, as Billig noted for Western 
democracies. In line with Billig’s idea of banal nationalism, Karen Fricker (2013) looks at 
British imperial nostalgia and a larger struggle for self-definition through a discourse analysis of 
BBC’s Eurovision broadcasts. Pajala’s (2007a) research on Finnish national shame in relation to 
a history Eurovision failures, enforces Fricker and Gluhovic’s idea of Eurovision actually 
affecting attitudes, not just mirroring them. Finland, for decades torn between West and East due 
to its geographical location
29
, coupled with its poor results in Eurovision, has been presented in 
the Finnish media as a perpetual loser. This has, according to Pajala (2007a), furthered Finnish 
national insecurities about Finland’s place in Europe. Similarly, Langlois (2013) and Singleton 
(2013) discuss the change of Irish Eurovision fortunes as related to the decline of the Irish 
economy in the 2000s, as well as a growing Euro-scepticism in Ireland and dismissiveness of 
Eurovision.  
Possibly because of the lack of pressure for commercial success, the contest has become 
a stage where various alternative politics can be presented, often ones that would be subjugated 
to larger hegemonic politics of the state and nation. Where else could one find Roma artists 
representing the Czech Republic on an international stage, especially considering recent right-
wing politics and anti-Roma sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe (BBC 2013b)? While 
                                                 
29
 Finland even participated in the Intervision Song Contest, OIRT’s alternative to Eurovision for the Eastern Bloc. 
Finland managed to win the contest in 1980, in its very last edition (out of four), while it took them until 2006 to win 
Eurovision – after over 40 years of participating in the contest. 
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Roma are often exoticised and commodified on the Eurovision stage for the purposes of 
“enhancing local flavour” (Szeman 2013, 131), their mere presence is indicative of a (not 
unproblematic) complicating of the idea of the nation and the national body to a much larger 
degree than is common.  
A significant strand of Eurovision literature has focused on challenging of normative 
politics, mainly through queering of the contest.
30
 Queerness has been used as an analytical 
category to various effects in the analysis of different Eurovision topics. From feminist readings 
of female representations in the ESC (Aston 2013) to the clash of heteronormativity and 
queerness on multiple Eurovision fronts: staging of the live performance, broadcast 
commentaries, and the altered landscape of the host cities (Pajala 2007b; Rehberg 2013). Pajala 
(2007b, 27) notes that the nation and nationalism have been heteronormative and heterosexist 
due to the need of the nation to reproduce itself and secure its future presence via childrearing. 
However, queer fans as well as some other minorities have managed to create a queer notion of 
citizenship through the contest. This reading of the contest allows for challenging and subverting 
“conventional standards of cultural belonging” and “relates more to a sense of belonging to a 
community and feeling represented by that community” (Tobin 2007, 28-9). This alternative 
reading of citizenship and belonging, as facilitated through the contest, allows sexual and ethnic 
minorities an alternative avenue to see themselves as part of the nation, at least for the duration 
of the contest. 
The flipside of this queering is presented in Rehberg’s (2013) analysis of the dequeering 
of ESC in Germany in 2009-10. The dequeering of Germany in the context of Eurovision was 
                                                 
30
 I use the term ‘queer’ liberally throughout the paper. In most cases, it refers to the identification of queer with the 
LGBTQ communities and non-heteronormative gender and sexual identifications. When indicated otherwise, it can 
also refer to the queering or challenging of normativities across identity politics and beyond. 
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done through a process of othering in relation to Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was labelled as 
queer, different and foreign, providing for an understanding of Germany as the opposite: non-
queer (heteronormative) and familiar. Rehberg (ibid., 184) goes to claim that this dequeering was 
done not only in the interest of the nation, but “moreover, done in the name of Western Europe,” 
which was seen as losing its hegemonic grip in the contest due to a streak of Eastern European 
victories and high rankings, and poorer showings by Western countries, 2001-08. Arguably, this 
is connected to Western European fears over the expansion of the EU as reflected on the contest: 
what if Eastern Europeans became as successful politically and economically as they had 
become in Eurovision?
31
 The whole basis of the West vs. East socio-political and cultural 
dichotomy, and self-perceived Western dominance in Europe, would crumble. 
Bringing it Together: Eurovision, Diasporas, and (Trans)national Belonging 
Before combining Eurovision, diasporas, and belonging into one theoretical fold, it is 
imperative to address the setup of Eurovision and its voting processes, as relevant to the 
reproduction of the banal hegemony of the nation in the contest. The contest itself, as well as the 
discourse surrounding it, is political and moreover, national, in a very banal fashion. For 
example, it is the national broadcasters that select the songs however they see fitting
32
. The 
                                                 
31
 With the possible exception of Greece (which is arguably both in the Eastern and Western) and Finland, most of 
the winners in the first decade of the 2000s were from Eastern Europe. Estonia won in 2001, Latvia in 2002, Turkey 
2003, Ukraine 2004, Greece 2005, Finland 2006, Serbia 2007 and Russia in 2008. Finland was the first ‘fully’ 
Western European nation to win Eurovision in 2006 since the Danish victory in 2000. More importantly, Western 
European countries started faring weaker compared to Eastern countries, with only handfuls qualifying to the finals 
in the late 2000s. This culminated in 2007, when no Western European countries qualified from the Semi Final, 
allowing ten Eastern European countries to qualify instead. 
 
32
 The selection process can include a ‘National Final’ of sorts where the broadcaster organises a mini-contest in its 
own country to choose its representative amongst a number of songs. Another alternative is an ‘internal selection,’ 
which means the broadcaster just announces the artist who will represent the country, without any input from the 
public. There are further alterations to this formula, where sometimes an artist is internally selected and is asked to 
prepare a number of songs, out of which the public will choose the one to represented them. 
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artists representing the broadcasters, and in turn, representing the countries, are often 
discursively equated with the country whose colours they are sporting. During the actual 
performance of songs, it is not the name of the artists that is constantly displayed in the bottom 
of the screen but that of the country the artist is representing. When all the songs have been 
performed, the winner is selected through a voting process where each country announces its 
points via satellite link to the venue where the contest is hosted. A presenter from each country 
awards the coveted ’12 points’ to the most popular song, as gauged by the juries and public vote 
in that country
33
. This is where the above discussed geopolitical relations across Europe come to 
bearing, which is at the same time the most watched part of the broadcast: who will give the 12 
points to whom? Are Greece and Cyprus going to exchange yet another 12 points, or will there 
be a surprise this year? Will the Armenians and Azeris finally burry the war axe, and exchange 
their first points? 
The scoreboard, where all the drama plays out, is not populated with song titles or names 
of the performers, or even the names of the broadcasters. Instead, the scoreboard features the 
names of the countries and their respective flags, which visually and vocally (presenters 
announce the points to countries) reinforce the national setup of the contest (see Image 1). As 
Rehberg (2007, 63) states, the voting in the contest every year is a “playful version of war,” a 
cultural war of sorts. This is evident by the fans present in the venue who often sport large flags 
                                                 
33
 The voting is set up as a split between a public vote (televote) and expert jury vote. Each country’s jury and 
televote are combined, and then transferred into the ‘Eurovision voting formula’: the highest ranked song gets 12 
points, second highest gets 10, third 8, fourth 7, and so on until the tenth song gets 1 point. Only the top ten 
countries get points. After each country has announced its votes, the song that has received the most points wins the 
contest. See Image 1, for the final screenshot of the scoreboard in 2013, with all the points awarded and Denmark 
winning the contest. 
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of their countries, interesting flag- or performance-inspired costumes, and attempt to visually 
represent their support for their nation and its representative.
34
 
 
Image 1: Snapshot of the final results on the scoreboard at the 2013 Eurovision Song Contest, just after 
the last country (Lithuania, as depicted) has announced its votes  
(http://eurovisionbyjaz.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/eurovision-2013-results.png. 
Last accessed May 25, 2014).
35
 
The representative qualities of Eurovision are what is truly fascinating about the contest. 
Eurovision, just like Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008, 547) note about major sporting events, seems 
to have the ability to mobilise powerful sentiments of belonging through a lens of competition. If 
this is the case for the people in the countries participating, could it be that diasporic 
communities across Europe experience a similar phenomenon? But which country would that 
experience relate to: their home country that has welcomed them and provided them a new life, 
                                                 
34
 For a visual representation, see Reuters’ video footage of Eurovision fans in front of the venue hosting the 2014 
contest in Denmark: http://www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist//RTV/2014/05/10/RTV100514070/. 
 
35
 On the left side is the scoreboard with the Lithuanian points on the left of each of the counties names, and the total 
points allocated on the right of the names. On the right side of the screen is the spokesperson from Lithuania via 
direct satellite link. (http://eurovisionbyjaz.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/eurovision-2013-results.png) 
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or the homeland they have left behind but share cultural and familial ties with? This is where 
Sökefeld’s (2006) ideas on diasporic mobilisation can shed light on the way that diasporic 
communities interact with the contest on both surface but also deeper, emotional levels. 
In all this representational and identity-based research that has been done on Eurovision, 
a fascinating gap has been left un-researched: the interaction of diasporic communities with the 
contest. The gap is more baffling given the huge media space given to diasporic communities in 
regards to Eurovision in the past decade. With the introduction of televoting in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in most countries, and the shifting of Eurovision success from West to Eastern 
Europe (as noted above), diasporas have been largely seen as a source of votes for countries with 
larger communities abroad (Björnberg 2007, 22; Ginsburgh and Noury 2008; 50; Ingvoldstadt 
2007, 102; Singleton 2013, 151; Solomon 2007). So much so, many artists and national 
broadcasters attempt to get the diasporic communities engaged to support their entry in 
Eurovision. It is a low-stakes way to support ones nation(s) on an international stage. But no 
research has been done directly with diasporic communities. 
Therefore, the complete absence of the study of diasporic involvement in Eurovision is 
rather strange, and limits both our knowledge of diasporic communities in regards to Eurovision, 
as well as in regards to larger transnational diasporic engagements with nationalism. Surely, 
remittances, visits to the homeland and other types of transnational diasporic connectivity and 
activity with the homeland are strong indicators of national sympathies and loyalty for diasporic 
communities. However, it is important to also understand other trends in the wider rhythms of 
diasporic activities, such as sporting and cultural events. After all, social and cultural aspects of 
identity are crucial for the everyday functioning of individuals and larger communities. From an 
affect perspective, it would be beneficial to understand how members of diasporic communities 
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interact with Eurovision and how they reconcile their multiple identities and senses of belonging 
in a competitive international staging, where both national reference points are present 
(homeland and host state).  
If we understand Eurovision as a cultural and inter-national event that represents a link in 
a chain of annual and every day diasporic activities, we can try to locate the contest as part of a 
larger diasporic social mobilisation in regards to the homeland (Sökefeld 2006). Amongst other 
questions, it is important to see to what extent the affective aspect of Eurovision can influence 
and trigger national affiliations, specifically for diasporic communities. Does the contest have the 
affective power to entice a sense of belonging, or at least re-kindle an already existing one? More 
importantly, does the banal setup (yet, visual spectacle) of Eurovision and the minimal effort 
needed to engage with the contest (by watching it on TV) allow for an easier and more efficient 
engagement for diasporic persons with nationalism? If compared to more time-consuming 
aspects of diasporic engagements, such as diasporic organisations for example, is the ‘lighter’ 
nature and low-cost engagement of Eurovision actually a benefit to its mobilising power for 
diasporic communities and transnational peoples? Through the study of the contest in regards to 
diasporas and transnational peoples, we can complicate our understanding of always-changing 
national and diasporic identities and affiliations, and study the effectiveness of national imagery 
in enticing a sense of belonging outside of the nation-state.  
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Chapter Four: 
Methods and Reflections 
 In this chapter, I will briefly discuss my methodological framing and present a more 
detailed review of the methods I have used to conduct my research and subsequent analysis and 
interpretation of results. I will also address issues I have faced both in and outside of the field, 
with achieving the goals I had set out for myself in regards to methods. Finally, I will discuss the 
framings of my discourse and symbol analysis.  
As noted in the introductory chapter, I have used a mixed-methods approach to my 
research believing that this would provide me with a well-rounded understanding of the 
embodied everyday experiences of the diasporic communities in southern Sweden. The methods 
I have used for my research are the following: 
a. A review of existing literature on transnationalism and diasporas, on nationalism and 
belonging, and on Eurovision itself; 
b. Semi-structured interviews with members of diasporic communities of former Yugoslavs 
in the Malmö metropolitan area; 
c. Semi-structured interview with the Head of Press of the delegation of Montenegro (I had 
originally planned interviews with the Heads of Press of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, 
and Serbia as well, but those did not come to fruition); 
d. An analysis of discourses and symbols contained within Eurovision performances from 
the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia 
since 1989. 
Semi-Structured One-on-One Interviews and Sampling 
Aside the extensive literature review of the two previous chapters, the centrepiece of my 
data collection is a series of semi-structured one-on-one interviews with members of the former 
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Yugoslav diasporic communities in southern Skåne, or more precisely, the Malmö metropolitan 
area. In order to answer my questions about the diasporic and transnational experiences of people 
from the former Yugoslavia now living in the MMA and to understand their reactions to 
portrayals of their homelands on the Eurovision stage, I saw it as instrumental to directly talk to 
the people I was theorising about. My choice of conducting interviews was guided by the wish to 
go more in depth, instead of breadth, with my research. As Linda McDowell (2010, 157-8) notes, 
“the purpose is to explore and understand actions within specific settings, to examine human 
relationships and discover as much as possible about why people feel or act in the ways they do.” 
Rather than attempting to do a large-scale survey of the former Yugoslav diasporas in 
Sweden, like Slavnić (2011) did, I have opted for a more in-depth approach allowing me to delve 
further into the worlds of a smaller number of people (Winchester and Rofe 2010, 9). This study 
does not attempt to be representative of all transnational and diasporic peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia in the MMA. It does, however, attempt to explore the experiences of the small group 
that has been interviewed, in order to understand the diasporic condition a bit better. Another 
important aspect of doing in-depth interviews is the ability to represent often silenced peoples’ 
understandings of the world and the phenomena at hand (Dunn 2010, 102). Ultimately,  
through interviews, difference rather than similarity in experience 
is explored and so generalisations may be challenged, as well as 
allowing into both the encounter and the resulting text the 
emotions and feelings of the subjects, and more recently the 
researcher. (McDowell 2010, 159) 
 The structure of the interviews has been also decided by taking into account the 
usefulness of informant-led input. While I have organised my interviews into three thematic 
segments with guiding questions (personal experiences of displacement, experiences with(in) the 
diasporas, and relevance of Eurovision), I have decided to take a semi-structured approach as to 
allow my informants to contribute to and guide the interviews in their own ways. Therefore, 
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while most interviews followed the personal experience–diaspora–Eurovision structure, I have 
actively tried to encourage a more conversation-like atmosphere rather than having a top-down 
power dynamic with my informants. Furthering my aim of having a more conversational 
interview structure, most of the interviews were conducted outside of settings typically 
understood as ‘formal.’ Only three interviews were conducted in office settings36, while the rest 
were conducted in a variety of places: interviewees’ homes, public parks, and coffee shops. The 
goal was to make the interviewees as comfortable as possible, including providing them the 
ability to choose familiar environments for the interview. 
 My sampling was based on snowballing, which is a technique where a key informant 
helps identify other possible interviewees they know, in hope that they are able to contribute to 
the research. The recommendation basis of the sampling method carries potential biases, as it 
could lead to a sample of participants that have similar propensities to the topic of research as the 
initial key informant (Jones 2009, 662). However, in the case of my research topic, I approached 
this as a strength and benefit  instead of a problematic issue. Despite the high viewing figures for 
Eurovision in Sweden, not everyone watches the show, so doing snowballing was seen as the 
best way to identify Eurovision viewers within the former Yugoslav communities in the MMA.   
Another potential issue with the research was compliance with ethics guidelines and 
regulations. Primarily, it was the maintenance of my informants’ privacy which is complicated 
by the snowballing method. There is a chance that an informant might be recognised by a family 
member, friend or colleague who reads the paper, if proper steps to protect their identity are not 
taken. In order to minimise the chances of that happening, I have altered the names of my 
informants and decided not to disclose any information that could potentially identify any one of 
                                                 
36
 The first interview was conducted at the interviewees’ workplace, while two other interviews were conducted on 
the premises of Malmö University, in Malmö. 
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them. That information could be anything along the lines of the number of years spent in Sweden 
or any personal experiences that might disclose their identity to the informant(s) they 
recommended, or were recommended by.   
 My final sample consisted of twelve informants living in the Malmö metropolitan area – 
eight from Malmö itself, three from Lund, and one from Eslöv. The gender split was rather even, 
with seven female and five male informants. The sample ended up being a bit older than I 
anticipated originally, with the average age of 33. In regards to migration reasons, the sample is 
very diverse. Five informants were refugees from the Bosnian War, four were second generation 
migrants, two were labour/education migrants in Sweden, and one was a family reunification 
migrant who moved with parents. Partially due to the snowballing sampling technique, there has 
been a somewhat disproportionate number of Bosnians represented, with seven informants from 
Bosnia & Herzegovina. One informant came from Serbia, and the remainder are second 
generation informants born in Sweden: one’s parents came from Bosnia & Herzegovina, one’s 
parents from Serbia, and the last one comes from a mixed Croatian-Serbian family. 
The amount of time people spent in Sweden varied greatly as well. While the average 
was 25 years, it was skewed by two outliers who spent significantly fewer years in Sweden than 
the average age of the sample. Also, taking into account that second generation people are not 
migrants in practice, if we exclude them from the calculation (since they have spent most of their 
lives in Sweden, by proxy), for the migrants we get an average of 17.5 years spent in Sweden, 
which is still quite a significant amount of time to live and adjust to another country. 
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Table 2: Select demographic information about project informants. Bracketed countries of origin 
indicate the places of origin of the parents in the case of second generation migrants.  
ID Name Sex 
Migration 
Type 
Country of origin 
1 Ahmed M Refugee Bosnia & Herzegovina 
2 Andrea  F 
Second 
Generation 
[Serbia / Croatia] 
3 Đorđe  M 
Second 
Generation 
[Bosnia & Herzegovina] 
4 Irma  F Refugee Bosnia & Herzegovina 
5 Jasmina  F Labour Serbia 
6 Kenan  M Refugee Bosnia & Herzegovina 
7 Maja  F 
Second 
Generation 
[Serbia] 
8 Merima  F Refugee Bosnia & Herzegovina 
9 Milan  M 
Second 
Generation 
[Serbia] 
10 Senad  M Labour Bosnia & Herzegovina 
11 Svjetlana  F Refugee Bosnia & Herzegovina 
12 Vesna  F Family Reunion Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 
 Along with the interviews with transnational and diasporic peoples, my second set of 
interviews was supposed to be with the official delegations that the broadcasters send to 
participate in Eurovision. The goal was to interview the Heads of Press, who are in charge of the 
media coverage of their song entry that year. I managed to contact the Montenegrin and Croatian 
delegations, but due to logistical issues while at Eurovision I was only able to conduct an 
interview with Sabrija Vulić, the Montenegrin Head of Press. The idea behind interviewing the 
official delegations was to see what the relevance of Eurovision participation is for national 
broadcasters, as well as the role of diasporas within the context of Eurovision and supporting 
ones homeland. While the one interview is a far cry from the four that I was hoping to obtain
37
, it 
                                                 
37
 I did not manage to get in contact with the Bosnian and Serbian delegations. The Bosnians did not participate in 
Eurovision 2013, and the Serbians left early due to the failure of the Serbian representatives to qualify to the Final.  
 79 | P a g e  
still provides some insight as to how broadcasters see Eurovision and what their goals with 
participation are. In a way, this allows me to look at both sides of the transnational continuum: 
the people who create the national images on the one side (delegation), and the people who 
consume the images (diasporic communities). 
 I did experience some setbacks with sampling for my diasporic informants, along with 
the delegation members that I tried to get in touch with. I had a three-pronged approach to 
acquiring informants: approaching the official Eurovision fan community, contacting people via 
diasporic organisations in Malmö, and utilising my existing contacts within the region. While 
some of the diasporic organisations seemed interested and forwarded my call for participants to 
their members, I had not heard back from any organisation or individual member, with the 
exception of one person once I had already left Sweden. I faced the same issue with the official 
“unofficial” ESC fan organisation, the OGAE (Organisation Generale des Amateurs de 
l’Eurovision)38. I had contacted the Croatian, Serbian and Swedish clubs, hoping that they would 
help find Serbo-Croatian speakers in Sweden interested in participating in my research. 
Unfortunately, while the clubs seemed cooperative and had shared my call for participants with 
their members, it yielded no interviewees, just like the diasporic organisations. Therefore, my 
final sample ended up being smaller than originally anticipated, with twelve interviews with 
people within the former Yugoslav diasporic social field, and one interview with the 
Montenegrin Head of Press.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
38
 While technically not affiliated with the EBU or Eurovision, the OGAE has had a significant role in the 
development of the fan community since its birth in the 1980s, especially on a national level. Most Eurovision 
participating countries have their own national OGAE clubs. They organise (in cooperation with the EBU) 
discounted tickets and opportunities for meet-and-greets with Eurovision performers, and other supplementary 
events. From the countries of the former Yugoslavia within the Serbo-Croatian socio-linguistic sphere, only Croatia 
and Serbia have their own clubs that are full members of the association. The newly-formed Montenegrin club has 
‘candidate’ status, while Bosnia & Herzegovina does not have its own club at all. (http://www.ogae.net/) 
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Performance Analysis  
 Like many scholars researching the contest have done before, I have decided to conduct 
an analysis of the performances staged at Eurovision. I have chosen to do this in order to 
supplement my interviews, by providing contextual background to some of the conversations I 
have had with my informants. The performance analysis is also useful in answering my research 
questions, especially ones regarding the entrenchment of national master frames via portrayals of 
the state in Eurovision performances. While works by Eurovision scholars like Aston (2013), 
Mitrović (2010), Solomon (2007; 2013), and Sieg (2013), amongst others, have analysed various 
elements of the performances in Eurovision, they do not provide clear guidelines as to their 
actual process. How did they categorise their observations, if at all? How did they differentiate 
between factors and which were deemed more important than others and why?  
Before elaborating on my representational categories for the analysis, it is important to 
address the criticisms of visual methodologies in geography and to justify my usage of the same. 
As Crang (2010) points out, visual and observational methodologies in geography have been 
extensively criticised due to the problematic history of geography as a discipline, especially in 
the early twentieth century. Geography was (ab)used as a tool of colonialism and even today as 
an objectifying tool via tourism, creating uneven geographies across the globe (Matthews and 
Herbert 2008). The representative qualities of the visual are what make it both powerful and 
problematic: photographs and other visuals are often taken for granted as objective reality. In the 
case of Eurovision, the representational qualities of the visuals are indeed meant to be 
representative. After all, they are meant to represent a whole country and their musical culture, or 
at least its musical industry to an extent, on an international podium. Therefore, while I recognise 
the issues with visual methodologies, they are an integral aspect of my research project. The very 
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nature of the Eurovision Song Contest rests on these representational ideas and visuals, and they 
are a crucial aspect of any attempt at understanding the contest and its implications. 
What I am searching for and analysing in the performances are musical and visual cues 
that promote discourses of national and cultural belonging for the audiences. These cues can be 
understood as symbols carrying representational power. As Swedish scholar Johan Fornäs (2012, 
46-7) points out, symbols are highly rooted in culture and cannot be understood as ‘subjective’. 
If they were subjective, they would not have the consistent representational power that they 
carry. They can be seen as “identity markers” or “emblems of a community,” precisely due to 
their non-subjective nature (ibid., 52-3). This conceptualisation of symbols is in line with larger 
discussions within the study of signs – semiology, or semiotics. The basic idea of a sign is taken 
from the work of linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, which sees signs/symbols as constructed from 
two elements: a signifier and the signified. The signifier is the actual material, physical element 
(such as sound or image) and the signified is the concept with which the signifier is associated 
(Scott and Marshall 2009). 
In line with this conceptualisation of symbols, I seek to deconstruct Eurovision 
performances from select former Yugoslav countries and identify symbols that carry a 
representational power perceptible only to the people within the social field the symbol is rooted 
in. In the case of Eurovision performances, I see symbols as belonging to three categories: 
audible, textual or visual symbols. Audible symbols would include music and sounds featured in 
songs – practically, the composition and vocalisation. For example, ethnic compositions and 
inclusion of ‘national’ instruments would fit into this category. The use of specific vocal 
interpretations would also belong into this category: such as the ululation in turbo-folk music in 
Serbia, noted in the previous chapter. Textual symbols would include lyrics and the general 
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thematic, or context, of the songs. The textual symbol analysis can be difficult to conduct, due to 
a variety of potential meanings. Some can be as overt as the example of the Belarusian 
Eurovision entry in 2011, with the chorus exclaiming “I love Belarus/ Got it deep inside/ I love 
Belarus/ Feel it in my mind.” Others can be very subtle, like the simple mentioning of one event 
to represent a whole set of historical and national meanings, as Mitrović (2010) noted in her 
analysis of the Serbian performance in 2008. Finally, the visual symbols are potentially the most 
fruitful aspect of the analysis. These include a variety of aspects of the very performance, such as 
the costumes, choreographies and background/scene staging in the contest. This has become 
more relevant in the past decade with the proliferation of visual technologies previously unseen 
in European television, and the EBU’s insistence on international technical cooperation and 
development as the primary goals of the contest. Again, there is a spectrum of symbolisms in this 
category. Some are directly derived from traditional and national cultures, transplanted so to say, 
while others are hybridised to appeal to a wider audience while simultaneously maintaining a 
sense of national authenticity, or at least a semblance of it. 
Together, the results of the interviews and performance analysis can help us better 
understand the connections between diasporic identities and the effect that transnational cultural 
events can have on them. Seeing whether the aims of the performances have been reflected 
accordingly in people’s perceptions and actions in lieu of voting, is instrumental in the 
understanding the effect Eurovision can have as a symbolic stage for the nation. In the following 
chapter, I will present the results of my performance analysis, which will encompass all the 
songs from Serbo-Croatian speaking countries starting with 1993, and the former Yugoslavia 
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from 1989-92. This encompasses a total of fifty-seven performances from six countries
39
, over a 
period of 24 years. While some performances are more symbolically relevant or fruitful than 
others, and some will get more space in my analysis and interpretation, I also include some of the 
performances that do not fulfil the criteria of my symbolic categories, and discuss what that 
means for my research.
                                                 
39
 The beginning year is 1989 and the end year is 2013. Therefore, Bosnia & Herzegovina (1993-2012): 18 entries;  
Croatia (1992-2013): 21 entries; Montenegro (2007-13): 5 entries; Serbia (2007-13): 7 entries; Serbia & Montenegro 
(2004-05): 2 entries; and Yugoslavia (1989-92): 4 entries. Serbia & Montenegro was the union of the two republics 
that lasted from 1992 to 2006, when it was dissolved, and Montenegro and Serbia became independent states. 
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Chapter Five: 
Everyday Spaces for Diasporic Mobilisation 
1. Setting the Stage for the Social Mobilisation of Diasporas 
 In his work, Sökefeld (2006) isolated the three issues that the social mobilisation of 
diasporas is, for him, based on: political opportunities, mobilising structures and practices, and 
framing. While my research focuses mainly on the framing and mobilising structures, it is 
important to see to what extent the political context within Sweden is in fact favourable towards 
diasporic social mobilisation. The literature featured in Chapter Two paints a changing picture of 
Swedish attitudes towards migrants since World War II, and charts how Swedish public opinion 
has dramatically altered over the decades, from the multiculturalist ideals of 1975 to the 
integrationist policies in place since 1997. 
In my interviews, I discussed some of the issues of adaptation to Swedish society and my 
informants’ experiences as immigrants and ethnic non-Swedes. These discussions, while not 
directly informing my research questions, nonetheless help frame my research within a larger 
theoretical context of social mobilisation, as well as contextualise my informants’ everyday 
experiences of being immigrants in Sweden. According to Sökefeld’s approach, it is hard if not 
impossible to have a diaspora mobilise without a favourable political environment. The term 
favourable, however, does not necessarily have to indicate a positive environment. A repressive 
environment toward immigrants, in lieu of marginalisation and discrimination, can be very 
favourable to the political organisation and mobilisation of immigrants (Ålund 1999, 111).  
It is important to briefly clarify the meaning and usage of ‘political opportunities’. 
According to Sökefeld (2006, 269), they “refer to the structural, including institutional, 
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conditions that enable the rise of social movements.” It is the politicisation of migrants and 
minorities that is reflected in these opportunities (and conversely, limitations) in multiple ways. 
It is not only self-perceived grievances of minorities, but also the larger structural conditions that 
create the need for a social movement, and subsequently, allow for the creation of a sense of 
shared lived experience, and in extreme cases such as diasporas, identity.   
Through a thorough process of coding, I have observed two major ways in which 
political opportunities have affected the course of diasporic mobilisation; as an external or 
internal differentiation. The external kind is based on the Swedish population’s self-
differentiation from immigrants, which projects and structures a variety of opportunities and 
limitations for different groups of immigrants. The internal kind, on the other hand, is 
exemplified through the immigrants differentiating themselves from the Swedish majority 
population, as well as having an intra-group differentiation in lieu of class. 
External Differentiation via a Hierarchy of Immigrants 
I feel as if I have to try to have some sort of advantage  
[over a Swede]. And I need to really show that I’m something 
good. That I am not the way they think about refugees, but to 
really prove myself. 
    Irma, refugee from Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Overwhelmingly, as Irma’s quote suggests, my informants have felt that there is a 
differentiation between Swedes and immigrants that is enforced by Swedes themselves. Seven of 
my informants, including all but one of the refugee informants, discussed this idea of a 
hierarchised scheme when it comes to the way Swedes approach different types of immigrants. 
Two of my second generation informants also mentioned it while reflecting on how Yugoslav 
migrants used to be seen by Swedes in contrast to how they are seen nowadays. The 
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hierarchisation seems to fall along socio-cultural and racial lines and is not exclusive to Sweden 
but is a larger trend in Western Europe and the ‘West’ (Ålund 1999; Ford 2011).  
Over a decade ago, Marita Eastmond (1998, 176) noted that former Yugoslavs are seen as 
culturally closer to Swedes than African or Asian migrants, for example. At the same time, 
Aleksandra Ålund (1999) observed the promotion of a cultural dichotomy of “Swedish vs. 
Ethnic,” which implies a “natural order” of cultures and ethnicities. A natural order where the 
Swedish culture is naturally “superior” to other cultures (ibid., 107-8). Allan Pred (2000) also 
discussed in long detail the experiences of immigrants of colour and their struggles in the 
everyday context of Sweden – conditions that Caucasian immigrants do not necessarily face.  
The concept of a hierarchised approach to migrants is a prominent way how my 
informants seem to understand the Swedish social context in regards to immigration. This view 
aligns with the main findings of Robert Ford’s (2011) research on immigrant hierarchies in the 
United Kingdom. He observed a “consistent hierarchy of preferences between immigrant groups, 
with white and culturally more proximate immigrant groups [being] less opposed than non-white 
and culturally more distinct immigrants” (ibid., 107). This can be easily applied to the Swedish 
context and other Western European countries. The hierarchy can be understood as a ladder-
based or pyramid-shaped system (see Figure 1). On the apex are Nordic migrants from 
neighbouring Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Underneath them are other ‘Westerners’ from 
Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world: British, Americans, Canadians, Germans, etc. On 
the very bottom of the pyramid are the ‘racially’ and ‘culturally’ most distantly-perceived sub-
Saharan Africans.  
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Figure 1: A rendition of the 
hierarchised immigrant 
pyramid, as described by some 
of my informants. It features 
Nordics on top of the pyramid 
being the closest to Swedes. 
Sub -Saharan Africans are 
located on the bottom of the 
pyramid, as the least socio-
culturally close to Swedes. 
 
 
The pyramid is both a culturally and racially based scheme. Issues faced by people of 
colour in Sweden presented by Pred (2000) are reflected in the pyramid itself. As one of my 
informants said: “One still looks at the colour of your skin, of your complexion, which country 
you come from.” Two of my informants, both blonde-haired and blue-eyed, noted how their 
looks tend not to ‘out’ them as not ethnically Swedish, so that they are not necessarily affected in 
the same way as a person of colour would be, or even just a person of darker complexion. 
However, people still experience culturally-institutionalised problems due to not being visibly 
Swedish, especially when it comes to employment opportunities.  
Both Eastmond (1998, 176) and Ålund (1999, 108) pointed out that in a Sweden where 
Swedishness is the normative status quo, cultural distinctiveness is often both a social and 
economic disadvantage. While my informants had a variety of career paths, four directly 
addressed issues with gaining meaningful employment or experiencing difficulties with the 
recognition of their educational degrees from abroad. Just as it was the case with many of  
Povrzanović Frykman’s informants in her research on Bosnian refugees’ employment 
opportunities (2012), Jasmina, a labour migrant, experienced many of the same problems with 
her degree. She now needs to go back to university and fulfil the course requirements to get the 
Swedish equivalent of  her degree from Bosnia, before she can work in her field. As this is not 
Nordics 
"Westerners" 
Other Europeans 
Asians / Latin Americans 
Middle Easterners & North 
Africans 
Sub-Saharan Africans 
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free for non-citizens at the university level, she is working a job where she is overqualified and 
underpaid, in order to save up for the Swedish degree. 
 The hardship many refugees faced when they had to flee Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
settle in Sweden was vividly described by my informant Andrea. Although she is a second 
generation migrant and has not experienced the war firsthand, she has worked directly with 
Bosnian refugees during the conflict. In line with hundreds of other stories of forced migration, 
she notes the hardship of the people she tried to help: 
When I worked at the welfare department, it looked as if it was 
harder for those people because they had lost the lives they had, 
and now they have to rebuild their entire life from scratch. I think 
they have acclimatised to Sweden rather well. But I still think there 
is something missing, when you think about what they had before 
[in the former Yugoslavia]. 
Due to my sampling technique, I ended up having informants who were either too young to 
remember much of the war in the first place, or were too young to have had any employment 
experience in the former Yugoslavia. This allowed most of them not to have had to experience 
the re-education that the Swedish government offered (Povrzanović Frykman 2012, 77) or have 
major problems with their previous careers being shattered, as Andrea mentioned. However, 
some did note difficulties with getting employment in general, because of as simple of a thing as 
a name – much like what Eastmond (1998) discussed in her work. Kenan faced severe obstacles 
with finding employment after getting his Master of Arts degree in Sweden. According to him, 
despite his degree being from a Swedish university and him being a Swedish citizen, it is his 
name that makes all the difference: 
For me, the problem is to get to a job interview in the first place, 
because I have a last name that is not Swedish. I am automatically 
placed in the group whose resumes are thrown into the rubbish bin 
first, solely based on the last name. 
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Somewhat to my surprise, some of my informants themselves utilise the pyramid scheme 
in their everyday lives and re-produce the hegemonic power of inequality embedded in it, despite 
themselves being part of the people who are oppressed by it. While some have a positive twist to 
the idea of cultural proximity to Swedes (“We are Europeans after all and Swedes notice that”), 
others recognise the issues with it, but nonetheless still see some benefit to it as well. It is 
pragmaticism at its best, or worst for that matter. Ahmed, for example, recognised both sides of 
the coin, but seemed to appreciate what the hierarchy can do for him personally: 
On the one hand it is sad that they make this big difference, but on 
the other hand it is good for some foreigners. Because I don’t want 
to be lumped together as someone from Somalia, or someone from 
Iraq. But, to be honest, also not with an American. Why should I? I 
know who I am, I know my identity, where I am from, and it is 
important to me that they know the difference. [...] Now, you 
cannot claim that an entire nation is one way or another. But then 
again, I think we all paint our own image of ourselves individually.  
Jasmina was rather critical of some groups lower down the pyramid, aligning with 
general Swedish sentiments of late. While often these things are not talked about out loud, or are 
vilified when expressed in the context of an ‘enlightened western society’ (Pred 2000, 186-223), 
Jasmina was quite candid in her criticism of some national groups in the lower ranks of the 
pyramid. Both Jasmina’s and Ahmed’s approach lend themselves to the othering and “cultural 
distancing” of non-Swedish people, in turn allowing ourselves to feel closer to Swedes than the 
group being othered. This aligns with a general shift to the right in both Swedish politics and 
social attitudes over the past few decades. This is not only evident via election results or 
scholarship by authors like Nordin (2005) and Pred (2000), but it is also through how ordinary 
people live their lives in Sweden.  
Although these external differentiations can be very powerful, especially because they are 
often structurally-imposed, the internal differentiations they perceive carry their weight, as well. 
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The process of differentiation from each other and identity re-affirmation is not an unidirectional 
process. Swedes do it, but so do the immigrants. As I will discuss next, these differentiations 
coming from the immigrants themselves often facilitate strongly ‘naturalised’ and fixed notions 
of both diasporic (i.e. Yugoslavian/Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian) and Swedish identities. 
Internal Differentiations: Mentality Clashes and Class Issues  
In many ways, the people of the former Yugoslavia have a very clear idea of their own 
identity, cultural belonging, and ways of socialising in regards to other nations or larger cultural 
groups, which is often referred to in Serbo-Croatian as mentalitet (mentality). The idea of a 
shared mentality across the former Yugoslavia, despite of the nationalism and processes of state 
disintegration (also known as ‘Balkanisation’), is rather prevalent, especially when contrasted to 
other cultures and geographies. This specific concept of mentality came up quite often in 
conversations with my informants, and was most often used to emphasise the difference that the 
former Yugoslavs experienced when it came to dealing with Swedes. Five informants directly 
addressed this issue of the “Swedish mentality,” and how dramatically different it is from “our 
mentality."
40
 
Some of my informants who came to Sweden as children mentioned difficulties with 
adapting at first, mainly due to a perceived lack of interest in socialising from Swedish children. 
This also extends to a general view that socialising is not as important to Swedes as it is for 
former Yugoslavs. Vesna, 37 now, remembers when she first came to Sweden with her mother in 
1986 and had a hard time adapting due to this very problem: 
                                                 
40
 Again, “our mentality” was unanimously considered as the mentality of the people from “our parts” of Europe. 
This transcended religious or ethnic lines, and was understood more as a cultural connection and affiliation that the 
people of the former Yugoslavia shared. 
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I felt very alone. Swedish kids, Swedish people are not as social as 
our people, and it was very hard on me the first few years. But not 
afterwards. After a few years, once you learn the language and 
everything, their culture, it becomes easier. 
Kenan, who fled the Bosnian conflict at the age of 18, discussed his experiences of 
coping with adaptation along with other immigrant teenagers. The “shared anguish” amongst the 
refugee children made them spend more time together, while having very little initial contact 
with Swedes. While he spent a lot of time with other refugee children from the former 
Yugoslavia, he also spent more time with other non-Yugoslav refugee children than he did with 
Swedes. Overwhelmingly, though, these issues changed with the acquisition of Swedish 
language skills. This was also the case for Jasmina, a labour migrant without any Swedish skills 
when she moved to Sweden. She noted the benefit of her moving on her own, without any family 
or friends, toward her success at integrating very fast to Swedish society and learning Swedish: 
I have been lucky from the get go here in Sweden, to have the 
opportunity to be surrounded by Swedes. To both work and live 
with Swedes. Maybe that is why I had a better foundation to learn 
Swedish – I was listening to it all the time. 
The fact that she did not have a family, whom she would possibly spend most of her time with, 
allowed her to extend her social circle and fully immerse herself into Swedish culture and 
language. Her opinions on the mentality differences between Swedes and former Yugoslavs were 
in stark contrast to the other informants. She dispelled the myth of Swedes as cold or 
inapproachable, or socially inept, as they are often characterised by former Yugoslavs. She went 
to directly compare them to people from the former Yugoslavia and said: “We are warm on 
words, ‘warm, social, welcoming,’ but only on words; they are more in practice.” Many Bosnian 
refugees during the war had similar experiences of Swedes helping them once they arrived in 
refugee camps, as Povrzanović Frykman (2012) noted in her research. Svjetlana, another refugee, 
remembers having many Swedish friends when her family first arrived to Sweden, and how they 
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helped them out: “Those were people who translated for us, who helped us out. The Swedes were 
really understanding and if you lived in the camp first, you got an apartment quite quickly. They 
helped us out a lot.”  
 While the sense of alienation from and inaccessibility of Swedish society was not the 
experience of all my informants, the differences in mentality, especially in regards to social life, 
were a prevalent point of discussion. Senad, who originally moved to study in Sweden, discussed 
the complexity of getting to know Swedish people and Swedish culture to its fullest. As a 
university student in Lund, he struggled with making friendships and meaningful relationships, 
especially in comparison to his social life in a number of places he lived previously. Only after 
finishing university and getting romantically involved with a Swedish person, allowed him to see 
Sweden in a different way. 
As Ahmed pointed out, one needs to find the “thin golden line, where I can balance both 
[the Bosnian and Swedish].” Reaching that thin line is further complicated by class issues within 
the diasporic groups themselves. This was especially prominent as an inter-group differentiation 
based on class and migration backgrounds. In my interviews, especially with the ‘old migration’ 
migrants (i.e. non-refugee, gastarbeiter), there seemed to be a clear sense of difference between 
old and new migrants, and those discussions often featured class-based discourse of difference. 
While I expected some sort of recognition of differences between the old Yugoslav 
gastarbeiter migration and the refugees, the division was surprisingly sharp, especially from the 
gastarbeiter-camp. The large influx of refugees in the 1990s seems to have not only altered the 
way that Swedes looked at immigrants, but it also seems to have influenced the way the already 
established immigrants saw the newcomers. On top of the 41,000 Yugoslav labour migrants in 
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Sweden in 1990
41
, within a year of the Bosnian War over 42,000 refugees came from Bosnia & 
Herzegovina alone and were granted permanent residency on humanitarian grounds. Once 
Swedes started shifting their opinions of immigrants due to the high volumes of refugees, the 
gastarbeiter responded negatively to the backlash unduly directed not just at the refugees, but 
towards them too. However, they responded negatively towards the refugees themselves, 
creating a class differentiation of sorts. 
Before the war, as Goeke (2011, 746) mentioned, workers from the former Yugoslavia 
were considered “exemplary pupils of the integration process” and hard workers. This idea of the 
hard-working Yugoslav worker, commonly known as Jugović in gastarbeiter-circles42, was 
crucial in for the differentiation from the incoming refugees. Maja and Đorđe, both second 
generation migrants, addressed this idea of a shifting popular perception of former Yugoslavs in 
Sweden (from positive to negative) as primarily the fault of the newcomer refugees. Maja 
remembers how her grandmother’s friends would always compliment Yugoslavs as industrious, 
which Maja re-affirms as being because they had a goal: “Let me just earn enough to buy a house 
and then I’m going back!” Nowadays, all she hears is criticism, and she herself admits that “now 
it seems as if everyone is on welfare,” echoing the popular perception that refugees are 
predominantly unemployed, have no wish to get meaningful employment, and abuse the welfare 
system. As another informant said, sarcastically: “However small or large it [the welfare benefit] 
may be, it is regular and secure. Which means, it is perfectly good. Whatever you may get 
monthly, without actually doing any work – amazing!” 
                                                 
41
 According to Statistics Sweden (2014), by the end of 1990 there were 41,053 non-naturalised citizens of the 
former Yugoslavia residing in Sweden. The number of Yugoslav citizens in Sweden never dropped under 38,000 
since 1973, and was relatively consistent between 38,000 and 42,000. 
 
42
 Commonly used phrase across the diasporic communities in Europe. The word Jugović (plural Jugovići) is a play 
on their Yugoslav background (Jugo-), and the very common suffix for last names in the former Yugoslavia, -ić. 
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The class differentiation that Đorđe makes between the Jugovići and refugees has also a 
strong geographical element to it. He reaffirms the idea of the hard-working gastarbeiter saying 
that they were amazing advertising, but that it all changed with the refugees: 
But after the war... You know what, the people who came are, I 
don’t wanna say... garbage. Many... Just go to Malmö, and you 
will see the difference. The difference between the Lund and 
Malmö Jugovići – they are polar opposites! Oh my! It’s like Mars 
and the world [sic]!  
He goes further to compare the Lund Jugovići to a highly educated, hard-working, but somehow 
almost bourgeois-imagined group, despite their working-class roots. The newcomers, 
contrastingly, are presented as lazy, money-focused and tacky (or lacking class). Furthermore, 
the Jugovići are quintessentially ‘more Swedish’ than the refugees: “We have adapted to this 
[Swedish] lifestyle more. We get degrees, we work, we socialise with Swedes. When you go to 
Malmö, people still wear crosses, gold, drive BMWs.” While in reality few would complain 
about owning a BMW, it is the element of ‘lacking class’ that is connected to the imagery Đorđe 
perpetuates of the refugees.
43
 
 The predominantly judgemental images of refugees portrayed in Swedish (and Western 
European) media and public opinion have clearly contributed to a fragmentation of identities of a 
group of people stemming from the same place, but coming from two different eras. It is not 
surprising then that some people who have actively reflected on their identity have struggled 
with their self-identification. For Vesna, her sense of being Swedish is intrinsically tied to being 
middle class, and not working class. Being able to perform a middle class identity, and feeling as 
if it is an authentic self, was crucial to her: 
                                                 
43
 The mentioning of crosses and gold as tasteless and tacky refers to many uneducated, low class people in the 
former Yugoslavia who wear golden crosses on chains, and thick golden necklaces and bracelets. This is an aspect 
of culture and class (or arguably, lack thereof) that is prevalent in the former Yugoslavia and is often looked at 
critically by the middle and upper classes of society. It often signifies a lack of education and is associated with rural 
‘mentalities,’ or urban mentalities corrupted by an influx of rural populations to cities. 
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For me it has a lot to do with belonging to a middle class right now. 
That makes me feel much more Swedish and much more accepted. 
I behave and I know Swedish in a Swedish way, in a Swedish 
middle class way, and then I’m read as a Swedish person because 
of that. It took me 15 years! [laughing] 
While theoretically political opportunities remain favourable for immigrant congregation 
and the development of a diasporic identities, practically there are numerous caveats that 
complicate the situation. Interlocking class relations, hierarchised cultural relations, as well as 
varied majority-minority relations all contribute to a complex landscape of opportunities and 
limitations for diasporic identity creation. There is a range of spaces in the everyday lives of 
immigrants that remind them that despite all the benefits that Sweden might provide them with, it 
is ultimately an imperfect fit. This imperfection provides a space for reflecting toward the 
homeland and the creation and maintenance of transnational connections, both in regards to 
identity and practice. For some the fit is better than for others and the varying degrees of 
commitment to the diasporic identity and community are easily noticeable. In the following sub-
chapter, I will discuss this variance in diasporic self-identifications, along with the discursive 
frames used for the conceptualisation and facilitation of those very identities.  
2. Facilitating Master Frames for Diasporic Identification and Belonging 
 The political opportunities and limitations that the Swedish state and population create 
for immigrants are only one aspect of the social mobilisation of diasporic communities. In this 
sub-chapter I will discuss my findings in regards to discursive master frames as ways in which 
the imagination of diasporic communities is activated from within the national group itself 
(Sökefeld 2006, 267). From the conversations I had with my informants about their sense of 
personal and national identity, and master frames that perpetuate these ideas, a few poignant 
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ideas emerged. Identification with a national identity has been a nearly universally accepted 
concept amongst my informants, while the concept and experience of diaspora was a hotly 
contested one. The often traumatic experiences of war and nationalism (both in the former 
Yugoslavia and the new diasporic communities in Sweden) were also identified as potential 
master frames for the creation and maintenance of an imagination for a national diasporic 
community in Sweden.  
A Sense of Diasporic and Transnational Belonging 
As noted in Chapter Three, primordial ideas of national belonging are still common 
amongst nationalists and the general public. They are often accepted uncritically by the public, 
while scholarship has largely distanced itself from such thinking. In the conversations with my 
informants, I have noticed an uncritical approach by some when it came to the idea of diasporic 
belonging. Mainly, this reflected itself in my informants believing they are diasporic 
automatically because they were born outside of Sweden. This was as much a reflection of 
citizenship as it was of ethnic belonging, as Ahmed and Svjetlana both noted that they are not 
Swedish since they are not ethnically Swedes despite being Swedish citizens. 
A more critical version of this primordialist-based master frame of national identity can 
be seen through the idea of culture. Senad, while being critical of usual national identity politics, 
identifies his connection to the diaspora and his national identity through cultural and traditional 
belonging. He accepts his ethnicity and nationality as fact, while emphasising culture as an 
aspect of understanding his identity: 
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But I am ethnically and nationally a Bosnian and a Bosniak. In that 
traditional-cultural idea of Bosniandom, Herzegoviniandom, and 
Bosniakdom, you can say. Because if I look at my parents... But is 
it one of my most important identities, no. There are far more 
important ones... 
The cultural aspect while being important, is also heavily tied to the sphere of the family, as a 
representative of a culture from the homeland. Kenan, who moved as an 18-year-old and was a 
largely formed personality when he came to Sweden, noted his relationship to the diaspora 
through his family. While he himself does not necessarily feel as an active or even self-
identifying member of the diaspora, he does feel his parents’ participation in the diasporic 
community makes him diasporic by proxy, whatever that may entail: 
I feel as if I am part of the community because my parents are part 
of that community, my entire family is part of that community, and 
a lot of my closest friends are part of that community. But do I feel 
some sort of connectedness with them solely because we come 
from the same country, whether Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia? 
Not really.     
On the other hand, second generation migrants tended not to identify with the diaspora as 
much, with the notable exception of one who identified with the Serbian diaspora. The 
identification, again, was due to both her parents coming from Serbia and having that cultural 
connection from a young age. In Maja’s case, these cultural connections trickled down to her 
children as well (also born in Sweden), who not only participate in diasporic organisations but 
regularly travel with their grandparents to Serbia for extended periods. 
 It is important to note the idea of active participation and performance as being part of a 
sense of belonging for some informants. Just as Maja understands her identity through the 
performance of transnational activities, such as travel to the homeland and diasporic organisation 
participation, others have also discussed these ideas. Merima, who is married to a Bosnian man, 
understands her belonging to a diasporic community through her actions, more than a self-
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identificatory process. Aside from travelling to Bosnia and owning property there (which are also 
participatory aspects), she notes that her family is part of the diaspora simply “because we are 
still interested, and we watch our television [laughs]! That way I do not feel as if we are that 
distant.”  
As a mother of two young children, Merima noted how she would not want to withhold a 
part of her childrens’ identity from them by not actively exposing them to it. In a fundamentally 
primordial fashion, she projects the Bosnian identity onto her children through the actions she 
takes to ensure that they eventually recognise themselves as part of the Bosnian national 
community. While she recognises the importance of integration within Swedish society, she 
emphasises safeguarding of one’s own tradition, especially for the generation of people who 
experienced the Bosnian War. In a tragicomic example, she boils down her fears about what 
could happen to her children if they were not properly ‘initiated’ into their Bosnian identity: 
There are many parents who talk only in Swedish with their 
children. And when they go to Bosnia, they do not know how to 
talk to their grandma or grandpa, or play or talk with kids there... 
By noticing this common phenomenon amongst second generation migrant children (Mesarić 
Žabčić 2006), Merima unknowingly points out the fallacies of primordial thinking: if you do not 
know you are Bosnian and if you do not practice that Bosnianness, you are effectively not 
Bosnian. In a sense, this ties in with Fox and Miller-Idriss’ (2008) ideas on the everyday 
reproduction of national identities through the paradigms of talking / choosing / consuming / 
performing the nation. Though their theory is not based on diasporas but on people living within 
their country of origin, it is easily applicable in a transnational social field of the diaspora. The 
primordialist master frame of identity becomes more complicated in this way, which most 
informants noted in our conversations. 
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After years in Sweden, some of my informants recognised their self-perception as 
changing and them adopting parts of what is considered ‘culturally Swedish’ into their own 
everyday lives. For some people the identity question has gotten to be somewhat confusing, like 
for Merima who left Bosnia & Herzegovina at the age of 10, who says: “I cannot even tell where 
I am from anymore. [...] But it is difficult now. Since we have many places to live. Nowadays, I 
just say that my home is where my family is.” Others, like Milan, a second generation migrant, 
never experienced a confusion of identity in the first place. For him, his identity was based not 
on nationality but on what his family practiced, which was a hybridised Serbo-Swedish culture: 
“I mean, I do enjoy knowing my culture, and what I mean when I say ‘culture’ is what we do at 
home. How we celebrate those holidays. How we socialise for those holidays.” 
An interesting observation came from Senad, who claimed that although he is a “child of 
Bosnia,” he grew to become a “man of Sweden.” Spending his entire adult life in Sweden has 
made him feel a connection to the country too, fortified by some Swedish societal norms and 
values he identifies with the most. He emphasises the Swedish norm of individualism and social 
orderliness as especially stimulating aspects of Swedish society and identity; aspects of society 
he has co-opted for himself. Similarly, the majority of my refugee informants discussed this 
same aspect of their personality, which they saw as a mixture of Bosnianness and Swedishness. 
Ahmed and Kenan, both refugees, note how they cannot divorce themselves from their Bosnian 
upbringing and identity, as they were relatively grownup when they fled to Sweden. At the same 
time, they (un)willingly took up aspects of Swedish culture into their own behaviour and 
understanding of selves, further complicating their identities. In line with an ethno-symbolist 
understanding of nationality, this allows for the maintenance of some sort of ‘original,’ identity 
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that is based on previous experience and memory, while being altered by more recent 
experiences and socialisations. 
Vesna, who moved before the war and had a long period of disassociation from the 
former Yugoslav communities in Malmö, pointed out a fascinating aspect of her identity 
struggle. She acknowledges, just like Ahmed, Kenan and Merima that she feels like something 
between a Swede and a person from the former Yugoslavia. However, being a queer female 
immigrant, she has actively thought about her identity since it is based on an intersectionality of 
various variables of marginalisation
44
. Yet another variable came into play after the collapse of 
the former Yugoslavia: 
I don’t feel like a Swede, just feel like something in between 
Swedish, Yugoslavian, and Bosnian. And it is strange becoming a 
Bosnian, as well. I’m not used to that. I wasn’t a part of the war, 
and I didn’t have that experience.  
Her complex identity as a queer female immigrant was further complicated as her cultural and 
national roots were displaced from afar. While being born in the Bosnian republic within the 
former Yugoslavia, for her family Bosnianness was overshadowed by a sense of a nation-wide 
Yugoslavianness. When the country fell apart through a series of conflicts, she struggled with her 
self-identification. Are you still a Yugoslav if there is no Yugoslavia, or are you a Bosnian now 
because that is a new state in place of the old one? This is also telling through second generation 
migrants’ usage of the term Jugović. The term is used to (sometimes consciously and sometimes 
unconsciously) differentiate between the ‘old migration’ of Yugoslavs and the more recent 
refugee migrants from the former Yugoslavia. It is also a term that none of my refugee 
informants used and it seemed like an exclusively gastarbeiter-phenomenon.  
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 “I think I’ve thought much more about my identity and the different parts which my identity contains than a 
regular Swedish person. I’m a woman, I’m gay, I’m an immigrant. You are forced to... well, not forced to, but I have 
thought a lot about it. And have had some experiences, good and bad, because of those things.” 
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This fluidity of identity, while acknowledged by many informants, has at times been 
questioned from within the diasporic communities themselves, especially when they went against 
larger ‘national interests.’ From my interviews, it seems as if most of the time those master 
frames of national identity were not threatened by Swedish influences but that the threats came 
from within the Yugoslav diasporic groups themselves. People from mixed marriages (three in 
my sample), all experienced different degrees of difficulties during the conflicts in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Croatia. Some experiences were relatively benign, such as people asking 
“whose side I’m on,” which is what Andrea dealt with throughout the conflicts. She had a ready 
answer to the questioners: “When you ask me that, it is as if I would have to choose who I like 
better, my mom or my dad. And I can never do that. Neither one [Croatia or Serbia] are right, but 
I cannot choose. Why would I?”  
Others, like Irma’s parents who are a mixed Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim [Bosniak] 
couple, had such severe issues with the Bosniak community in the small town they lived in in 
Sweden that they decided to move to Malmö the first opportunity they got, in order to escape the 
hostile environment. Nationalist ideologies within the master frames played a big role here, 
influencing the everyday lives of people who wanted nothing to do with them but were unable to 
escape their reach. For some, the experiences within the diasporic communities, but also from 
back in the former Yugoslav republics, assisted in forming a critical (and sometimes hostile) 
stance toward diasporic communities. For others, it fuelled a straight-out rejection of identifying 
with the diaspora and an overall negative outlook on former Yugoslavs in Sweden. 
The negative image that the diasporic communities have developed back in the former 
Yugoslavia was expressed most articulately by Jasmina. She, like many others (including 
myself), has had the image of the diaspora marred by experiences of diasporic people visiting her 
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hometown every summer for the holidays. While discussing why she fervently rejects being “put 
in the same bucket” with “the diaspora,” Jasmina recalls her disgust with the way diasporic 
people would behave when they returned to her hometown in Serbia:  
Of all the things I hate, I hate the most our diaspora in the summer. 
Sinan Sakić [a turbo-folk singer] blasting out of the open window 
in the car; some ‘souped up’ car, which I now know is bought on a 
loan, leasing, and all that other stuff. You put your elbow out the 
window, put your sunglasses on, spend money and talk about how 
WOW the West and Europe are. When our people would return 
from Germany, Sweden, wherever, and would talk about how they 
lived there, I had the feeling that those were different planets. That 
it’s some heaven on earth, where you drink ambrosia, and where 
everyone is in big white togas, and where everything is good, 
everyone travels, no one does any work; you pick money from 
some trees. You know? [That’s how] Our diaspora people present 
the West to us poor folk down in the Balkans. And once I got here 
and saw all of this, now especially I have no wish to be lumped 
together with those diasporic people. I am not diasporic. 
This view is also shared by Đorđe, as noted previously, but one that is based on class and 
geographical differentiation: he only sees the Malmö diaspora in that light (“When you go to 
Malmö, people still wear crosses, gold, drive BMWs”). Ironically, it was the gastarbeiter 
migrants who started the trend, since their main goal was to earn enough money to secure a good 
life for themselves back in the former Yugoslavia, hence they funnelled funds into building and 
developing their properties. Some people, like Vesna, had negative experiences with the diaspora 
that were more directed toward her personally. Her family had issues with gossip within the 
community, leading to her choice to disassociate herself from former Yugoslavs and push her to 
actively try to achieve a ‘Swedish identity.’  
 Kenan and Ahmed, both exiled from their homes as teenagers, had an altogether different 
issue with being labelled ‘diasporic,’ or more specifically, being called a dijasporac45. Their 
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 Dijasporac is the male form of the word that means ‘member of the diaspora’ in Serbo-Croatian. 
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issue with the term is due the politics and representational power it carries. Kenan notes how he 
first identified with being a refugee, like the tens of thousands of Bosnians who came during the 
conflict. Now, after almost twenty years in Sweden, he struggles with how to label himself – it 
has been too long for him to call himself a refugee, but he refuses to use the term ‘diasporic.’ 
What both him and Ahmed pointed out was the negative connotation that the word often carries, 
as is evidenced by Jasmina’s statement above. More importantly, their dissatisfaction with the 
term is about the trivialisation of their experience of displacement, as Ahmed puts it: 
I must be honest, and say that I get horribly irritated when I go 
down [to Bosnia] and someone calls me dijasporac. Because that 
is an ugly word to me. It is somehow in a negative context. I did 
not just take my car and drive away because I felt like it. I was 
thrown out. And I cannot come to terms with people calling me 
dijasporac, when I was born there and I am Bosnian. The fact that 
I was forcefully displaced, and that I live in Sweden now, well, 
that was not my choice. 
Experiences like the ones that Jasmina described taint the image of diasporic people in the 
former Yugoslavia, leading to the creation of a negative connotation to the term dijasporac, or 
dijaspora, which are often used interchangeably. In that light, it is understandable that Ahmed 
and Kenan would have an issue with the terminology, especially considering their histories and 
experiences within the Bosnian conflict and its aftermath. This discussion brings us to the next 
major master frame for former Yugoslav communities, which is the war and nationalism. 
 War and Nationalism as Master Frames of National Identity 
 Discussing the war experiences of my informants was a difficult task and one which I 
intended to leave largely unaddressed when I was planning this project. However, the war came 
up in every one of my interviews. Indeed, now it is clear to me that it is almost impossible to 
discuss the diasporas of the former Yugoslavia without talking about the war. Experiences such 
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as Kenan’s and Ahmed’s were rather common amongst refugees, as was reflected in my 
informants’ experiences of having to leave their homes and move to Sweden. For them, but also 
for people who stayed in Bosnia during the war and managed to go through all of the war’s 
hardships, the conflicts are a strong master frame for identity.  
Unsurprisingly, in an ethnic conflict, ethnic differences are heightened and focused on, 
especially for people who are victimised because of their ethnic or religious identity. I tried to 
steer clear of getting into overly emotional and personal discussions of the war, trying to focus 
on the changes of one’s identity as a result of the war instead. However, I would not be giving 
due credit to the conflict and its consequences if I did not at least acknowledge the life-
threatening situations many people found themselves in, including some of my informants. 
Though (or maybe precisely because) he did not escape Bosnia during the war, Senad carries 
emotional scars that influence the way he sees his homeland to this day: 
Bosnia, as a homeland, has given me very little. As a matter of 
fact, it has given me very ugly memories. Many memories of 
exclusion, humiliation. Very, very ugly memories. I have many 
reasons to cut it all off, like some of my friends have done. I had 
periods where it would have been easier to just cut off that link. 
Maybe it would have been easier in a way. But in another way, 
maybe it would have been harder. 
 The conflicts left concrete and complex emotional and material scars for some, while for 
others they ushered a period of challenges and changes to their identities. As previously 
mentioned, Vesna suddenly found herself struggling with not being Yugoslavian any more but 
now being Bosnian, and wondering how to reconcile that with her own idea of herself. It surely 
did not help the way that the Swedish media depicted the conflicts in Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
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Croatia, where Yugoslavia was depicted as the aggressor
46
. Naturally, if a place you have such 
strong familial and personal/identity connections with is suddenly presented as a villain on the 
international stage, many might struggle with rationalising their own identity and position 
towards their homeland. Merima, who was 10 at the time, remembers her family’s and 
environment’s constant perpetuation of Bosnian Muslim identity, especially in relation to the 
Bosnian War: 
In order to hold onto the little of your own when you move to 
another country, you had to repeat it all the time to yourself, 
somehow. And [for] us, the children of the war, that is all our 
parents talked about [i.e. nationalism and the war]. ‘You are this, 
you are that, you are a Bosniak,’ etc. And it sticks somehow. 
While some had their identities fortified, others had theirs uprooted altogether, some were 
just confused with the whole situation. Milan’s being a second generation migrant from a mixed 
Serbian-Swedish marriage, who grew up in both a multicultural southern Sweden and in a small 
multicultural town in Serbia over the summers, gave him an idea of multiculturalism and 
harmony in inter-ethnic relations. He discussed how his parents had friends from all over the 
former Yugoslavia, including all religions and ethnic backgrounds, and how, ultimately, 
“everything turned out so stupid when the war broke out. Everyone started thinking in a 
completely different way, and I just did not understand that.” However, the conflict is still a 
strong driving force for many peoples’ identifications and understandings of themselves as 
individuals as well as members of larger collectivities. According to Merima, the war 
reverberated in the diaspora as well: 
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 At first, it was the remnants of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) fighting in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and at 
the beginning of 1992 in Bosnia & Herzegovina. At least officially, by the end of May 1992 the JNA had withdrawn 
from Bosnia & Herzegovina, but the fighting had continued through its offspring - the Army of Republika Srpska 
(VRS). The VRS acted as the Bosnian Serb army in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia & Herzegovina, but was largely 
supplied and supported by the newly created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002, 238-9). 
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The war was present also here, but while the war ended down there 
and people do not care anymore, here there is a war after the war. 
And some people behave as if it is the ‘90s still. They are still in 
that small world of the ‘90s, unfortunately.  
Nationalist aspects of diasporic communal identity are still heavily present, according to 
many of my informants. While some have argued that nationalism is weaker in the diaspora than 
back in the former Yugoslavia, others have claimed the opposite. There are also differing views 
on what is meant by nationalism. On the one end, we have Andrea who fundamentally questions 
whether the majority of the former Yugoslavs in Malmö are nationalists, while on the other end 
we have Merima’s stance on the continuation of the war mentality post-war. This continuation is 
visible in problems inter-ethnic couples still face today, for example. Jasmina experienced 
backlash from some local former Yugoslav Muslims, when she briefly dated a Serbian man in 
Malmö. He also experienced backlash from his Serbian diasporic acquaintances and friends for 
dating a non-Serbian (or more specifically, a Bosniak) woman. Through these practices, borders 
between the ethnic groups were being thickened and emphasised. 
However, it seems as if the situation has been changing in the last few years. During the 
war in Bosnia and some years after, there was absolutely no mixing with other ethnic groups, 
which often included even Swedes. Many of my informants shared anecdotes of parents getting 
into confrontations with their children for not dating within their own diasporic national 
community but having Swedes as romantic partners. From being a norm in the 1990s, now it is 
changing, and most significantly in relation to Swedes. These changes were also reflected within 
my informant group, where three informants were in romantic relationships with Swedes, 
another three with people from their own ethnic group, and one in a relationship with a person 
from another ethnic group from the former Yugoslavia. 
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Beyond romantic interactions, the nationalist master frame is ever-present in the lives of 
many, often as part of the legacy of the wars and traumas related to them. The indoctrination into 
a clear Bosnian Muslim identity by her family that Merima experienced seems not to have been 
just an isolated incident. Jasmina noted this early on when she moved to Sweden and she 
expressed disdain and disappointment with the situation she came to find within the diasporic 
communities in Malmö, especially in regards to the youth and second generation migrants: 
They’ve grown up on this [Swedish] belief that we are all 
somehow the same, that we should not be divided, especially not 
like we do back there. But they pride themselves on some Serbian 
or some Muslim [nationalist] ideas. That is horrible. That was one 
of the things that surprised me the most, and quite frankly, 
disappointed me the most, as well. 
This nationalist permeation did not only affect the refugees and newcomers in the 1990s, but also 
some of the older gasterbeiter migrants, who suddenly readjusted their views to fit the pervasive 
nationalist framework from back in the former Yugoslavia. Đorđe, who was born in Sweden by 
Bosnian (Serb) parents and has even lived in Bosnia for a brief period in the 1980s, nonetheless 
rejects his Bosnian identity completely. In a simple act of identity performance, he reaffirms that 
he never supports Bosnia & Herzegovina in any sort of competitive setting but supports Serbia 
instead. When asked why, he elaborated by presenting a nationalist framework behind his 
thinking: 
I do not belong to Bosnia. OK, let’s say it this way. I can say that I 
am a Serb, that I am a Serbian Orthodox. I know that you are a 
Serb, Croat, Muslim, whatever. But everyone who has moved here 
and says ‘I’m from Bosnia’ is a Bosnian Muslim. That’s when I 
tell Swedes ‘I’m from Bosnia,’ they immediately think ‘Oh, a 
Muslim refugee.’ And that is not what I am. I was born here. 
That’s why I do not have... it’s like a foreign country to me. But I 
cannot say I am from Serbia, when I am not... 
This nationalist-based argument is founded on the priority that is given to the differentiation 
from the ‘war enemy,’ in this case the Bosniaks. Out of an irrational fear of being labelled a 
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Bosnian, which allegedly implies being Muslim and a refugee, by someone he does not know, he 
is willing to refute his belonging to the place he is from and where he has even lived. 
Furthermore, the nationalist framing allows for an appropriation of an altogether different 
identity to fit the larger nationalist discourse, one that is easily digestible and presentable. It is 
also telling how irrational the stance is considering that previous to this statement Đorđe said that 
he was an atheist and not religious at all. However, when it came to national identity and 
belonging, religion instantaneously gained in significance, regardless whether it is a practiced 
religion or one that is symbolically projected through the lens of nation.  
Similarly, Svjetlana, a child of a mixed Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat couple, admits 
to “maybe cheer[ing] a bit harder for Serbia and Croatia. I do not feel tied to Bosnia & 
Herzegovina the same way [as to Croatia and Serbia].” Again, this lack of national ties to 
Bosnia, despite being born there, owning property and having friends and family there, is purely 
based on the overarching nationalist discourses that shape the political landscape of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina but also its diasporic communities across Europe and the world. A sense of identity 
is refined not only along the axis of religion, but also through nationalist framings of ethnicity, 
history, and understandings of the aggressor-victim dynamics in the Bosnian War. 
 These larger nationalist discourses and master frames of national identity are present in 
everyday lives both of people in the former Yugoslavia and in diasporic communities. When 
nationalism and inter-ethnic hostilities are perpetuated and focused on, it is not surprising to see 
these ideas as integral in the overall conceptualisation of one’s national identity. Beyond one’s 
own identity, the collective understanding of diasporic belonging is heavily shaped by the 
experiences of war and its consequences. The ‘nationalisation’ of the older gastarbeiter 
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generation, which according to my informants used to be largely non-nationalist
47
, is also 
indicative of the power of the nationalist master frames within the diasporic communities. 
 The space for diasporic mobilisation in the Malmö metropolitan area, but also Sweden at 
large, is clearly present and utilised. In part, this is due to the earlier noted imperfection of the 
migratory fit from the former Yugoslavia to Sweden. The orientation toward the homeland is 
also evident in the above noted re-nationalisation of older generations of migrants, but also in the 
maintenance of a strong nationalist framework for collective identity. While it is understandable 
that conflicts would have an effect on collective memories and identities, the nationalism from 
‘back home’ transferred quite easily to the Swedish diasporic context. Most of my informants, 
however, tried to steer clear of nationalist ideologies and emphasised their own anti-nationalist 
sentiments, at least rhetorically.  
 The nationalist frameworks at work in the diasporic communities (but also the anti-
nationalist currents) provide an interesting context for the Eurovision Song Contest to play out. 
Theoretically, being an international contest of nations, the ESC should be an almost ‘too good 
to be true’ vehicle for the perpetuation of nationalist ideologies and agendas. In the next chapter, 
I will analyse nationalist master frames perpetuated in the ESC, and discuss the ways in which 
the contest facilitates a sense of national identity maintenance and its potential for diasporic 
social mobilisation. The fundamental question here is whether the ESC can actually be seen as a 
mobilising structure for diasporic communities, or at least a way for the maintenance of already 
existing diasporic identities via a perpetuation of nationalist symbolism.  
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 There were exceptions, of course, especially when it came to ethnic Croats. Some left the former Yugoslavia due 
to political reasons (many being anti-communists), not solely to seek better employment opportunities abroad. Many 
of those were already nationalist, long before the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were even in their inception.  
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Chapter Six: 
National Symbolism, Diasporic Nationalism and 
the Eurovision Song Contest 
1. Performing the Nation on the Eurovision Stage 
In the simplest of terms, the Eurovision Song Contest is an annual international music 
competition. However, the event that started off as an attempt at pan-(West)European technical 
cooperation in the post-war era ended up becoming the most watched non-sporting televised 
event in the world. The sheer scale of the geographical reach of the contest is staggering and 
indicates its importance in the global mediascape. Not only have there been over 40 participating 
countries from across Europe, but it has been broadcast as far as Australia, Canada and China.
48
 
Being Europe’s biggest cultural media event is largely helped by Eurovision having all 
the makings of a spectacle – the drama, the excitement and an unparalleled audio-visual impact. 
It is a public arena where a multiplicity of narratives are exhibited, multi-scalar but inter-linked: 
from personal narratives of the artists and national narratives of the countries they are 
representing, to larger international narratives of geopolitical relations in Europe and the world. 
It is a stage where the national is heightened due to Eurovision’s competitive staging, in line with 
other (mainly sporting) events, such as the FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championship or 
the Olympic Games.   
In her research on South Korea’s hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Rachael Miyung 
Joo (2006, 57) concluded that “Koreans located elsewhere in the world were likewise connected 
                                                 
48
 While Australia has a decades-long relationship with live broadcasting the contest, Canada and China have 
recently started airing the contest. However, it is not live but months after the actual contest takes place. Chinese 
broadcaster CCTV, aired the 2013 edition of the contest (Eurovision 2013), while Canadian OutTV broadcast the 
2014 edition of the contest (Eurovision Canada 2014). 
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through the representations of national crowds. All those who participated in the World Cup – 
whether as viewers, netizens, shoppers, or spectators – combined to produce a national 
commodity spectacle.” Similarly, using Billig’s theory of banal nationalism, Sabelo Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2011, 291) argues that for South Africans, the hosting of the World Cup in 2010 led to 
“nationalism and patriotism [to become] [...] ubiquitous during the one-month long tournament” 
and that ultimately “the emotional gains of the World Cup cannot be quantified” (ibid., 292). If 
we look at Eurovision from a similar stance, can we argue that Eurovision helps facilitate a sense 
of national belonging for diasporic communities? Is Eurovision a potential mobilising structure 
for diasporic communities, or maybe a little shot or injection of national pride that helps stir 
those unquantifiable “emotional gains” toward the nation? 
Before presenting and analysing the insights from my interviews, I first need to address 
Eurovision’s long history of national representations in regards to the former Yugoslav countries. 
As presented in Chapter Three, the contest has a well-researched history of national 
representations. The literature suggests that Eurovision is quite often a stage for the perpetuation 
of national symbolism and values, as facilitated through its audio-visual channels. In the 
following section, I will present my analysis of the live performances on the Eurovision stage of 
select former Yugoslav republics – Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
This will provide a better contextual understanding of the ways those countries utilise Eurovision 
as a way to present imaginations of the nation for domestic and international consumption. 
The Performance Analysis Process 
My analysis of Eurovision performances from the Serbo-Croatian speaking former 
Yugoslav countries totalled fifty-seven performances over the span of twenty-four years. The 
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first performance analysed was Yugoslavia’s only winning entry from 1989, Rock me. The 
specific year has been chosen due to its importance in the larger socio-political shifts in Europe, 
as they developed from the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Iron Curtain. The 
contest in 1989 was held a few months prior to the monumental changes in Berlin (the contest 
was held in April, while the Wall officially fell in November), but it is important to see how the 
former country represented itself in Eurovision just before and after the political liberalisation of 
Eastern Europe began. 
Prior to delving into the actual analysis, I will briefly explain my process in the 
performance analysis, and how I delineated national symbols. As noted in the methods chapter, 
my analysis involved identifying audible (compositional and vocal), textual (lyrical) and visual 
(performance) symbols that allude to national belonging and identity. After listening to each of 
the songs and watching the performances multiple times
49
, I have created a scale of national 
symbolism that is present in each of the three aspects. It is important to note that this is not a 
‘scientific’ scale by any means. Its main purpose was to enable an easier overview of trends and 
patterns over the years and across countries. I have created the scale based on a spectrum from 
national to international symbolism (from +2 to -2), for each of the three categories (audible, 
textual, and visual). The allocated numeric values correspond to the following observations
50
:  
-2 Completely foreign appeal / performance 
-1 An international ‘flavour’ to the song / performance 
0 Non-national, mainstream sound / performance 
+1 Some national symbolism 
+2 Explicit / strong national symbolism 
 
                                                 
49
 Appendix C features a list with links to videos of the 57 live performances used in the analysis. 
 
50
 The complete list of all the numeric values allocated to each of the performances is provided in Appendix D. 
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I must emphasise the fluidity in the understanding of national symbols and to what 
purpose those are being used. My own positionality and knowledge of national symbols have 
been critical in the construction of the scale and the allocation of the appropriate scores. As much 
of an enabling factor as my positionality as a well-educated Bosnian who has experienced the 
nationalist conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina is, it has also its limitations. I am not an expert on 
national symbolism by any means, and the scale should be understood accordingly. It is not a 
definite source of national symbolism within the analysed performances, and it should be looked 
at critically – there are surely more symbolisms that have escaped me, as has been the case with 
some previous scholarly work on the contest. That being said, the scale is not arbitrary either, 
and it is based on a variety of noted symbolisms within the three categories observed. 
Major Trends and Observations in the Performances  
Over the twenty-four years encompassed in my analysis, it is not difficult to notice some 
trends in the songs chosen to represent the former Yugoslavia and its successor states in the ESC. 
The first thing to note is the frequency of national symbolism occurrences within these fifty-
seven performances. Fifteen songs (26%) had no noticeable national or international symbolic 
value to them, meaning they got a score of 0. Interestingly enough, the same number of 
performances has been identified as having national symbolism and international symbolism – 
twenty songs (35%) each. Only two songs had conflicting symbolisms when it came to their 
musical/audible aspects and their visual presentation – the Croatian song in 1995, and Serbian 
song in 2007 (see Figure 2). None of the songs fulfilled all three criteria (audible, textual, and 
visual) in regard to international appeal, while six songs (11%) fulfilled all three criteria for 
national symbolism. From those six songs, four were in 2005 and 2006, representing a peak in 
national symbolism with the performances. However, at the same time as the two performances 
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in 2005 had heavy national symbolism (Croatia, and Serbia & Montenegro), the Bosnian song 
went in quite the opposite direction – it was so ‘mainstream pop’ that it seemed as if it were 
disassociating itself from the national, actively aiming for an international quality. 
Figure 2: Number of songs differentiated by their given national symbolism score, as per the 
                author’s analysis. 
 
 
Focusing on state-level trends yields some interesting patterns (see Figure 3). Out of the 
eighteen Bosnian songs, seven had national symbolism (39%), nine had an international appeal 
(50%), while two were without any national or international symbolism (1%). Croatia on the 
other hand, has been much more neutral with their representations. As many as 43% (nine out of 
twenty-one) of Croatian performances had neither international or national symbolism and 
associations, while six (29%) featured national symbolism and only five (24%) featured 
international associations. One of the Croatian songs featured mixed (inter)national messages. 
Montenegro has only participated five times, and none of its songs have had any national 
symbolism. Two of the songs (40%) were relatively international in their performances and 
musical qualities, one being a rap-dubstep song (in 2013) and the other one a German-penned 
retro pop number (in 2009).  
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Interestingly, Serbia is the country that has had the strongest patterns here. While the first 
song representing Serbia as an independent country (in 2007) sent mixed signals to Europe, the 
majority of its seven representations had quite clear national symbolism. Four (57%) songs had 
national symbolism, while only one song (14%) had an international appeal. The union of Serbia 
and Montenegro (2004-05) saw both of its songs feature national symbols quite prominently, 
while the former Yugoslavia saw the opposite trend 1989-91, where the songs featured 
international flavours in favour of national ones.   
Figure 3: National and international symbolism scores by country, as per the author’s analysis. 
 
We should note the way the former Yugoslavia represented itself in the last few years 
before its collapse, in the period between 1989 and 1991. In 1992, the song representing 
Yugoslavia was actually representing the new union of Montenegro and Serbia, which was 
established after the other federal republics declared independence from the former Yugoslavia 
by April 1992. In the period of 1989-91, the songs tended to be non-national, and arguably even 
had an international flavour to them. The 1989 entry, Rock me, which even won the contest, 
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represented the  pop-rock scene of Yugoslavia, 
and was completely devoid of national 
symbolism. Its successor in 1990, Hajde da 
ludujemo (Let’s go crazy) was a mainstream pop 
song, whose mainstream sound was enhanced by 
the styling of the singer Tajči, who drew 
inspiration from Marilyn Monroe (Image 2). She 
ended up a strong 7
th
 in the contest. The 1991 
entry by Baby Doll, Brazil, was less successful, only managing to place 21
st
 in a field of 22, 
despite being heavily internationally-themed like the previous two Yugoslav songs. It had a Latin 
sound to it, featuring maracas and Spanish guitar as its main instruments, along with (gibberish) 
lyrics listing Latin American countries and Latin dances, such as samba, rumba and cha-cha. In 
many ways, Brazil was emblematic of the chaoticism of national representations in Yugoslavia at 
the time, with the sharp rise in nationalism and the heightened nationalisation of the social 
environment from a previous socialist, anti-national one
51
.  
After the collapse of Yugoslavia, the union of Montenegro and Serbia (Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia) faced international sanctions, which meant disqualification from the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) and consequently inability to compete in the contest. The flipside of 
that was that 1993 saw the debut of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia on the Eurovision stage, 
                                                 
51
 The chaoticism was also evident in the Yugoslav national selection for their representative at the 1991 contest, 
“Jugovizija.” The nationalist discourse was ever-present in the broadcast, especially during the 40-minute voting 
segment, as each of the federal broadcasters gave their votes. Ultimately, Baby Doll’s victory was also a political 
victory for Serbia, as she was the representative of the Serbian TV Belgrade. She won by only receiving points from 
Serb-controlled broadcasters, despite being snubbed by juries from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and 
Slovenia. It seemed as if Serbia was trying to assert its dominance not only in the political scene of the federal state, 
but also in its cultural and media landscapes, too. For the full video of the voting in Serbo-Croatian see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI0MnrX2mGw  (last accessed September 24, 2014). 
Image 2: Tajči performing Hajde da ludujemo  
in 1990. (Snapshot from the live performance video;  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA3fnvVAkSE) 
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with both countries’ entries reflecting on the conflict undergoing in their countries. The Bosnian 
song was titled Sva bol svijeta (All the pain of the world), and its lyrics expressed defiance and 
strength of the Bosnian people and state in light of destruction and misery. The Croatian song, 
Don’t ever cry, was a prayer for a fallen 18-year old soldier, ending on a somewhat nationalistic 
note (sung in English, interestingly): “Don’t ever cry, my Croatian sky.” Both symbolically and 
practically, these two entries re-affirmed Bosnian and Croatian claims to sovereignty on an 
international stage, at a time where it was contested on both the domestic and international 
fronts. 
The state-affirming lyrical content continued in the Bosnian entries for 1994 and 1995. In 
1994, the Bosnians sent an inter-ethnic duo from the two warring sides, Alma Čardžić and Dejan 
Lazarević singing a love ballad about a love defying all odds, including the war. In 1995, the 
entry Dvadeset i prvi vijek (Twenty-First Century) was an indirect criticism of Europe’s inability 
to act and get involved in the Bosnian War. The lyrics express disappointment with Europe:  
The twenty-first century is coming, my dear   
And you’re nowhere to be found  
The twenty-first century is coming, my dear   
And happiness is nowhere to be found. 
At the same time as it is expressing disappointment, the song expresses a yearning for Europe 
and its promise of prosperity and peace, in the face of destruction and loss: “Your light is still on, 
like an everlasting lighthouse / Why was I born, to lose everything I cherish?”  
After the wars in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia, the songs featured fewer, if any, 
national symbolism until their efforts in 1999. The Bosnian-French song
52
 Putnici (Travellers) 
                                                 
52
The 1999 Contest saw the language restriction lifted for the first time since 1977. This meant that countries did not 
have to sing in their national languages any longer, but could sing in any language they chose. The Bosnian entry 
was mixed Bosnian and French, with the Bosnian singer Dino Merlin singing in both languages, while the featured 
artist, Beatrice Poulot from France, sang only in French.  
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featured oriental instruments prominently, such as the Turkish/Arabic bağlama53, djembe drums, 
and violins. The Croatian entry had also some national elements to it, such as the strong 
influence of the djembe drums, chimes and ukulele creating a somewhat ethnic feel to the song. 
The lyrics and title of the song, Marija Magdalena, gave the song an obvious religious 
connotation, making it more ‘authentic’ than clear-cut mainstream pop. Neither one of the songs 
had necessarily direct national symbolism, but it was the ethnicisation of the songs via the 
composition that gave the illusion of national authenticity in a field of largely mainstream Euro-
pop songs. This, in effect, made the songs seem more authentic and valuable to both national and 
international audiences.  
The songs representing Croatia (2000-04) and Bosnia & Herzegovina (2002-05) were for 
the most part mainstream pop songs devoid of any ethnic sounds or visuals. The shift towards 
mainstream pop also included songs being performed in English, in whole or part, which was 
seen as a strategy to strengthen chances of victory
54
. This was a strategy used by most countries, 
and was not specific to the former Yugoslav countries by any means. However, it led to 
mediocre results for the two countries, with the exception of the 2004 Bosnian entry In the 
Disco, which featured one of the strongest international sounds and looks. The song was staged 
in a faux disco (including a huge disco ball), with provocative and hyper-sexualised dancing and 
a very simple, repetitive chorus. The performance was also easily read as queer, due to the way 
the (male) singer danced and sang, but also the media hype over such a song and performance 
                                                 
53
 Bağlama is a large string instrument, somewhat similar to the ukulele, but has a different sound to it. It is more 
often used in Arabic and Turkish music. 
 
54
 The national language requirement was dropped briefly between 1973 and 1976, with considerable success for 
English-language songs. The most famous Eurovision winner, ABBA, performed Waterloo in English in 1974, 
bringing Sweden its first victory. The Netherlands followed the trend the next year, acquiring another victory for an 
English song (Ding-a-Dong by Teach-In). At the same time, five out of the Top 10 songs in 1975 an d 1976 were in 
English (including the winner of the 1976 contest, UK’s Save Your Kisses For Me), showcasing the dominance of 
English in the world of pop music. 
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representing Bosnia & Herzegovina – a country with an international reputation still marred by 
the war, and ideas of ‘Balkan tribalism’ and backwardness. Just as the peak of the mainstream 
sounds came, it was the inclusion of Serbia & Montenegro
55
 to the contest in 2004, which 
ushered what Björnberg (2007) labelled the “ethnic turn” in Eurovision56. 
Serbia & Montenegro spearheaded the “ethnic turn” with both of its entries in 2004 and 
2005. The surprising success of their first entry, Lane moje (My fawn), placing second in a field 
of 36, led a shift in Croatian and Bosnian songs attempting to play the ‘ethnic card.’ The 
performance, aptly analysed by Mitrović (2010), featured a strong ethnic composition via its 
instrumentalisation: kaval (end-blown flute), djembe drums, violins and šargija (a Bosnian string 
instrument). The 
visuals featured 
an image of an 
idyllic medieval 
Serbian culture, 
including 
ethnicised 
garments, and the 
band’s 
simulation of a 
medieval 
                                                 
55
 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its constitution and its name in 2003, becoming Serbia & 
Montenegro.  
 
56
 It is important to note that the winning song that year, Ukraine’s “Wild Dances,” had also a heavily hybridised 
ethnic-pop sound and reached pan-European success. However, the larger (and more common) movement was 
toward ethnic balladry, which was ushered by Serbia & Montenegro’s 2004 effort. 
Image 3: Željko Joksimović and the Ad Hoc Orchestra performing Lane moje at 
Eurovision 2004 in Istanbul. (Snapshot from the live performance video; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7OvpjplJ_8) 
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troubadour ensemble’s look (Image 3).  
The 2005 entry came from the Montenegrin part of the country, and strongly played on 
Montenegrin ethnic sounds and visuals. Performed by a boy band of six, the song featured a red-
lit stage, reminiscent of the newly-adopted flag of Montenegro, as the singers performed an array 
of adapted traditional Montenegrin dances while singing. Audible aspects of the song are also 
quintessentially Montenegrin with the prominence of violins and drums, but also the chant “Oj 
ha!,” specific to the region. The lyrics also referred to the sea, rivers, and mountains – all 
symbols of Montenegro. Topographic depictions of the homeland have been rather limited over 
the years, and in those rare occasions almost exclusively exemplified by the mentioning of 
mountains, the sea, or rivers (Bosnia & Herzegovina 2007; Croatia 1995, 1996, 2005; 
Montenegro 2007).  
Croatia tried to follow the “ethnic” model set by Serbia & Montenegro, in 2005 and 2006 
but to much less success (placing 11
th
 and 12
th
 respectively). The 2005 entry Vukovi umiru sami 
(Wolves die alone) is arguably one of the most nationally symbolic songs from the former 
Yugoslav countries. It features strong national symbols in all three categories – lyrics, 
composition and visuals. The song has the most prominent vocal symbolism, with strong 
ululation singing by the backing vocals, who are composed of three female members of a 
traditional Croatian music ensemble, Lado. Unlike Serbia & Montenegro’s 2004 effort, the song 
did not showcase a rural idyll but a Central European-influenced, traditional urban Croatian 
aesthetic.  
The 2006 song, Moja štikla (My stiletto), sung by Croatia’s most famous singer Severina, 
was also heavily influenced by ethnic symbolism in lyrics, composition and visuals (she was 
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supported by male Lado members), but failed to achieve much success in the contest
57
. While 
Severina’s styling was meant to predominantly sexualise her and win over the male 
demographic, the backing Lado singers were dressed in national outfits from the Croatian coastal 
region of Dalmatia. Along with the visuals, they also yelled gibberish-sounding lyrics throughout 
the song, which were actually inspired by Croatian traditional folklore nursery rhymes 
(brojalica). They were further read as traditional due to the dialectical specificities of the chants: 
Zumba, zumba, zumba, zumba / Hay, straw, cheese, salami / Risi bisi, a bigger pot / Red beet, 
red beet / Africa, paprika!
58
 
Bosnia & Herzegovina joined the trend in 2006, with the ballad Lejla. The song featured 
ethnic instruments, showcasing qualities of the traditional Bosnian sevdalinka
59
 songs. The 
national sound was complemented by ethnicised modern outfits, striking the perfect balance 
between modern and traditional. The song was a collaboration with the Serbian composer and 
2004 representative of Serbia & Montenegro, Željko Joksimović. The ethnicisation of Bosnian 
songs is a particularly delicate and potentially problematic process, due to the mixed ethnic and 
religious population and the relative historical recency of the Bosnian conflict. The ethnic songs 
need to have a ‘Bosnian,’ yet non ethnically-specific sound. The 2007 Bosnian entry, Rijeka bez 
imena (Nameless River) had an oriental sound to it, mainly due to the prominence of string 
instruments, including the Turkish bağlama. The overt orientalisation of the song, which would 
                                                 
57
 For a more detailed analysis of the song and the controversy surrounding it, see Baker (2008b).  
 
58
 Risi e bisi (or risi bisi) is a traditional Italian dish that is also popular in Dalmatia. 
 
59
 Traditional Bosnian folk song genre, generally love songs with slow or moderate tempo. See footnote 17 on page 
54. 
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usually be associated with the Bosnian Muslim majority, was somewhat balanced by the choice 
of a Bosnian Serb (and nominally, Christian Orthodox) performer.
60
  
Image 4: Regina waving a red flag during the performance of Bistra voda at Eurovision 2009.  
                (Snapshot from the live performance video;  
                https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwtnCw_hEP8) 
 
While Croatia abandoned the ethnic model after their mediocre results in 2005 and 2006, 
and opted to return to a more pop-friendly sound, Bosnia & Herzegovina has had an eclectic 
array of song choices. They ranged from rock songs (2010) and typical ballads (2012), to their 
2009 entry, Bistra voda (Clear water), which was visually, musically and lyrically nostalgic for 
the communist past. The outfits of the band were military uniform-inspired, the communist 
inspiration further emphasised by a scene during the instrumental part of the song where the 
entire band poses together (again, inspired by communist art) and waves a red flag (see Image 4). 
                                                 
60
 This was further strengthened by the financial assistance the representatives got from the Bosnian Parliament, 
including the support of both the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2007). 
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The composition was also militaristic as it was based on a march-drum, while the lyrics alluded 
to the communist past of the country and discursively used militaristic imagery:  
Give birth to me on a dawn in May 
Bathe me in clear water 
I guard a world when all others are gone 
I am guarding you as long as I live 
While Bistra voda was the only Bosnian song featuring strong national elements in the 
2008-12 period, all Bosnian songs have managed to qualify for the final of the competition, 
including three Top 10 placements. Croatia, on the other hand, tended to send songs without 
national symbolism and generally to poor results. In the period 2007-2012, only two Croatian 
songs qualified for the final, placing 21
st
 (2008) and 18
th
 (2009). Their last song, Mižerja (2013), 
was a klapa song – a type of traditional Dalmatian ethnic a cappella singing. Despite its national 
symbolism, the song failed to impress European audiences and did not qualify for the final. 
One of the most striking trends has been in the performances of independent Serbia. Out 
of the seven Serbian songs, five have featured national symbolism in their audible aspects, such 
as vocalisation and musical composition. Molitva (Prayer), Serbia’s first and so far only winning 
entry, featured the frula instrument in the bridge of the song giving a strong ethnic quality. The 
2008 song, Oro (Traditional Dance), was written by the same composer as Lane moje and Lejla, 
Željko Joksimović, and again featured national Serbian and Balkan instruments. The gimmick-
entry in 2009, Cipela (Shoe), prominently featured the accordion, widely considered a traditional 
instrument in Serbia and used in most folk and turbo-folk music. The song from 2010, Ovo je 
Balkan (This is the Balkans) was clearly lyrically connected to the Balkan peninsula and Serbia 
specifically, as exemplified by the line “Belgrade! Belgrade!”, but also musically through the 
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prominence of the use of the trumpet as used in traditional Roma music in the Balkans
61
. The 
2012 entry, again by Željko Joksimović, had musically ethnic flavours due to the use of violins 
and the kaval, but was more restrained in its ethnic sound and visuals than his previous efforts. 
Taking into account the results of the analysis, it is clear that the countries analysed have 
been represented both by songs with limited and extensive national symbolism, as well as some 
songs with a clear international flavour to them. Whether one is more relevant than the other is 
not the principal issue here. According to the literature on Eurovision, its representational power 
is what makes Eurovision so relevant as an international event. It gives the national broadcaster a 
chance to create a symbolic, yet physically concrete, space for the representation of the nation 
that is in existence for only three minutes, but thanks to audio-visual technology can be accessed 
and reproduced indefinitely by its audiences. Having established that a considerable number of 
songs have actively perpetuated national symbolism (and some directly perpetuating the 
discourses noted above), the next step is to see whether these discursive master frames and 
symbolism actually trickle down to the audiences watching the performances. In the next sub-
chapter, I will address this issue of Eurovision as a potential facilitator of a sense of national 
belonging for diasporic communities and analyse the ways that my informants see the contest: 
both its relevance for them personally and for diasporic communities and their homelands. 
  
                                                 
61
 The traditional Balkan qualities of Ovo je Balkan were also advanced by the international reputation of its 
composer, Goran Bregović. The composer has reached international fame for his music, which heavily relies on 
traditional Roma (Gypsy) music, which is also exemplified in his Eurovision entry to a large extent. 
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2. Engaging Eurovision, Its Failures and Successes 
Aspects of Eurovision’s (Ir)Relevance  
 The common idea of the song contest has become one of a “big European party,” as one 
of my informants joyfully proclaimed when asked about what the contest is like. While the 
majority of my informants did not consider Eurovision a ‘relevant’ aspect of their lives, some did 
consider it an important entertainment event. For many, it represents one of the highlights of 
May, as one of my informants pondered: “It would be really empty. What are we to do in May? 
Watch some soccer [mockingly]?” Another one dubbed it the “European music championship,” 
although noting that the musical relevance of the contest has diminished and that it is all about 
sending “the best show” nowadays. Arguably, it has become all style and little substance. 
 While all of my informants watch and enjoy the show, some do view Eurovision as a 
waste of money and media attention when compared to “real” issues facing European societies 
and the world at large. Jasmina was very direct in her criticism of Eurovision and the funds that 
go into it: “I think it’s better if I give that money to a beggar on the street than for a song.” 
Furthermore, the costs associated with the hosting of the contest are even more frustrating for 
her: “It is easy for Sweden to host Eurovision, but how is it for Serbia – I do not even want to 
think about that. I think too much money is spent on it, especially for smaller countries like 
Azerbaijan last year, or Serbia.” The exorbitant costs of Eurovision participations and hostings, 
along with the difficulties with finding sponsorship were also lamented by the Head of Press of 
the Montenegrin delegation, Sabrija Vulić:  
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It does cost us a lot [to participate in Eurovision], and we get no 
return effect. Actually, I’m lying to you, we do have a return 
effect, just one that is not seen materially [financially] but in a 
promotional sense. But that promotion would be much cheaper if 
you just paid advertising on TV...
62
 
 
However, as Vesna pointed out, despite the high cost “people do need entertainment as well.” 
And gauging by the longevity and popularity of the contest, Eurovision plays the entertainment 
factor quite well. While Đorđe does not follow the contest every year, nor identifies himself as a 
fan, he attributes the contests’ popularity to its inclusivity – something most events lack, even 
ones he watches regularly, like soccer:  
Eurovision attracts everyone. From five-year olds to ninety-year 
olds. It is a family event. And that is great. If you watch sports, 
soccer for example, that is 95% men, just sitting around and 
drinking beer. It is more male. But Eurovision is open to everyone. 
And that is really super. No matter where you are from, or 
whatever. It is more like a love parade, we are all together, let us 
all sing! Yes, a little bit. But I find that great! 
 
This inclusivity is something that hardcore Eurovision fans have recognised for a long 
time. Many informants reminisced on times in the 1980s (and some 1990s) when they used to 
videotape the contest, before it was readily available online, and re-watch it. Especially for 
people who have attended Eurovision itself, the experience is often one of pure joy and, as Senad 
said, “something very spiritual.” He went on to compare his experience at his first Eurovision he 
attended to an adrenaline kick that some get from bungee jumping or extreme sports. Aside from 
his enjoyment of multicultural environments, such as Eurovision, he does recognise that it was 
probably such an experience for him because of the sexual openness he experienced as a 
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 Participation fees vary from broadcaster to broadcaster, but they are just a fraction of the total cost of 
participation. One needs to take into account the cost of accommodation, paying all the delegation members 
(including the performers, director, costume designers, choreographers, etc.), marketing and promotion, and the time 
investment for the preparation of choreographies and set design. Every broadcaster also has to provide a music video 
accompanying the song, which comes at a cost as well. Therefore, it is easy for a broadcaster’s costs to skyrocket 
from the initial participation fees to over 100,000 EUR and more, which can be hard to manage for smaller 
broadcasters, such as the former Yugoslav ones. 
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teenager at the contest. However, even for non-hardcore and non-gay fans, such as casual 
viewers like Đorđe, Eurovision provides an alternative entertainment event that prides itself on 
its inclusivity and diversity. Furthermore, for many this inclusivity seems to have translated into 
a way to identify with and support ones’ nation, and to symbolically perform their national 
identity through the contest.  
The primordial ideas of nationhood and belonging to the national body are well and alive 
in the general public, and Eurovision provides a space for primordialism to reign supreme as part 
of a nation-based competitive setting. The popular perception of national allegiances of diasporic 
communities at display in Eurovision voting was partially re-affirmed through my interviews. As 
Merima and Kenan noted, they would always vote for Bosnia & Herzegovina, no matter how bad 
the song may be. Merima said she always voted for Bosnia, “even when I disliked the song, if it 
was a disaster or anything. At least so it gets 7 or 8 points from Sweden...” Kenan also admits 
that, despite saying that him liking a song is the most important for his choice of favourite song, 
ultimately when it comes to the voting at the end of the night, “Bosnia will get my vote, no 
matter what the song. That is something unavoidable.”  
As noted in the previous chapter, some informants have had issues with aligning their 
allegiances with a newly-formed Bosnia & Herzegovina, favouring Croatia and/or Serbia 
instead. This was not only the case when it came to competitive settings, but also in their 
everyday lives where they just self-identify more with the other two countries, although often 
they have tenuous ties with them at best. While this in part has to do with the experiences of 
conflict in the 1990s, it is largely an aspect of a populist primordial nationalism, rampant in the 
former Yugoslav republics but also present in their diasporas across the globe. 
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This penetration of everyday ‘real-world’ politics onto the Eurovision (battle-)stage, 
often in lieu of nationalist voting and song selection, has been lamented by some of my 
informants. Merima, for example, takes issue with Bosnia & Herzegovina’s song selection 
process, despite her unwavering support to whoever ultimately represents the country. She 
expressed dissatisfaction with the often talked about but never proven hypothesis of the “national 
key” used for the Bosnian representatives’ selection: the obligatory rotation of Bosniak-Serb-
Croat performers from year to year
63
. Nationalist behaviour during Eurovision has also been 
criticised by Ahmed when referring to the Serbian winner of 2007’s Eurovision, Marija 
Šerifović. Due to her showing the controversial “three fingers” gesture64 as she received the 
highest 12 points from Bosnia & Herzegovina, she raised a media frenzy in Bosnia as well as 
alienated many of the people she won over with her song earlier in the evening (see Appendix 
E). 
The complex post-war political situation in Bosnia & Herzegovina is often reflected not 
just in the choice of Bosnian representatives, but also in Bosnian participation in the first place. 
After Bosnia & Herzegovina surprisingly dropped out of the 2013 contest
65
 citing financial 
difficulties, Kenan had nothing but words of disappointment for the national broadcaster, but 
also the political climate in Bosnia at large. While he was disappointed with the obvious lack of 
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 The period 2001-10 was the most notorious for the key-hypothesis. In 2001, an ethnic Bosniak represented the 
country, followed by a Serb in 2002, 2003 by a Croat, 2004 a Bosniak, 2005 a Croatian band, 2006 a multiethnic 
band, 2007 a Serb, 2008 a Bosniak, 2009 a multiethnic band, and 2010 a Serb. While it is obviously not a cookie-
cutter type of key (with the exception of the 2001-04 period), it does provide for an interesting conspiracy theory. 
 
64
 The three fingers gesture is a commonly used Serbian greeting symbol during the 1990s, which indicates 
Serbhood. It was popularised in the 1990s during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Due to its frequent use by 
Serbian soldiers in the conflicts, it is seen as a provocation by ethnic Bosniaks and Croats, and many liberal-leaning 
Serbs disassociate themselves from the sign. See Appendix E for the image of Marija Šerofivić making the gesture. 
 
65
 And again in 2014. 
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dedication to European cultural events and larger pan-European commitments, he was not 
surprised by it: 
Truth be told, I am not surprised in a country that does not have 
enough money to maintain its national museum open in the capital. 
If that is of no importance for the country, why would Eurovision 
be of any importance?
66
 
 
The last time the Bosnian government helped fund a Eurovision act was in 2006, when 
Marija Šestić got financial support as part of the broadcaster’s and government’s collaborative 
project “The Sound of Rivers” – alluding to the name of the song, Rijeka bez imena (Nameless 
River). While this was the last time the government supported Eurovision, there is a recognition 
that Eurovision can be used for the international promotion of a state. This is, according to the 
majority of my informants, one of the more successful and beneficial aspects of Eurovision 
participation. 
The Promotional Power of Eurovision 
 In a sense, Eurovision’s main aim has always been national promotion, along with the 
proliferation of technological excellence in television. The setup of the contest itself with the 
annual change of host country and the ability to promote both the host and participating nations, 
makes Eurovision a powerful promotional tool. When I discussed the contest with the 
Montenegrin delegation’s Head of Press, he reiterated the promotional aspect of the contest as 
the main draw for the broadcasters’ participation at the event: 
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 The Bosnian National Museum closed due to lack of funds allocated for its operating by the Bosnian government 
in 2012 (BBC 2012b). It has still not been re-opened after two years. 
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Eurovision is a big event in which our country can represent itself. 
Therefore, that is the first reason why we participate in Eurovision, 
and of course, to continue to be part of Europe. In order to 
represent our country in Eurovision in a musical and touristic 
sense, keeping in mind that we are a tourist country. Put simply, 
for the promotion of the country.  
This capacity for a large-scale promotion that reaches over 100 million viewers, albeit for only 
three minutes, has been recognised by my informants as one of the major reasons for 
participation. Nine out of my twelve informants discussed the promotional powers of Eurovision 
in the interviews, but it was noted that the promotional powers work in a twofold way. It is not 
only important for the host country as a promotional tool, but maybe more for the host city itself, 
as Merima points out: “It is a great honour and great advertising for the country and the city. I 
think there were many people across Europe who had no idea where Malmö was and now they 
know.” 
The line between promotion and self-glorification can be a thin one, as I have noted 
previously with the Belarusian song from 2011, “I love Belarus.” While the former Yugoslav 
countries have never sent such an overtly self-glorifying song, they have sent a plethora of songs 
that definitely played on romanticised notions of a national culture unscathed by modernity. At 
other times, when it suited them differently, they took the ‘international approach’ showing that 
we are not any different than Europe and can have the same cultural background and music, too. 
However, the best promotion seems to have come from those romanticised national 
performances on the Eurovision stage, according to my informants (and to the scores in the 
contest). 
Overwhelmingly, two songs came to the forefront of discussion with my informants, as 
the best representatives in both a musical sense and a promotional/representative sense. The 
Serbia & Montenegro ballad Lane moje from 2004 and Bosnia’s Lejla from 2006 were singled 
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out by the majority of my informants as the best pickings from the Serbo-Croatian speaking area. 
The most talked about person was Željko Joksimović, who wrote both of the songs and was 
lauded as the Balkan ‘Mr. Eurovision’ who cannot do any wrong67. Many informants professed 
to being fans of his and liking both his participations (in 2004 and 2012), but that Lane moje is 
the song that had started the whole Balkan ethno-ballad trend. The composition and live 
performance of Lane moje was generally seen as a more benevolent, ‘civilised’ (read, European) 
depiction of the Balkans. As Mitrović (2010, 174) argues, “the Serbian team tried to transform 
the image of the Balkan/Serbian male, and people for that matter, from a militant and non-
cultivated savage, or brute, always ready to fight, into something civil, emotional, yet archaic.” 
This seemingly successful attempt, elevated not just foreigners’ opinion of the former Yugoslav 
peoples but also their own perceptions of themselves: we are European after all, and we can 
create beautiful art and music that can rival, and even better its European counterparts.  
The benevolent, civilised imagery promoted by the performance was in large part so 
successful within the diasporas, the former Yugoslav republics themselves and across Europe in 
general, precisely because it went against the usual narratives of the war-torn Balkans. Not only 
were Balkan people ‘softened’ and made more ‘cultured’, but it provided, for the first time in 
over a decade, a chance to represent the area in a positive light and distance it from the conflicts 
that have plagued the area. Many informants pointed out the same thing – how positive 
depictions of the Balkans via Eurovision performances, such as Lane moje or Lejla, can help the 
image of the countries and their peoples. Furthermore, Lejla was seen as an especially relevant 
composition, since it showcased the collaboration of formerly warring states and the embracing 
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 In his four Eurovision participations, he has managed to acquire a 2
nd
, two 3
rd
, and a 6
th
 place, making him one of 
the most consistently successful composers in Eurovision. 
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of a cultural synchronism that was negated throughout the 1990s in an attempt to ensure cultural  
sovereignty for the Bosnian state, along with political sovereignty. 
The relevance of Eurovision’s promotional capabilities was especially emphasised by my 
informants when discussing Bosnian and Serbian performances. Most informants, quite 
understandably, tended to discuss the Bosnian War and Eurovision’s ability to show a different 
side of the formerly war-torn country. Not only are Eurovision performances important “so that 
the world sees that we are not just war and fighting there” and “that there are nice things there, 
too,” as Ahmed pointed out, but also for a sense of personal fulfilment. Furthermore, for some, 
like Senad, Eurovision is a way to re-imagine the homeland as a happier place and to be able to 
have a positive reference point of their experiences: 
I am a child of war. I think all of us, war children, we have very 
limited contexts in which we get to prove ourselves. We have few 
occasions to show ourselves in a positive light, in a happy light. 
‘Bosnia, argh, tragedy only!’ [Eurovision] is a way to paint my war 
memories with some better, happier connotations and associations. 
Whether through focusing on the musical and lyrical content of songs or through the 
collaborative aspects of the former Yugoslav music scene, Eurovision can provide a little relief 
from consistently negative associations with Bosnia. Up to the time when I conducted my 
interviews in the summer of 2013, Bosnia & Herzegovina’s only recognised successes in any 
sort of international context came through the arts. One example is the victories of the Bosnian 
films in international film festivals
68
 and another are Bosnia’s (relatively consistent) Eurovision 
successes, especially Lejla’s third place in 2006. 
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 Most notably, the Academy Award win in the Best Foreign Film category for the film No Man’s Land in 2002. 
Additionally, Bosnian films have done well at the Berlin Film Festival, winning the highest award, the Golden Bear 
in 2006 with the film Grbavica, and most recently winning the Jury Grand Prix award (second highest award) for An 
Episode in the Life of an Iron Picker, in 2013. The film was also shortlisted for the Academy Award’s Best Foreign 
Film category as one of the top nine films that year, but did not make the final nominees list of five.  
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 In a promotional sense, the song contest is possibly most important for Serbia, since its 
international reputation has been severely tarnished by its involvements in wars in Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo, from 1991 to 1999. As Andrea noted, the way the 
Swedish (and Western) media depicted Serbia was as the violent aggressor: “That was the image. 
I am not saying whether that is real or not, but that’s the image presented.” In her opinion, it is 
good that Serbia gets to participate in the song contest after being banned for over a decade, 
since it gives the country a chance to speak for itself through song and showcase its European 
sensibilities. 
 The importance and popularity of Eurovision in Serbia has fluctuated over the years, with 
its successes and failures at the contest. However, through it all, the contest has managed to 
rekindle a sense of national pride based on actual achievements instead of solely a nationalist 
perception of a glorified Serbian history. Along with its recent sporting successes, most notably 
in tennis due to Novak Đoković, Serbia’s high rankings in Eurovision have become a point of 
national pride. In a way, it is similar to the relationship the Irish had with the contest in the 
1990s, when they won an unprecedented four contests that decade
69
 (Singleton 2013). Eurovision 
gives Serbian people something to be proud of once again, after a reputational ‘dark age’, as 
Đorđe points out: 
It is nice, in a way. That means that you are proud of where you 
are from, but you did not really have anything to brag about in the 
past 12 years. Now we have Eurovision and tennis and it’s like ‘we 
are something [important] after all!’ That we are not that backward 
because of the war. We used to be important before the war. 
Everyone knew who Jugovići were, and now we are slowly 
coming back. Whether through music, film, tennis, sport, 
whatever. Ultimately, every advertising is positive, I think. 
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 Ireland won in 1992, 1993, 1994, and again in 1996. No country has won two contests back to back, but Ireland 
managed three. Along with the four victories, it placed second twice, in 1990 and 1997, making it by far the most 
successful nation in the contest in the 1990s.  
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The relevance of Eurovision for Serbia has been even larger in big part due to their 
victory in 2007 and the consequent hosting of the event in Belgrade the year after. Hosting is 
both an honour and obligation set by the EBU and can be used to varying effects. Some countries 
take hosting more seriously than others due to a number of (often political) reasons. As Vesna 
pondered about the contest’s hosting in 2012 (Baku, Azerbaijan) and 2013: “I thought that Baku 
and Azerbaijan maybe had the greater need to present itself as a good country and stuff like that, 
and Sweden had a more relaxed way.” National promotion, or “putting the country on the map” 
as Svjetlana said, is also done through the proper hosting and promotion of the host city. While 
the potential for reputational betterment is a big winner in the whole media aspect of the contest, 
tourism is another one. 
The economic expectations of Malmö and Skåne in regards to the hosting of ESC were 
quite high (Book 2013) but ultimately justified, according to a report commissioned by the city 
and region a month after the contest (Malmö stad and Region Skåne 2013). The city was visited 
by a total of 48,100 people (out of which 31,700 were tourists) and the overall profit of the 
hosting was 22 million EUR for the two-week event. The estimated promotional value in lieu of 
marketing was worth over 120 million EUR. As residents of Malmö and its metropolitan region, 
most of my informants expressed joy over the city’s hosting of the contest and positive 
experiences over those two weeks. On the one hand, the promotion of the city was seen as very 
successful, so much so, that it made people proud of being from the city, as Ahmed pointed out: 
They did a crazy good advertisement for Malmö. I was very proud 
to be from Malmö when I was watching the intro number and all 
that. Zlatan [Ibrahimović]70, the lights, everything, just wow. You 
could not believe it. It created something positive, a positive spirit. 
Like ‘look where I live’.  
                                                 
70
 Zlatan Ibrahimović is a famous Swedish soccer player and the captain of the Swedish national team since 2008, 
born and raised in Malmö. His parents are Bosnian and Croatian, and he is often celebrated as a figurehead of 
Swedish integration success. 
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Similarly, according to Kenan, some lamented the post-Eurovision state of Malmö and the loss 
of vibrancy in the city that they experienced during the contest: 
I do not remember ever experiencing Malmö as empty than the 
days right after Eurovision. It was the very first time that I 
experienced Malmö as a world-class, European city, a true 
metropolis, despite its usual multinational character. A place where 
there were so many different people. I met a group of people from 
Australia – incredible! From Japan. From Australia and Japan! I 
could not believe my eyes when I met them. We met people from 
all over in those seven days. 
 Aside from the discussion of Malmö’s successful hosting of the contest, one of my 
informants mused about what it would be like if the contest, with its 40,000+ visitors, came to a 
place like Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital. Senad expressed his disappointment at the inability of 
the Bosnian people to “get along down there on our 100 square metres,” while the rest of Europe 
is united through the EU, which manages to “unite some 37 languages, differences, 
constitutions.” He thought of what it would mean for the citizens of Sarajevo, and Bosnia at 
large, to see with their own eyes the diversity that Europe offers and how seemingly harmonious 
it can all be, in spite of a competitive setting of the contest. National and host-city promotion 
aside, these encounters that Eurovision facilitates both in person at the event as well as on small 
screens across Europe, is the most rewarding aspect of the contest for my informants. 
“Together Unite, Unite Europe!”71  
 Eurovision, as a multi-media family event, provides a space for families to get together 
and participate in a pan-European event simultaneously with millions of others across the globe. 
According to both scholarship and my informants, the majority of people watch Eurovision with 
either friends or family, or both. Professional networking opportunities in the media field during 
the contest are extraordinary and are part of the draw for various professionals. One of my 
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 Lyric from the 1990 Eurovision winning song from Italy, Insieme: 1992 (Together: 1992). 
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informants who is interested in event management expressed her appreciation of being able to 
meet so many peers from across Europe: “I have made friends for life. Networking contacts for 
life, both personally and professionally. And that is very important to a person. And to me, 
personally, so I can succeed in life.” If we put those professional and family-oriented experiences 
of socialising around Eurovision to the side, a much more relevant aspect of the contest becomes 
clear: the facilitation of large-scale encounters and their effects on peoples’ perceptions of 
themselves, their countries, and Europe in a global context. 
 As noted previously, both the physical and imagined encounters that are facilitated 
through the contest are crucial for the development of a larger idea of Europeanness. Eurovision 
represents a multicultural transnational social field where the ‘European idea’ is increasingly 
relevant for the contest, but also the contest itself is relevant for the European idea itself (Fricker 
and Gluhovic 2013b, 9). One reinforces the other. And while we can see in the case of the former 
Yugoslav republics that many songs have national rather than international (or European) 
representations in their compositions, lyrics and visual performances, they seem to be interpreted 
as part of a pan-European cultural heritage rather than a destructive nationalist one. As Senad 
eloquently phrased it, regardless of our perception of the performances, they are important in 
themselves because they represent much-needed encounters: 
Europe with its history, and especially us Bosnians and 
Herzegovinians, cannot afford not having encounters, and 
Eurovision is one of those encounters. We just cannot afford that. 
Everyone needs to work towards more encounters. And more 
meetings that are not in my backyard and my mosque. Outside of 
this Bosniak-Muslim perspective where [the same] people meet 
each other in their backyards, in their villages, in their mosques. I 
want to go to someone else’s backyard, someone else’s mosque! I 
am very interested what happens there, it is important to me. 
Whether it be in Athens, Istanbul, or now in Malmö. 
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The image of a Europe inspired by its own diversity through millions of encounters via 
the reach of Eurovision, is a powerful one. The ability to unite millions through a simultaneous 
sharing of a musical (and socio-political and cultural) experience is where Eurovision has 
managed to resonate the most with my informants, as Ahmed points out: 
I think it connects people in a way where at least for one night 
every country, or at least a part of its population, face each other 
and become inspired by one another. It is kind of like this year’s 
logo, ‘we are the one’ [sic]. At least for that one night, we are all 
somehow united. 
The appreciation of European cultural diversities is seen as a positive experience, one that is not 
marred by potential nationalist outliers. Even if nationalist outliers are present, they are still 
perceived as part of that larger European experience and help enrich the diversity of 
understandings of Europe as a whole, but also specific regions and countries. In spite of the 
“territorial imperative” of the rootedness of nations in soil and similar primordial ideas still being 
prevalent in Europe (Heffernan 1998, 239), Eurovision can still be understood as a potential 
driver of changing pro-European attitudes. As Fricker and Gluhovic (2013b, 3) argue: 
The ESC, with its unique, imaginative, and aesthetic modality, has 
always been a symbolic contact zone between European cultures – 
an arena of European identification in which both national 
solidarity and participation in European identity are confirmed. It 
is also a site where cultural struggles over the meanings, frontiers, 
and limits of Europe, as well as similarities and differences 
existing within Europe, are enacted. 
 Their observations are clearly reflected in the ways my participants experience Eurovision. 
While the territorial imperative that Heffernan notes is still present and strong, the underlying 
current seems to be one of a celebration of European diversities. Michael Heffernan (1998, 242) 
claims that a truly multicultural and cosmopolitan Europe can be only achieved as “a diasporic 
Europe of overlapping, changing and temporary identities, an arena of endless heterogeneity and 
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hybridity.” Eurovision is, clearly, such an arena both when theorised by scholars and when 
practically experienced by its fans and audiences. 
When looking at the former Yugoslav republics and their diasporas, it is important to 
mention their re-assertion of belonging to these pan- and pro-European ideas, as demonstrated 
via the contest (Sieg 2013). The idea of encounters is crucial here, too. Simply put, if they do not 
participate in cultural events, they cannot expect to be seen as belonging to Europe in the same 
cultural capacity as other countries which do participate in events such as the ESC. This is 
especially the case for societies and states that have tarnished reputations internationally, such as 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, and ones that have had their sovereignty questioned, such as 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia. It is a platform where nations and their populations can 
assert their Europeanness. 
While one could easily dismiss the contest as an irrelevant entertainment event, it does 
enforce cultural and national hierarchies and differentiated understandings of European regions, 
as Georgiou’s (2008) research on Eurovision’s effect on stereotypes has demonstrated. However, 
we need to be careful to not overestimate the power of Eurovision in shaping the European 
cultural landscape. After all, it is an annual event and while its emotional effects cannot be 
quantified, for the majority they do not parallel the influences of everyday hegemonic structures 
of nationalism onto their conceptualisations of the nation and their membership in the same.
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Chapter Seven: 
Conclusion  
To me, the Song Contest is a battlefield where you can allow 
yourself to be a patriot. You can even allow yourself to be a 
nationalist, which is a word you don’t want to attach very much to 
people these days. You can support your own country, you can say 
that others stink. It’s harmless but it’s very significant. If we didn’t 
have that battlefield we might have more battles.  
Jørgen Franck, Director of Eurovision TV;  
quoted in Fricker and Gluhovic (2013c, 71) 
After almost 60 years of the contest and more than a thousand performed compositions 
from over 40 nations, the fundamental structure of the Eurovision Song Contest still reinforces 
the nation-state system. While it is understood as ‘bringing Europe together,’ the hegemony of 
‘the nation’ is never fully disrupted by the contest. The banality of the nation-state is reinforced 
not only by the national competitive setup of the contest, but also by the fans’ participation. 
Overwhelmingly, the contest, in combination with the audience, naturalises the social contract 
where the latter expresses the appropriate, expected emotion – one of national belonging, loyalty, 
pride, and, according to the director of Eurovision TV, one of nationalism itself.  
Franck’s comment reflects Eurovision’s unparalleled scope for national self- and state-
representation. It allows for an immersive three-minute construction of the nation for domestic 
and international consumption: visually, audibly, contextually, and physically. The all-round 
construction of a symbolic national space has the flexibility to showcase the nation in terms it 
chooses – often seemingly silly and innocent, yet clearly political and often directed from the 
upper echelons of the nation-state itself. 
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 The contest does provide for a somewhat unquantifiable ‘shot’ of national identity, 
belonging and pride for participating nations, just as the World Cup and other international 
(usually sporting) events often do. Some of my informants confirmed this with their unwavering 
support for their homelands, no matter the performance or song quality, or their personal feelings 
about the performer. The homeland is the homeland, and one must support it. In a way, 
supporting the nation, whether through active voting or even just cheering on one’s homeland at 
a viewing party, makes some diasporic people actively perform their diasporic identities. Even 
for the ones that usually reject the diasporic label, Eurovision represents a space for diasporic 
mobilisation where they can briefly participate in and take their diasporic identity from a way of 
being, to a way of belonging, as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) put it. It is the perfect example 
of the fluidity and constant negotiation of (diasporic) identities and the showcasing of the 
processual basis of the identity. As Brubaker (2005) argues, diaspora indeed becomes a category 
of practice, which can be accessed and employed when necessary. 
On the other hand, this engagement with one’s national diasporic identity via ESC tends 
to be surprisingly short. The emotional connection can rise to a fever pitch, but soon after the 
contest is done, it easily dissipates almost as quickly as it came. The interpellation, or discursive 
‘call into being,’ of fellow nationals that the contest can stage via its national symbolism in the 
performances, tends to have little staying power beyond the contest itself. This is also evident in 
the long-term staying power of only two songs, Lane moje and Lejla, from a field of fifty-seven 
analysed songs, when it comes to their popularity and power of national representations. Of 
course, dedicated Eurovision fans allocate much more relevance to the contest and venerate a 
much larger sample of songs, but that is a comparatively small community in the larger scheme 
of things. 
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The clear ‘winner’ of the contest seem to be its promotional aspects and specifically the 
promotion of the ‘European idea.’ While the contest facilitates the showcasing of national 
differences (which can lead to stereotyping of different countries and cultures, as Georgiou 
(2008) argues), it simultaneously showcases European cultural diversity. All my informants 
appreciated the ability to experience European diversity, no matter how limited the experience 
was – whether it was just the three minute performance or attending Eurovision events organised 
in Malmö during the hosting of the contest there. From enjoying meeting new people to 
experiencing their city in a completely different light for the first time, Eurovision did help 
enforce a sense of European cultural diversity as a positive phenomenon.  
Despite national symbolism in Eurovision performances failing at generating the power 
of a mobilising structure, national representations are nonetheless understood as an excellent 
promotional tool for the state. Whether it allows for the tourist promotion of the host city or the 
re-imagining of (stereotypes of) a nation and re-branding of tarnished reputations (i.e. Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Serbia), the contest is an effective tool for representing European diversities. It 
tells a short story of/about the nation, albeit one sanctioned by the state itself via the national 
broadcaster. This celebration of European diversities is in many ways similar to the project of the 
European Union and the creation of a larger European identity. 
Understanding the contest as an exemplification of cultural ideals of the European Union 
does have its merit. Maybe Eurovision has the paradoxical power of enforcing and naturalising 
national imagery, while simultaneously promoting European diversity and an appreciation of 
exploring European differences as a factor of cultural unity. Fundamentally, that would be a 
much more productive end-result of such an event and one that makes the contest worth the 
funds, time, commitment and (inter)national engagement from year to year. The fact that the 
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height of its reach comes in a limited period every year is not necessarily a negative thing. I 
would argue that we could easily replace the “World Cup” from Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2011, 291) 
quote with “Eurovision” and argue that the emotional gains of the Eurovision Song Contest 
cannot be quantified. That is precisely why it is so important for scholarship, its fans and casual 
audiences, both diasporic and non-diasporic, across Europe and beyond.  
My Contribution and What is to be Done 
In the long run, my research points toward the ESC as serving the ‘European idea’ rather 
than the overt national ideologies and causes that could be perpetuated via its representational 
aspects. This is in part because of an overall lack of nationalist ‘hotness’ to the symbolism noted 
in the performances analysed. This lack of hotness could be attributed to the inclusive nature of 
Eurovision as a pan-European, inter-national, multi-generational and, importantly, non-
masculine-only event. Where sporting events regularly ignite visceral masculine and nationalist 
passions due to their exclusive air of masculine ownership over the events, Eurovision is an open 
playing field for all Europeans, regardless of sex, gender, or age.  
That being said, national representations and symbolism are nonetheless an integral part 
of the ESC. The analysis of national symbolism in the performances sheds light on the ways that 
national representations can be both useful for the promotion of the state in a reputational sense, 
as well as engaging a short-term sense of national pride. More importantly however, the analysis 
affirms Eurovision’s capacity for the long-term promotion of pro-European ideas, which is 
especially relevant in a Europe increasingly plagued by right-wing ideologies based on 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism.  
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Furthermore, the project reaffirms the usefulness of Sökefeld’s (2006) approach to the 
understanding of the social mobilisation of diasporas via political opportunities, mobilising 
structures, and master frames. In spite of the small sample size, my research confirms the 
existence of master frames that create a sense of an imagined diasporic community. In my case 
study of the former Yugoslav communities in the Malmö metropolitan area, the major master 
frames revolved around the conflicts and nationalism in the homelands. The coagulation of the 
discursive and conceptual aspects of the master frames with the ability for visual and audible 
expression of the same, gives credence to Eurovision as a clearly political and relevant project in 
Europe, as per Fricker and Gluhovic (2013b). 
I must emphasise the small sample size and the limited generalisability of my research 
findings, which is something I have reiterated in the methods chapter. The generalisability of the 
sample can be questioned on several accounts, such as the low average age of the sample, as well 
as the highly liberal and anti-nationalist sentiments expressed, which are not usually not seen as 
representative of former Yugoslav diasporic communities. The sampling results were due to the 
snowballing sampling technique, but also due to the topic at hand. The general public does not 
view Eurovision as a serious event, let alone as a legitimate topic of research, so it does take a 
somewhat more open minded person to be willing to participate in such a project.  
 Additionally, it would have been instructive to organise a focus group after having the 
one-on-one preliminary interviews in order to discuss the national Eurovision performances in a 
group setting. Having organised a ‘viewing party’ of all the performances I analysed, and then 
discussing them with the group would have yielded interesting insights, especially since it would 
have given me two instances of interaction with my informants. Furthermore, in retrospect, my 
project could have benefited from the application of a comparative approach. For example, 
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instead of looking at former Yugoslavs solely in Malmö/Sweden, I could have looked at how 
diasporic communities in a non-European country such as Canada reflect on Eurovision. Do they 
even know of it, do they follow it at all, or is it completely irrelevant? What sort of diasporic 
mobilisers are they exposed to and respond to, or do not respond to?  
Taking the comparative approach further, one could look at how people back in the 
homeland (in this case, the former Yugoslav republics) understand the contest, and whether their 
perceptions correspond to the perceptions of the diasporas. That would also pose the question of 
how effectively the national broadcasters’ messages are coming across and whom they are 
targeting with their performances in the first place. Furthermore, although my sample was quite 
limited, it would be useful to conduct a large-scale, pan-European comparative analysis of larger 
diasporic communities across Europe, such as the Romanian or Turkish ones, for example. Such 
a comparative study would not only benefit our understanding of Eurovision, but it would 
highlight the ways different diasporic communities engage with the representations of their 
homelands on an international scale.
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Appendices 
Appendix A: 
The expansion of Eurovision from 1956 to 2013 
  
Year interval 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
Debuting Countries and Years of Debut 
1956-59 10 
The Netherlands (1956) 
France (1956) 
[West] Germany (1956) 
Italy (1956) 
Luxembourg (1956) 
Belgium (1956) 
Switzerland (1956) 
Austria (1957) 
Denmark (1957) 
United Kingdom (1957) 
Sweden (1958) 
Monaco (1959) 
1960-69 16 
Finland (1961) 
Spain (1961) 
Yugoslavia (1961) 
Portugal (1964) 
Ireland (1965) 
1970-79 18 
Malta (1971) 
Israel (1973) 
Greece (1974) 
Turkey (1975) 
1980-89 20 
Morocco (1980) 
Cyprus (1981) 
Iceland (1986) 
1990-99 24 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(1993) 
Croatia (1993) 
Slovenia (1993) 
Estonia (1994) 
Hungary (1994) 
Romania (1994) 
Slovakia (1994) 
Lithuania (1994) 
Poland (1994) 
Russian Federation (1994) 
FYR Macedonia (1996) 
2000-09 34 
Latvia (2000) 
Ukraine (2003) 
Albania (2004) 
Andorra (2004) 
Belarus (2004) 
Serbia & Montenegro (2004)  
Bulgaria (2005) 
Moldova (2005) 
Armenia (2006) 
Czech Republic (2007) 
Georgia (2007) 
Montenegro (2007) 
Serbia (2007) 
Azerbaijan (2008) 
San Marino (2008) 
2010-13 41  
 
Source: Eurovision. 2014b. “History.” Last accessed May 21. 
http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/year.
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Appendix B: 
Ethnic motives featured in Top 10-ranking Eurovision songs 
The table features 24 songs in the past decade (2003-13) that have managed to rank in the Top 10 
songs of the contest, and which featured some sort of ethnic motives. Rarely are the songs 
completely ethnic and usually they feature some sort of mixing with pop-sounds, as is noted in 
the table. There have been many more songs that featured ethnic motives, but they did not fare as 
well as the ones featured.  
The shaded countries are considered to be from ‘Western European’ countries, if we utilise the 
East-West dichotomy.  
Year Country Rank Singer & Song Ethnic Aspect 
2003 Turkey WINNER 
Sertab Erener 
“Everyway that I can” 
Music and Performance 
(fusion with pop) 
2003 Belgium 2
nd
 place 
Urban Trad 
“Sanomi” 
Music and Performance 
2004 Ukraine WINNER 
Ruslana 
“Wild Dances” 
Music and Performance 
2004 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
2
nd
 place 
Željko Joksimović 
“Lane moje” 
Music and Performance 
2004 Greece 3
rd
 place 
Sakis Rouvas 
“Shake it” 
Music  
(heavy fusion with pop) 
2004 Turkey 4
th
 place 
Athena 
“For real” 
Music  
(heavy fusion with pop-
rock) 
2005 Moldova 6
th
 place 
Zdob si Zdub 
“Boonika bate doba” 
Music and Performance 
(fusion with pop-rock) 
2005 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
7
th
 place 
No Name 
“Zauvijek moja” 
Music and Performance 
partially 
2005 Greece WINNER 
Helena Paparizou 
“My number one” 
Music and Performance 
(heavy fusion with pop) 
2006 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
3
rd
 place 
Hari Mata Hari 
“Lejla” 
Music  
2006 Ukraine 7
th
 place 
Tina Karol 
“Show me your love” 
Music and Performance 
(slight fusion with pop) 
2007 Turkey 4
th
 place 
Kenan Dogulu 
“Shake it up shekerim” 
Performance mainly 
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2007 Bulgaria 5
th
 place 
Elitsa & Stoyan 
“Water” 
Music 
(heavy fusion with 
techno) 
2007 Armenia 8
th
 place 
Hayko 
“Anytime you need” 
Music 
(fusion with pop) 
2008 Serbia 6
th
 place 
Jelena Tomašević 
“Oro” 
Music and Performance 
2009 Norway WINNER 
Aleksander Rybak 
“Fairytale” 
Music 
(fusion with pop) 
2009 Turkey 4
th
 place 
Hadise 
“Dum tek tek” 
Music and Performance 
(heavy fusion with pop) 
2009 France 8
th
 place 
Patricia Kaas 
“Et s’il fallait le faire” 
Music 
2010 Armenia 7
th
 place 
Eva Rivas 
“Apricot Stone” 
Music and Performance 
2010 Greece 8
th
 place 
Giorgos Alkaios & 
Friends 
“OPA!” 
Music and Performance 
(fusion with pop) 
2011 Greece 7
th
 place 
Loucas Yiorkas & Stereo 
Mike 
“Watch my dance” 
Music and Performance  
(fusion with rap) 
2012 Russia 2
nd
 place 
Buranovskiye Babushki 
“Party for Everybody” 
Music and Performance 
(heavy fusion with pop) 
2012 Serbia 3
rd
 place 
Željko Joksimović 
“Nije ljubav stvar” 
Music and Performance 
2013 Denmark WINNER 
Emmelie de Forest 
“Only Teardrops” 
Music 
Performance marginally 
 
 
Source: Eurovision. 2014b. “History.” Last accessed May 21. 
http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/year
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Appendix C: 
Sources for the performance analysis videos 
Year Country 
Artist & Song in 
Parenthesis 
YouTube link 
1989 Yugoslavia Riva (Rock me) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0q5uQm-9aBA 
1990 Yugoslavia 
Tajči (Hajde da 
ludujemo) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA3fnvVAkSE  
1991 Yugoslavia Baby Doll (Brazil) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JrLO8CFM8M  
1992 Yugoslavia 
Extra Nena  
(Ljubim te pesmama) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fQJAlbO9CM  
1993 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Fazla (Sva bol svijeta) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yCDM_WegJVw  
Croatia Put (Don't ever cry) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKanpKMeLfQ  
1994 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Alma & Dejan  
(Ostani kraj mene) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Rtsu5NQWJI  
Croatia 
Tony Cetinski  
(Nek' ti bude ljubav sva) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzE8q0IQbrg  
1995 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Davorin Popović  
(Dvadeset i prvi vijek) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wM-b6XJI7E 
Croatia 
Magazin & Lidija 
(Nostalgija) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rSGV4zV41g  
1996 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Amila Glamočak  
(Za našu ljubav) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iy7Ro7082R8  
Croatia 
Maja Blagdan (Sveta 
ljubav) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1epZjewaJ-Q  
1997 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Alma Čardžić (Goodbye) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8dGvx4r0RbU  
Croatia E.N.I. (Probudi me) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOn2EokyQ40  
1998 Croatia 
Danijela (Neka mi ne 
svane) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojVGmkYnFM8  
1999 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Dino Merlin & Beatrice 
(Putnici) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bMXjZfZhTc  
Croatia 
Doris Dragović  
(Marija Magdalena) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEHoc_qIJnk  
2000 Croatia Goran Karan (Ostani) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqZKKfK2aEA  
2001 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Nino Pršeš (Hano) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdXt72Ox3Tc  
Croatia 
Vanna (Strings of my 
heart) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKw7TFWdUTg  
2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Maja Tatić  
(Fairytales about love) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUA-jNAmsyw 
Croatia 
Vesna Pisarović  
(Everything I want) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVRljHW3n_s  
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2003 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Mija Martina (Could it 
be) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fajtrqcTBx8  
Croatia 
Claudia Beni  
(Više nisam tvoja) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDG19zG5PDY  
2004 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Deen (In the Disco) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23h__RssJQo  
Croatia 
Ivan Mikulić  
(You are the only one) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnuBcWHRMj
Y 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Željko Joksimović  
(Lane moje) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7OvpjplJ_8  
2005 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Feminnem (Call me) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elPI-5JZCws  
Croatia 
Boris Novković  
(Vukovi umiru sami) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpS7rzZqJw8  
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
No Name (Zauvijek moja) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qE1NlzpCGiM  
2006 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Hari Mata Hari (Lejla) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXlIN3mcsH4  
Croatia Severina (Moja štikla) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGp3YfEj_GY  
2007 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Marija Šestić  
(Rijeka bez imena) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxzWQwKx0yI  
Croatia 
Dragonfly ft. Dado Topić 
(Vjerujem u ljubav) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UR-I5VwEuQ  
Montenegro 
Stevan Faddy (Ajde, 
kroči) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5T0zBpHpJU  
Serbia 
Marija Šerifović 
(Molitva) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSueQN1QvV4  
2008 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Laka (Pokušaj) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UkIFRPw17PQ  
Croatia 
Kraljevi Ulice feat. 75 
Cents (Romansa) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uvpoe355YRU  
Montenegro 
Stefan Filipović  
(Zauvijek, volim te) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZjBSvdFeW8  
Serbia 
Jelena Tomašević feat. 
Bora Dugić (Oro) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMt5RCrl8qM  
2009 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Regina (Bistra voda) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwtnCw_hEP8  
Croatia 
Igor Cukrov feat. Andrea 
(Lijepa Tena) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jUheqlIJ_Y  
Montenegro 
Andrea Demirović  
(Just get out of my life) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N503LJ2dygI  
Serbia 
Marko Kon and Milaan 
(Cipela) 
Live performance video with sound unavailable due 
to copyright issues. Used multiple videos.  
For the performance: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uV9Y7S9C6To. 
For the song: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRObP8XE4Ko.  
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2010 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Vukašin Brajić  
(Thunder and Lightning) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgPtHtmSFec  
Croatia Feminnem (Lako je sve) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2M9zNayOF0  
Serbia 
Milan Stanković  
(Ovo je Balkan) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TBwWB3kKd6o  
2011 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Dino Merlin (Love in 
Rewind) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBg3coarF_8  
Croatia Daria (Celebrate) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTJzolnObu0  
Serbia Nina (Čaroban) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CWvXKxjCs8  
2012 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Maya Sar (Korake ti 
znam) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81hIbZNoFU8  
Croatia Nina Badrić (Nebo) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzdI4yuqwzY  
Montenegro 
Rambo Amadeus  
(Euro Neuro) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHnqF5PLP2w  
Serbia 
Željko Joksimović  
(Nije ljubav stvar) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9x9VbJzaDQ  
2013 
Croatia Klapa s Mora (Mižerja) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYm4sGd-qP0  
Montenegro Who See (Igranka) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FR9rtB2ilZU  
Serbia Moje 3 (Ljubav je svuda) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DbAAFijZIxE  
 
The links were all last accessed on August 14, 2014. 
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Appendix D: 
National symbolism values as allocated through the performance analysis 
Explanation of score values, as presented in Chapter 6 : 
 
-2 Completely foreign appeal / performance 
-1 An international ‘flavour’ to the song / performance 
0 Non-national, mainstream sound / performance 
1 Some national symbolism 
2 Explicit / strong national symbolism 
 
Table featuring all the national symbolism values, as allocated via the performance analysis: 
Year Country Artist & Song in Parentheses Points 
Rank / # of 
countries 
Audible Textual Visual Total 
1989 Yugoslavia Riva (Rock me) 137 1 22 0 -1 0 -1 
1990 Yugoslavia Tajči (Hajde da ludujemo) 81 7 22 0 0 -2 -2 
1991 Yugoslavia Baby Doll (Brazil) 1 21 22 -1 -2 -1 -4 
1992 Yugoslavia Extra Nena (Ljubim te pesmama) 44 13 23 1 0 0 1 
1993 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Fazla (Sva bol svijeta) 27 16 25 1 2 0 3 
Croatia Put (Don't ever cry) 31 15 25 0 2 1 3 
1994 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Alma & Dejan (Ostani kraj mene) 39 15 25 0 1 1 2 
Croatia Tony Cetinski (Nek' ti bude ljubav sva) 27 16 25 0 0 0 0 
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1995 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Davorin Popović (Dvadeset i prvi vijek) 14 19 23 0 0 0 0 
Croatia Magazin & Lidija (Nostalgija) 91 6 23 -1 0 1 0 
1996 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Amila Glamočak (Za našu ljubav) 13 22 23 0 0 0 0 
Croatia Maja Blagdan (Sveta ljubav) 98 4 23 1 0 0 1 
1997 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Alma Čardžić (Goodbye) 22 18 25 -1 0 0 -1 
Croatia E.N.I. (Probudi me) 24 17 25 -1 0 -1 -2 
1998 Croatia Danijela (Neka mi ne svane) 131 5 25 0 0 0 0 
1999 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Dino Merlin & Beatrice (Putnici) 86 7 23 2 0 0 2 
Croatia Doris Dragović (Marija Magdalena) 118 4 23 1 1 0 2 
2000 Croatia Goran Karan (Ostani) 70 9 24 0 0 0 0 
2001 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Nino Pršeš (Hano) 29 14 23 1 0 -1 0 
Croatia Vanna (Strings of my heart) 42 10 23 0 0 0 0 
2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Maja Tatić (Fairytales about love) 33 13 24 -1 0 0 -1 
Croatia Vesna Pisarović (Everything I want) 44 11 24 0 0 0 0 
2003 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Mija Martina (Could it be) 27 16 26 -1 0 0 -1 
Croatia Claudia Beni (Više nisam tvoja) 29 15 26 -1 0 0 -1 
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2004 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Deen (In the Disco) 91 9 36 -2 0 -2 -4 
Croatia Ivan Mikulić (You are the only one) 50 13 36 0 0 0 0 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Željko Joksimović (Lane moje) 263 2 36 2 0 2 4 
2005 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Feminnem (Call me) 79 14 39 -2 -2 0 -4 
Croatia Boris Novković (Vukovi umiru sami) 115 11 39 2 1 2 5 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
No Name (Zauvijek moja) 137 7 39 2 1 1 4 
2006 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Hari Mata Hari (Lejla) 229 3 37 2 1 1 4 
Croatia Severina (Moja štikla) 56 12 37 2 1 1 4 
2007 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Marija Šestić (Rijeka bez imena) 106 11 42 2 0 1 3 
Croatia Dragonfly ft. Dado Topić (Vjerujem u ljubav) DNQ DNQ 42 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro Stevan Faddy (Ajde, kroči) DNQ DNQ 42 0 0 0 0 
Serbia Marija Šerifović (Molitva) 286 1 42 1 0 -1 0 
2008 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Laka (Pokušaj) 110 10 43 -1 0 0 -1 
Croatia Kraljevi Ulice feat. 75 Cents (Romansa) 44 21 43 -1 0 -1 -2 
Montenegro Stefan Filipović (Zauvijek, volim te) DNQ DNQ 43 0 0 0 0 
Serbia Jelena Tomašević feat. Bora Dugić (Oro) 160 6 43 2 2 1 5 
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2009 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Regina (Bistra voda) 106 9 42 0 1 2 3 
Croatia Igor Cukrov feat. Andrea (Lijepa Tena) 45 18 42 -1 0 0 -1 
Montenegro Andrea Demirović (Just get out of my life) DNQ DNQ 42 -1 0 -1 -2 
Serbia Marko Kon and Milaan (Cipela) DNQ DNQ 42 1 0 1 2 
2010 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Vukašin Brajić (Thunder and Lightning) 51 17 39 -1 0 0 -1 
Croatia Feminnem (Lako je sve) DNQ DNQ 39 0 0 0 0 
Serbia Milan Stanković (Ovo je Balkan) 72 13 39 2 1 0 3 
2011 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Dino Merlin (Love in Rewind) 125 6 43 0 0 -1 -1 
Croatia Daria (Celebrate) DNQ DNQ 43 -2 0 -1 -3 
Serbia Nina (Čaroban) 85 14 43 -2 0 -2 -4 
2012 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Maya Sar (Korake ti znam) 55 18 42 1 0 0 1 
Croatia Nina Badrić (Nebo) DNQ DNQ 42 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro Rambo Amadeus (Euro Neuro) DNQ DNQ 42 0 0 0 0 
Serbia Željko Joksimović (Nije ljubav stvar) 214 3 42 1 0 1 2 
2013 
Croatia Klapa s Mora (Mižerja) DNQ DNQ 42 1 1 1 3 
Montenegro Who See (Igranka) DNQ DNQ 42 -2 0 -1 -3 
Serbia Moje 3 (Ljubav je svuda) DNQ DNQ 42 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix E: 
The three-finger gesture 
 
 
 
Marija Šerifović, the representative of Serbia and Eurovision winner of 2007, making the three-
finger gesture as the receives the highest points from Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/bs/7/73/Evrovizija_2007_srbija2.jpg.  
Last accessed October 1, 2014. 
